OFFICIAL SENSITIVE SUFFOLK GENERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN



SUFFOLK GENERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

In an emergency go straight to Section 1 – Response, page.....

Considerations:

- Initial coordination with core responders (virtual or teleconference) to be held within 40 minutes of the incident to develop shared situational awareness.
- Decision on the level of coordination & activation.
- First full meeting of the agreed level of coordination to be held within 90 minutes of an incident occurring.

Lead Organisation:	Suffolk Constabulary & Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of SRF	
Last Review:		
Next Review:		
Issue:	4.0	

GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 2016/679 AND DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018

This plan does not include personal, sensitive, or special category data as defined under the General Data Protection Regulations. It does include data/information relevant to achieve planning arrangements and identifies how more specific personal data will be used during any emergency.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000

This document will be made publicly available through the SRF website. Where content has been redacted under the freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) in the publicly available version, the paragraph number will be highlighted to show there has been a redaction and the relevant section of FOI referenced.

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS 2004 (IF REQUIRED)

This plan presumes disclosure of all environmental information, under Environment Information Regulations.

Where exemptions are claimed under Environment Information Regulation 12 (5)a, this will only be where one of the responder agencies has judged that the information may adversely affect either international relations, defence, national security, or public safety. Where such content has been identified, the paragraph number will be highlighted, and the paragraph text removed from public versions of the plan.

REVIEW

This plan will be reviewed by Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of the Suffolk Resilience Forum at least every 3 years. Earlier reviews will take place if there is a change in working practices, legislation or best practice is identified during local incidents/exercises or nationally.

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DISTRIBUTION

Agency	Contact
Animal and Plant Health Agency	
MHCLG	Resilience Emergencies Division (RED)
DES&NZ	Nuclear Emergency Planning
Maritima & Caastauard Aganay	National Maritime Operations Centre
Maritime & Coastguard Agency	Humber Coastguard Operations Centre
National Highways	
Met Office	
National Grid - Gas	
National Grid - Electricity	
BT	Emergency Planning
Network Rail	Security & Emergency Planning
Civil Nuclear Constabulary	Contingency Planning
EDF (Sizewell B & C)	Existing Nuclear Emergency Planning
Magnox Ltd	Emergency Preparedness
NHS England & NHS Improvements East	East Emergency Preparedness
Office for Nuclear Regulation	Emergency Preparedness
USAFE (UK) – RAF Mildenhall	
HQ Centre	Joint Regional Liaison Officer East
HQ Air Command	RAF Regional Liaison Officer, East of England
Cadent	
Anglian Water	Emergency Plans
Essex & Suffolk Water	Emergency Plans
UKPN	Emergency Planning Manager
Greater Anglia	Emergency Planning, Security & Fire Coordinator
LUZ Lla altha Canavaita Annanav	RCE Hazards Directorate
UK Health Security Agency	East of England Health Protection Team
East of England Ambulance Service NHS	
Trust	Emergency Planning
Suffolk Constabulary	Emergency Planning
Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service	Resilience Team
Suffolk & NE Essex Integrated Care Board	Emergency Preparedness, Resilience & Response
Norfolk & Waveney Integrated Care Board	Emergency Preparedness, Resilience & Response
Suffolk Local Authorities	Via Joint Emergency Planning Unit
ABP Ipswich	
ABP Lowestoft	
Hutchison Ports Felixstowe	
Harwich Haven Authority	
Norfolk Resilience Forum	
Essex Resilience Forum	
Cambridgeshire Resilience Forum	

AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment	Date	Amended	Summary
		by	

Introduction

<u>Background.</u> This plan provides details of how Suffolk will generically respond to major incidents or emergencies. This is the overarching plan for dealing with hazards and threats identified by the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF).

In the event, that there is an incident where there is no site or hazard specific plan, this document will be utilised to provide guidance on the management of the situation.

Aim. The aims of this plan are to:

- a. Provide a consolidated reference point for how Suffolk will respond to emergencies.
- b. To act as a signpost for more detailed plans which explain response to specific hazards and threats or provide capability information.
- c. Outline the standing arrangements for warning and alerting.
- d. Detail the default arrangements for coordination at strategic, tactical, and operational levels of response to major incidents and emergencies.
- e. Outline the multi-agency emergency response communications network and related information management requirements.
- f. Provide generic operational roles and responsibilities of Suffolk Category 1 and 2 responders plus key supporting agencies in a major incident or emergency.

<u>SRF Emergency Plans</u> All SRF emergency plans are available on Resilience Direct, full version and on the Suffolk Resilience website (http://www.suffolkprepared.co.uk), in redacted version if appropriate. Hard copies are available at both the Strategic and Tactical Coordination Centres.

<u>Individual Agency Plans.</u> Each agency maintains detailed plans on their individual response and recovery activities that complement SRF plans. Further information on individual responder plans is available from each agency direct.

SECTION 1

RESPONSE

1. Introduction

- 1.1 Definitions of a Major Incident and an Emergency can be found at APPENDIX A.
- 1.2 Multi-agency/major incidents, generally fall into three categories:

Rising Tide.	Incidents with some warning, such as severe weather or flooding, allow time to prepare. In these instances, a Multi-Agency Meeting (MAM) will be held to share information and facilitate the discussion regarding potential activation of necessary levels of coordination structure as per Section 5 and APPENDIX F.		
Rapid Onset.	An incident that happens without any warning, such as an industrial accident, or serious road traffic collision, industrial action, where management of the response will usually start at the operational level led by the emergency services and be escalated through the tactical and strategic coordination levels as required, dependent on the development of the emergency/incident.		
	Has the potential to become a major		
	There are several risks that trigger a declaration and associated notification		
	deciaration and associated notification	Off-site nuclear emergency	
	Radiation Emergency Plan	declaration at Sizewell Power Stations.	
		External COMAH emergency	
	COMAH External Emergency	declaration, site locations are	
Pre-Determined.	Plans	referenced in APPENDIX B.	
	Pipelines	Level 4 response.	
	Suffolk Marine Pollution Emergency Response Plan	Tier 3 response	
	Severe Weather Response Plan	Amber/Red warnings issued	
	Severe vveatrier Response Plan	by the Met Office.	
	Flood plan	Severe flood warning.	
		Notification by central	
	National Power Outage	government or general	
		awareness.	
	Mass Casualty Incident	Notification by NHS	
		organisations.	
	Marine Mass Casualty Rescue Operation (Op Waypoint) See Appendix	Notification by the MCA	

2. Notification

2.1 Notification of an incident can be received in a number of ways; the following provides an overview:

Rising Tide	The triggers for the majority of these are included in the relevant hazard specific plans – See APPENDIX B.	
Rapid Onset	 Call to an emergency service control room by a member of the public. Call to an emergency service control room by an operator (site, transport etc) Notification from the initial responding agency. For SRF hazard specific plans – See APPENDIX B,	
Pre-Determined	The triggers for these are included in the relevant hazard specific plans – See APPENDIX B. They include the specific wording that the incident has offsite impacts, which will trigger the automatic Major Incident Declaration.	

ALL HAZARD/SITE SPECIFIC PLANS INCLUDE THE MULTI-AGENCY INFORMATION CASCADE REQUIREMENTS.

2.2 All information sharing for the notification of an incident will follow the **M/ETHANE** acronym, refer JESIP **APPENDIX C.**

It is the responsibility of the originating emergency response organisation to notify other Suffolk agencies of an 'incident' using the SRF Alerting Directory.

Any appropriately empowered emergency responder can request the convening of a virtual multi-agency meeting (MAM)/SCG via the SRF team (in hours), JEPU Duty Officer (out of hours) to review the risk associated with an incident and any Major Incident declaration that may be required.

It should be borne in mind, that in the initial stages, the information available may be minimal, decisions, agency notifications and actions should be undertaken on the information available at the time, accurate policy logging should be maintained should future justification of decisions be required.

3. Response Organisations – Roles & Responsibilities


3.1 Responding Agencies. Suffolk response to emergencies or major incidents (refer APPENDIX A) will normally start with agencies based in the County, however it may also involve regional or nationally based agencies (refer APPENDIX A) or mutual aid (Refer APPENDIX E) depending upon the scale and nature of the incident.

The generic roles and responsibilities of the core responding agencies are at **APPENDIX D**.

Any roles and responsibilities <u>specific</u> to a hazard will be included within the relevant SRF and single agency plans.

4. Response Escalation

4.1 The transition from routine, single agency incident management to multi-agency major incident management is shown graphically as follows:



4.2 **Multi -Agency Meeting (MAM)** - Unless there is an immediate or pre-determined Major Incident Declaration (Refer <u>APPENDIX B</u>), the management of the majority of incidents/emergencies will commence with a MAM.

The membership of this group will assess the situation based on the information available, utilising the M/ETHANE pneumonic and Joint Decision Model (JDM) (Refer <u>APPENDIX C</u>) and make a decision regarding any required Major Incident declaration, activate the response structure and decide whether this will be virtual or full face to face meetings.

Any Major Incident Declaration should be confirmed by the SCG at the first meeting.

5. Command, Control & Coordination

5.1 <u>Multi-Agency Response Framework</u>. Suffolk uses the statutory generic framework for managing emergency response and recovery.

This framework assists the integration of plans and procedures within and across geographical boundaries. It is based upon levels of incident management as per **APPENDIX F**.

5.2 Strategic Level

5.2.1 Location; Refer APPENDIX H.

Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCG's) can be virtual dependent upon the incident.

5.2.2 Core Functions.

Located in the StratCC. are:

- Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)
- Media Coordination Cell (MCC)
- Multi-agency Information Cell (MAIC)
- Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC, if required)
- Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

5.2.3 Resources and Procedures

Staff requirements and agreed operating procedures to support working in the StratCC .are contained in the Strategic Coordination Centre Guidance, Part 3.

5.2.4 Activation

The StratCC. will be activated by Suffolk Constabulary on declaration of a Major Incident. The StratCC. may also be used prior to a Major Incident during a 'Rising Tide' event on the direction of the SRF Executive.

5.2.5 Strategic Coordinating Group Role

- Take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency.
- Establish the policy and strategic framework, utilising the Joint Decision Model (<u>APPENDIX C</u>) within which lower tier command and coordinating groups will work.
- Anticipate and consider long term impacts that may arise.
- Cascade response strategy to the TCG.

5.2.6 Composition

The core SCG will comprise of executive representatives (as relevant to the incident) from:

- Suffolk Constabulary
- Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service
- East of England Ambulance Service
- County Council
- District or Borough Council (relevant to the location of the incident or where impacts are felt)
- Environment Agency
- NHS England
- UK Health Security Agency
- MCA (if appropriate)
- MHCLG Resilience & Emergencies Division
- Site operators (COMAH/Sizewell/Pipelines)
- Chair designate of the Recovery Coordinating Group
- Met Office (weather related or incidents with weather considerations)
- UK Military (if required) USAF Military (if required)
- Chair of STAC (if required)
- Office for Nuclear Regulation (nuclear emergency)

In addition, liaison officers from the **Category 2 responders** may be required. These will be listed in the SRF hazard or site-specific emergency plans or identified as pertinent to the situation.

5.2.7 SCG Meetings and Chair

Meetings, either virtual or physical occur when there is the likelihood of a full major incident response, or there has already been a declaration, and are chaired as follows:

• <u>Pre-Major Incident.</u> In recognition of the uncertainty in the initial stages of 'rising tide' incidents over the scale and impact of the event, a scaled down version of multi-agency management called 'Multi-Agency Assessment Meeting (MAM).'

This interim position is the progression from normal emergency response by the 'blue lights' agencies to full multi-agency major incident management structures.

This allows flexibility of response structures whilst clarity on escalation or impacts of the incident can be determined.

This will involve an initial SCG Teams meeting/teleconference at Executive level to determine ongoing coordination arrangements, in particular, where a major incident is **NOT** declared.

Where low level multi-agency response is agreed, a tactical coordination function, either at the predetermined TCG location, by Teams/teleconference or another agreed venue (**NB for a National Power Outage, the TCG will be co-located at the StratCC**) is likely and SCG Teams/teleconference meetings will continue to provide higher level coordination and information sharing.

The default Chair of the initial SCG Teams/teleconference would be the Chair or Vice Chair of the SRF. If the hazard suggests that a particular agency is best placed to chair, then this agency may be asked to take the lead.

- Major Incident. Once a declaration has been confirmed/made. The StratCC. Will
 be activated and the SCG established. a Suffolk Constabulary Chief Officer will
 often provide the Chair, unless another agency is pre-determined in an SRF
 emergency plan (Refer <u>APPENDIX B</u>) or more suitable to the nature of the
 incident.
- <u>Initial Situational Awareness Briefing</u>: This will be based on the initial M/ETHANE (Refer <u>APPENDIX C</u>) and will be provided by the Emergency Services in the majority of cases.
- Ongoing Situational Awareness: As the incident develops the Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC) will collate incoming information and provide a briefing at the commencement of each SCG meeting, this facilitates the membership in reporting by exception only and moving on to decision making and actions in a timely manner.

 <u>Decision Making:</u> The SCG does not have collective authority to issue executive orders. Each organisation retains its own responsibilities and exercises command and control of its own operations/resources.

The SCG, therefore, under the stewardship of the Chair relies upon a process of discussion and consensus to reach collective decisions. Further details on the SCG meeting, including the generic strategy and agenda is at APPENDIX G and in the SCG User Guide.

• <u>Supporting Functions</u>; The following cells are co-located in the SCG to provide relevant professional expertise and advice.

<u>Media Coordination:</u> Any major incident will attract widespread local, national, or even international media attention.

A cell comprised of partner agency communications representatives will be established at the StratCC. This facility will oversee the production and release of information to the public via electronic and written media.

Further information is available in the SRF Major Incident Communications Plan.

<u>Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC)</u>: The collation and assessment of information to support decision making is critical.

This cell will collate the agency reports from Resilience Direct, and information from other relevant sources to produce briefings and updates for the SCG.

They can also be tasked ascertaining specific information that the SCG require.

Further information is available in the SRF Multi-Agency Information Guidance.

<u>Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC):</u> When required, scientific and technical advice will be provided to the SCG in a coordinated manner via this cell.

The relevant expertise from a range of agencies, from local, regional, or national bodies is brought together to provide timely and co-ordinated scientific, technical, environmental, and public health advice to the Strategic Coordinating Group

The manner in which this will be established may vary:

- Suffolk Only Incident. A STAC may be physically situated at the StratCC.
- <u>Regional or National Incident</u>. The availability of relevant staff will become stretched, and advice may be provided through a regionally situated STAC with the local member maintaining contact via TEAMs or teleconference.

A national Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) may also be established to provide advice and guidance to central Government on long term consequences.

 <u>Nuclear Emergency Advice.</u> Specific arrangements exist in relation to incidents at the Sizewell power stations. The Office for Nuclear Regulation and Operator representatives will work with the STAC to provide necessary advice.

Further information is available in the **East of England STAC Plan**.

<u>Recovery Coordination Group</u> – The formation of this cell will be triggered automatically at the first meeting of the SCG.

This concurrent strategic function will be chaired by the Chief Executive or nominated executive representative of the Local Authority area in which the incident has occurred.

If more than two district areas are involved, this will be the Chief Executive or nominated representative of Suffolk County Council.

Once the response phase ends, the SCG will formally consider the hand over to recovery phase, a checklist of the criteria to be considered and a formal handover certificate can be found in **Annex A** of the **SRF Generic Recovery Plan**. At this point, the lead for coordination will be assumed by the Local Authority.

Further information is available in the **SRF Generic Recovery Plan**.

5.3 **Tactical Level**

5.3.1 Location: Refer APPENDIX H.

In some instances, the decision may be taken to run a virtual TCG.

5.3.2 Core Functions

Tactical Commanders/Liaison Officers from each of the responding agencies, including the Voluntary and Community Sector Coordinator if required, formulate that tactical plan and arrangements to deliver the strategic aims and objectives.

5.3.3 Resources and Procedures

Staff requirements and agreed operating procedures to support working in the TCG is normally provided by SFRS Support Staff and may be supported by other Category 1 agencies on occasion.

5.3.4 Activation

The TCG may be triggered as follows:

- Rising Tide (see <u>APPENDIX B</u>) On the direction of the SCG.
- On declaration of a major incident when the SCG is established.

Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service lead on the activation of the TCG, requests should be made via Fire Control.

5.3.5 Tactical Coordinating Group Role

- Develop and implement the Tactical Response plan, utilising the Joint Decision Model (APPENDIX C) to deliver the SCG strategy.
- Via relevant responder representatives, cascade operational actions and requirements to Operational Commanders/Emergency Control Centres.
- Ensure that Operational Commanders and other responders at the incident scene(s) have the means to deliver the coordinated response, by acting as a conduit for managing resources and consideration of issues that may arise E.G. vulnerable people and associated specialist resource requirements.
- Consider impacts of tactical activity on future recovery.
- Collate information on the implications of the emergency and upload relevant information via RD to ensure the continued development of the Common Operating Picture (COP)
- Escalate collective resource issues that require SCG decision making.
- Escalate information /intelligence received from Commanders/Emergency Control Centres that may impact on strategic response or recovery planning.

5.3.6 Composition

The core TCG will comprise of appropriate representatives from:

- Suffolk Constabulary
- Suffolk Fire & Rescue
- East of England Ambulance Service
- County Council
- District or Borough Council (relevant to the location of the incident or where impacts are felt)
- Environment Agency (may be via TEAM's/teleconference)
- NHS (Integrated Care Board)
- UK Health Security Agency
- Site Operators (COMAH/Sizewell/Pipelines)
- MCA (if required)
- UK military (if required) USAF Military (if required)
- Voluntary and Community sector coordination

In addition, liaison officers from the **Category 2 responders** may be required. These will be listed in the SRF hazard or site-specific emergency plans or identified as pertinent to the situation.

5.3.7 TCG Meetings & Chair

Meetings, either physical or virtually. These meetings will be Chaired as follows:

• <u>Pre- Major Incident.</u> During a 'rising tide' incident or significant public event that requires multi-agency coordination for safety purposes, a TCG may be established to provide a focal point for collective working.

In this instance, the Chair of the TCG will be agreed between responder agencies.

Major Incident

The Chair of the TCG will often be provided by Suffolk Constabulary unless another agency is pre-arranged in an SRF contingency plan (Refer APPENDIX B) or more appropriate to the incident.

 <u>Situational Awareness.</u> Coordination of information management will be via the MAIC at the Strat.CC, the TCG should ensure that they are kept informed of important updates throughout the course of the incident.

Further information is available in the SRF Multi-Agency Information Cell Guidance.

 <u>Decision Making:</u> The TCG does not have collective authority to issue directions. Each organisation retains its own responsibilities and exercises command and control of its own operations/resources by TCG representatives cascading their allocated agency actions to the pertinent Silver Command/Emergency Control Centre.

The TCG, therefore, under the stewardship of the Chair relies upon a process of discussion and consensus to reach collective decisions on the requirements of the multi-agency tactical plan and associated activity. (Refer JDM APPENDIX C)

- <u>Voluntary & Community Sector Coordination;</u> Suffolk County Council (Localities & Communities) will act as the focal point for voluntary organisations.
- 5.4 **Operational Level** (Including Silver Command/Emergency Control Centres)
- 5.4.1 On-Scene Location; Forward Control Point(s) established close to an incident scene or in the event of a wide area emergency relevant focal points for face-to-face management of the situation.
- 5.4.1.1 Single Agency Command & Control Location; As per individual agency emergency/contingency plans.

5.4.2 **Core Functions**

5.4.2.1 FCP/On-Scene

- In the development stage of an incident (sudden impact), the FCP is likely to make the initial assessment of requirements and potential escalation of issues and will provide information to facilitate decision making on the required management of an incident.
- Operational Commanders/Liaison Officers from each of the responding agencies, formulate the operational plans and actions to deliver the multiagency tactical plan at the scene(s) of the incident.
- Delivery of single agency tasks to fulfil the requirements of agreed plans (cordons, traffic management, rest centres etc)
- Provision of information/intelligence/issues to single agency Commanders/Emergency Control Centres that may impact the implementation of the current plan/ongoing planning processes including any resourcing issues.
- Ensuring relevant multi-agency activity is carried out and that JESIP principles are being applied.
- Ensure welfare of deployed staff.
- Reporting completion of tasks to single agency Silver command/Emergency Control Centres.

5.4.2.2 Single Agency Silver Command/Emergency Control Centres

- Command and control of agency resources and assets.
- Assessing the requirements of their agency to fulfil the tactical plan. Including any possible long-term shift change over requirements, this should also incorporate handover considerations for Silver Command/Emergency Control Centre staff.
- Provision of human resources.
- Provision of transport, accommodation, welfare requirements of the public (as per designated roles and responsibilities – <u>APPENDIX D</u>).
- Provision of transport, welfare, and personal protection equipment for staff.
- Briefing and deployment of agency assets to relevant scene locations (including information on any points of contact/liaison with partner agencies).
- Ensure actions are being completed and record when.
- Include updates in Agency Report submissions on Resilience Direct as required by the incident battle rhythm, to keep SCG & TCG informed.
- Seek information/intelligence that is required to assist in the ongoing response/recovery planning eg. Any further resources required, changes to the situation etc.
- Provide a link to TCG to update on progress of actions and provide information/intelligence updates received from staff at the scene(s) that may impact tactical or strategic planning.
- Maintain a welfare overview.

5.4.3 Activation

The operational level may be triggered as follows:

- Rising Tide (see <u>APPENDIX B</u>) Due to notification periods of a potential incident, this level can often be planned, and direction will be given by the TCG to Silver Commanders/ Emergency Control Centres re the required single agency 'on-scene(s)' deployments.
- Sudden Impact In this instance, the operational level/FCP is likely to be the
 first aspect of the coordination structure to be activated. On notification of an
 incident to an Emergency Services Control Room or an agency, officers/staff
 will be deployed to the scene to assess the situation and provide a M/ETHANE
 (See <u>APPENDIX C</u>) report to their command function to facilitate decision
 making on any potential escalation to a multi-agency/major incident.

If at this initial stage, more than one organisation is in attendance, compliance with JESIP (See APPENDIX C), in particular a joint dynamic risk assessment is critical.

5.4.4 FCP Meetings and Chair

The Commanders and agency representatives at the scene(s) of the incident will meet at either the pre-designated FCP location as indicated in the Emergency Plan (See <u>APPENDIX B</u>) if it is safe to do so, or, in instances where there is no specified location, or the designated FCP(s) is compromised, agencies will identify a location EG. a landmark or agency command vehicle, and will work through the JESIP cycle (See <u>APPENDIX C</u>) on a regular basis.

The Chair will be the most appropriate agency in relation to the incident.

Agency representatives will make regular updates to their Silver Command/ Emergency Control Centre to:

- Fulfil agency information requirements to be communicated to the TCG.
- Request further resources and capabilities.
- Confirm completion of tasks.
- Seek any further tasking.
- Advise of any welfare concerns including consideration of shift change if an incident becomes extended.

In some instances, a deadline may be set to fulfil the reporting requirements of the Battle rhythm set by the SCG.

5.5 Investigation, Inquests and Enquiries

5.5.1 Any major incident may be the subject of an investigation.

This will require evidence of the highest quality, and this can only be achieved if the scene is secured as soon as possible and anything that can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence is preserved and not damaged or moved unless it is for the purposes of saving life.

- 5.5.2 A number of different agencies may conduct an investigation and attend the incident scene. For example.
 - Aviation Accident Investigation Branch
 - Environment Agency
 - · Fire Investigation
 - Health & Safety Executive
 - HM Coroner
 - Marine Accident Investigation Branch
 - Office for Nuclear Regulation
 - Office of the Rail & Road Regulator
 - Police
 - Rail Accident Investigation Branch

- 5.5.3 Incidents may become subject to public inquests or inquiries; it is therefore imperative that accurate records of decision making are kept at all levels of response. This should include why some options for actions have been discounted.
- 5.6 Regional and National Crisis Management Structures
- 5.6.1 **Cross Border Incidents**. There are a number of risks that may have impacts or consequences across neighbouring or multiple Counties, for example:
 - Severe weather
 - Flooding
 - Power outage
 - Hazmat plumes or contaminants
 - Infectious outbreaks (human, animal, or plant)
 - Loss of utility infrastructure

- Maritime
- Cyber attack
- Terrorist attack
- Shortage or loss of fuel
- Transport (traffic collisions, rail, shipping, or aviation)

In such situations it is preferable that the SCG seeks to align its response strategy with neighbouring SCG's and that battle rhythm timings are staggered, to facilitate attendance of agencies that need to be represented at more than one SCG/TCG.

Dependent on the situation and the urgency for such a decision, the following options (or a combination of) may be utilized to agree such an alignment.

- A discussion between the relevant SCG Chairs.
- A discussion between the relevant Police Chief Officers (terrorism).
- A discussion between Coroners.
- The SCG's of the impacted Counties will undertake a 'fast time' analysis of the factors below from a local perspective and form a consensus. Consultation may be required with other parties as indicated. The JDM (refer APPENDIX C) will be useful in this process.

Areas for consideration:

- In which County did the incident occur? This may not always be pertinent or evident, however, there are factors that could provide a basis for example:
 - Which location has suffered the most impact.
 - Where the majority of casualties/fatalities are sited.
 - The registered address of any operator/polluter.
 - Aviation/Rail incident the location of the main wreckage.
 - Shipping incident the departure or intended destination port.
- Initial Attendance. In the instance that the prevalence of initial resources deployed are from one LRF area, it may be beneficial to allow them to retain the primacy.

- Any investigative jurisdiction. There may be a number of investigative aspects as follows:
 - Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)
 - Incident specific (AAIB, RAIB, MAIB, HSE, ONR etc)
 - Corporate manslaughter

If relevant, incident specific investigators may need to be consulted.

- Coroners Jurisdiction. This may be based on:
 - The County in which the incident occurred.
 - Immediate accessibility of mortuary provision before escalation to any additional arrangements.

If relevant Coroners will need to be involved in decision making.

- Existing Memoranda of Understanding or Protocols between Emergency Services and Agencies. Such as:
 - Access to specialist resources EG. marine unit.
 - Easiest access to the scene EG. inbound or outbound carriageway for a major road traffic collision.
 - Pre-determined attendance in bordering areas EG. Newmarket Race Course, SFRS response to Firmin Coates COMAH site in Cambridgeshire.
 - Local Government Department/MHCLG RED considerations.

The indicators/options above are not exhaustive and other methods may be more suitable at the time of any plan activation. Any incidents of this nature will require timely and accurate communications and information sharing processes, this will be facilitated as follows:

- Standard information sharing protocols between Emergency Services Control Rooms in the initial stages.
- Deployment of Liaison Officers to the neighbouring SCG & TCG. This would usually done virtually.
- Use of Resilience Direct.
- Use of MS Teams to join relevant meetings.

In the event that there is a change in the lead SCG and responsibility for development of the strategy, a formal handover will take place, and this will be documented in the policy log.

5.7 **National Crisis Management** Structures. In some instances, the nature or severity of an incident may necessitate the involvement of central government tier of emergency management. This will be facilitated by the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) or in some instances the Lead Government Department.

- 5.7.1 **Reporting**. It is probable that during a major incident, information may be required at national level to facilitate wider communications, planning, and support activities. Reporting can take two forms:
 - Single agency to relevant Government department EG. Police reporting through NPCC to Home Office.
 - Multi-Agency–SCG reporting to COBR via the MHCLG RED representative.

The standard SITREP can be found in the <u>SRF Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC)</u> <u>Guidance.</u>

FOR TERRORISM RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS REFER APPENDIX I

FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE REFER <u>APPENDIX J</u> (this includes information on consideration of vulnerable people and psychosocial care)

FOR OUTLINE MASS CASUALTY MANAGEMENT SEE APPENDIX L

FOR OUTLINE RESILIENT TELECOMMUNICATONS RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS SEE APPENDIX M

FOR OUTLINE CYBER RESILIENCE RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS SEE APPENDIX N

6. Public Information

- 6.1 During the different phases of an emergency, media and press will be used to distribute information, advice and contact details as part of the coordinated communications approach managed by the Media Coordination Cell.
- 6.2 Government Emergency Alerts can be used to support public messaging during a Major Incident where there is an imminent and severe threat to life, and where the public need to take action.

The Cabinet Office uses cell broadcast technology to transmit messages to mobile phones that are connected to masts within a defined geographic area.

Recipients are alerted to the incident by a klaxon-like sound and vibration from their handset and a message that appears on the home screen. All Emergency Alert messages will be shared on Gov.uk/Alerts to allow the public to validate the Alert, confirm what action is required or to view links and telephone numbers that have been shared to facilitate access to more information.

SCG: decision to send an alert SCG: Alert preparation SCG Comms Cell prepares the While the message Have all the thresholds been met: SCG Comms Cell is being drafted, SCG Chair alert, including the following: Is there a risk to life? Y/N confirms the SCG Issuing Authority Major incident Is the incident in an area that can be defined? Y/N alert to COBR Unit Secretariat Watchkeepers at decision to informs the COBR Subject Is there urgency? Y/N
Do the public need to take a nss.watchkeeper1 Unit Watchkeepers on 0203 793 1859 Action the public must take @cabinetoffice.gov alert Specific location specific action? Y/N Direction to further info to expect an alert **COBR Unit: Authorisation** SCG: Alert follow-up Alert release SCG confirms Emergency alert is SCG confirms with If the alert is authorisation is gained if there **Duty Director** Watchkeeper inputs the released via mobile that the alert COBR Unit being updated, this logs into Notify network operators and Watchkeepers when has been to review and are more than 1 alert into out to handsets in the received on the the alert should be Notify defined area ground updated/terminated begins again recipients

To process to request an Emergency Alert from the Cabinet Office is as follows:

The SCG should regularly review the Emergency Alert message to ensure that it remains valid and relevant.

During this process, DLUHC (RED) Op Centre provides situational updates to Cabinet Office

The content of the Alert can be modified, and or cancelled (all-clear issued) when the risk to life has been rescinded.

Following the transmission of any Emergency Alert, the SRF will be expected to contribute to the review of the Alert's reach and effectiveness, plus whether there were any unintended consequences.

Further information can be found in the **SRF Major Incident Communications Plan**.

7. Telecommunications

and OGDs, as appropriate

7.1 <u>Airwave</u> is a digital radio system with built-in encryption for security. Talk groups can be enabled locally, regionally, or nationally to allow responders to communicate with each other and their Control Rooms.

In addition to the Emergency Services, the military also use Airwave to allow them to integrate with the emergency response communication network.

7.2. Other Communications. Fixed and mobile telephones and MS Teams are used to conduct day to day communications, and this would continue during an emergency.

To prevent overloading telephony infrastructure, use is made of discrete telephone numbers (fixed lines) and if necessary, the Mobile Privileged Access Telephone Scheme (MTPAS) (mobile network). The latter system is a government authorised scheme facilitating major mobile phone companies to prioritise calls on predesignated numbers to improve connection between emergency responders.

7.3 Resilient Satellite Network (RSN). This is a high-quality digital voice system. It provides a resilient and secure voice network playing a critical role in enabling uninterrupted communications at Official-Sensitive level in the event of failure of other communications infrastructure. It can maintain contact between regional and national levels for incident management and coordination.

Its main purpose is to facilitate emergency responders remaining in contact with central government and each other until normal communications have been restored.

The RSN for Suffolk is located in the Strat.CC.

- 7.4 <u>External Support</u>. During a major incident, responding agencies can call upon the following for support.
- 7.4.1 <u>British Telecom (BT)</u> Provision of additional equipment and connectivity e.g. mobile phones, pay phone trailers at Rest Centres.

This is available 24/7 through the National BT Control Room – **Refer SRF Alerting Directory**.

7.4.2 <u>RAYNET</u> – Is a nationwide voluntary group of qualified radio amateurs who are able to provide emergency radio communications for emergency services and local authorities.

They can provide specialist VHF/UHF assistance across the County.

In addition to voice communication, they can offer data links and professional mobile radio (PMR) repeaters and Wi-Fi links, these services would require some pre-planning in support of events.

8. Incident Funding

8.1 Agencies are advised to capture all costs related to the response. Information on recovering costs post emergency is covered in the relevant legislation/guidance such as the Bellwin Scheme.

Funding should not be a constraint on providing emergency response, especially where there is risk to life.

9. Stand Down

9.1 All agencies involved in the command, control and coordination of an emergency should be consulted before a decision is made to stand down the response phase of an incident.

This may not be possible until public confidence has been restored to the affected areas.

The decision to stand down a formal emergency response and to hand over ongoing activity to either a formal recovery or business as usual stance, will be taken at the strategic level.

10. Debriefing

10.1 Refer <u>SRF Protocol for Training and Exercise Management</u>. The same College of Policing debriefing process is used for both incidents and exercises.

SECTION 2

RECOVERY

11. Recovery Definition

11.1 The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency (Emergency Response & Recovery Guidance, HM Government) and is an integral part of incident management.

For full details refer the <u>SRF Generic Recovery Plan</u> available on suffolkprepared.co.uk and Resilience Direct.

PART 3

INFORMATION, CONTINGENCY PLANNING & PREPAREDNESS

12. Background Information

12.1 <u>Resilience Framework</u>. The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA 2004) and associated guidance sets out the framework for national, regional and local resilience to promote emergency preparedness through regular cooperation and information sharing.

The <u>UK Government Resilience Framework 2022</u> states:

'We live in an increasingly volatile world, defined by geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts, rapid technological change and a changing climate.

This context means that crises will have far reaching consequences and are likely to be greater in frequency and scale in the next decade than we have been used to. We have a responsibility to prepare for the future.

This challenge is not unique to the UK but faced by countries around the world. However, we must act now to bolster the UK's resilience and ensure we have plans to prepare and mitigate a wide range of risks when they arise on our shores, ensuring that we can face the future with confidence.

The framework is the first articulation of how the UK Government will deliver on a new strategic approach to resilience. It is based on three core principles:

- A developed and shared **understanding of the civil contingencies risks** we face is fundamental.
- Prevention rather than cure wherever possible: a greater emphasis on preparation and prevention; and
- Resilience is a 'whole of society' endeavour, so we must be more transparent and empower everyone to make a contribution.

A strong resilience system – including UK Government departments, devolved administrations, **local authorities, emergency services and the private and voluntary and community sectors** – is more important than ever.'

The principal mechanism for routine cooperation in the County is the **Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF).** This is comprised of representatives from Category 1 responders with an open invitation to Category 2 responders. Other parties such as voluntary and community groups are included in the SRF structure and are routinely involved in relevant aspects of preparedness and planning.

12.2 <u>Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF)</u> – Is a partnership mechanism by which local responders routinely cooperate to discharge their duties under the **Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 2004)**.


It is not a statutory body, nor does it have powers to direct its members; however, it is the agreed forum that coordinates multi-agency emergency preparedness, including:

- Risk assessment.
- Contingency planning.
- Training & exercising.

We seek to enhance preparedness for emergencies utilising the principles of integrated emergency management by:

- Preparation of plans for Very High and High risks identified in the Suffolk Community Risk Register. This is in addition to statutory requirements for preparedness under legislation pre-existing the CCA such as:
 - Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)2015 Regulations (originally published 1999)
 - Radiation Emergency Preparedness & Public Information Regulations (REPPIR) 2019 (originally published 2001)
 - Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996
- Embedding emergency preparedness activity within each responding organisations business arrangements.
- Maintaining appropriately trained and equipped people to respond and recover from incidents
- Exercising/training together at regular intervals to validate arrangements.
- Maintaining flexible arrangements and capabilities to ensure response and recovery can be provided and adapted to suit any situation.

12.3 <u>SRF Organisation</u>. The executive leadership of the forum is as follows:



12.4 <u>Risk Assessment</u>. A <u>Community Risk Register</u> containing assessments for potential natural and man-made risks to Suffolk is maintained. These are devolved from the National Security Risk Assessment.

All local/regional responders relevant to a risk are involved in the rolling review of this document and contingency planning arrangements are developed to mitigate the impact and consequences of hazards and threats identified as VERY HIGH and HIGH.

12.5 <u>SRF Plans.</u> Emergency plans for key risks are maintained, and these documents represent the agreed basis for multi-agency response.

These plans are overarched by this document and the Generic Recovery Plan and provide more focused emergency arrangements relating to specific hazards.

In addition, plans are also maintained to meet the statutory requirements mentioned at 12.2.

Published plans can be found on Resilience Direct, redacted versions for access by the public are found at suffolkprepared.co.uk.

The plan structure can be found at **APPENDIX B**.

- 12.6 <u>Public Information</u> On natural and manmade risks within the County, emergency arrangements and advice to communities and businesses on what to do prior to and during an incident is published on:
 - Suffolkprepared.co.uk
 - Gov.uk/prepare
- 12.7 <u>Business Continuity.</u> This is an internal organisational process the helps manage risks to the running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring continuity of **CRITICAL** functions in the event of a disruption, and any effective recovery from an incident.

All Category 1 responders have a statutory duty to maintain such arrangements.

As risks driving business continuity are often the same as those which drive emergency planning, it is important that close links are maintained between both types of preparedness arrangements.

These links should be maintained by relevant staff within each organisation.

13. Training & Exercising

13.1 The Training & Exercise Protocol provides the mechanism, process, timescales and documentation that are used to develop and debrief exercises.

Arrangements should be tested:

- When plans/procedures are first established.
- After a major review, post exercise/incident.
- To reinforce any training that has been delivered.

The aim is to exercise contingency arrangements for VERY HIGH or HIGH risks every 3 years, this is designated SUFFEX.

- 13.2 In addition, statutory demonstrations of emergency arrangements for Sizewell (REPPIR 2019) and COMAH (2015) sites in compliance with regulations are conducted every 3 years.
- 13.3 The SRF will give consideration to participation in exercises when requested in:
 - National exercising programmes
 - Exercises to support partner agencies such as the military.
- 13.4 Prior to any exercise, further training of responders and supporting staff may take place either by individual agencies, or by the SRF, to ensure people can conduct the required role and that organisations are able to operate collectively.

Definitions of Major Incidents & Emergencies

Major Incident

An event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.

This definition is amplified by the following notes:

- a. 'Emergency responder agencies' describes all Category one, and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.
- b. A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment, or national security.
- c. A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.
- d. The severity of consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.
- e. The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers.

Emergency

The CCA 2004 defines an emergency as either:

- An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, OR
- An event or situation that threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK, OR
- c. War or terrorism that threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. CCA 2004 allows for special provisions for emergency situations through the use of Emergency Powers

The CCA 2004 allows for special provisions for emergency situations by the use of Emergency Powers.

Plans & Notification Arrangements

The generic structure for the use of SRF emergency plans is as follows:

Suffolk Generic Emergency Response
Plan

Suffolk Generic Emergency Recovery Plan

Supporting/Capability
Plans

Individual Agency Response Plans and Operational Procedures

Incident Response
(including Suffolk Community Resilience where in place)

APPENDIX B

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Triggers/activation for these plans are as follows:

Site Specific	Anticipated Multi-Agency/Major Incident Category	Notification/Activation
Control of Major Accident Hazards 2015 (COMAH) Sites Calor Gas, Saxham International Flavours & Fragrances, Haverhill PPG, Stowmarket Treatt PLC, Bury St Edmunds Radiation Emergency Preparedness & Public Information 2019 (REPPIR) Sites Radiation Emergency, Sizewell B & C & civil radiation material in transit, Defence nuclear material in transit RAF Lakenheath RAF Mildenhall	Pre-Determined Major Incident for Offsite notifications/Defence Nuclear Material transport emergency.	'Offsite Emergency' declaration by the operator or first responder on arrival. 'Offsite Nuclear Emergency' declaration by site (Sizewell sites) RAF Commander/RAFRLO
<u>Others</u>		
Op Stack, closure of Port of Felixstowe (MOU)	Rising Tide	E mail from Port Police

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Hazard/Incident Specific	Anticipated Multi- Agency/Major Incident Category	Notification/Activation
Animal Diseases	Rising Tide	Advisory from APHA/Trading Standards
Flooding	Rising Tide	Environment Agency Flood Warning & Advisory ServicesFlood Forecasting Centre
Fuel		Local activity/informationAdvisory from DESNZ
Marine Pollution		Maritime & Coastguard Agency Pollution Report
Marine Mass Casualty Rescue Operation (Op Waypoint) See Appendix	Rapid Onset	Notification by Maritime & Coastguard Agency
National Power Outage		Notification by central government or general awareness.
Pandemic	Rising Tide	Advisory from UKHSA
Pipelines	Rapid Onset	Alert from a member of the public.Alert from the operator.
Severe Weather	Rising Tide	Met Office National Severe Weather WarningFlood Forecasting Centre
Radiation (also used for non-Sizewell radiation incidents under the REPPIR regulations)	Rapid Onset	Notification by transport operator/MOD
Mass Casualty Incident	Rapid Onset	Notification by NHS Organisations

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Support/Capability		
Communication (Media)		
Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC) (Maintained by UKHSA)		
Guide to Evacuation & Shelter		
Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area (MASHA)		
Mass Fatalities		
Humanitarian Assistance		
Strategic Coordination Centre Guide		
Tactical Coordination Centre Guide		
Multi-Agency Information Cell		
Mass Casualties – Plan archived – Refer Appendix M of this document		
Resilient Telecommunications & ICT - Plan Archived – Refer AppendixOf this document		
Vulnerable People Data Sharing Guidance		
Management of spontaneous volunteers		
Voluntary, Community Sector Emergency Planning (VCSEP)		
Recovery		
Individual Agency Response Plans and Operational Procedures		
Refer to your agency Emergency Planning team.		

All Suffolk Resilience plans are available via Resilience Direct and are published for accessibility by the public on the Suffolk Prepared website – suffolkprepared.co.uk.

APPENDIX C

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Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)

<u>M/ETHANE</u> – Information Sharing

M	MAJOR INCIDENT	Has a major incident been declared? (Yes/No – If 'No', then complete	Include the date and time of any declaration.
		ETHANE message)	
E	EXACT LOCATION	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?	Be as precise as possible, using a system that will be understood by all responders.
			\ <u> </u>
T	TYPE OF INCIDENT	What kind of incident is it?	For example, flooding, fire, utility failure or disease outbreak.
			V
Н	HAZARDS	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	Consider the likelihood of a hazard and the potential severity of any impact.
			V
A	ACCESS	What are the best routes for access and egress?	Include information on inaccessible routes and rendezvous points {RVPs}. Remember that services need to be able to leave the scene as well as access it.
			V
N	NUMBER OF Casualties	How many casualties are there, and what condition are they in?	Use an agreed classification system such as PI; P2; P3 and dead.
			V
E	EMERGENCY SERVICES	Which, and how many, emergency responder assets and personnel are required or are already on-scene?	Consider whether the assets of wider emergency responders, such as local authorities or the voluntary sector, may be required.

JESIP Doctrine

CO-LOCATE

Co-locate with other responders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location.

COMMUNICATE

Communicate using language which is clear, and free from technical jargon and abbreviations.

CO-ORDINATE

Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead organisation. Identify priorities, resources, capabilities and limitations for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

JOINTLY UNDERSTAND RISK

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards, to agree appropriate control measures.

SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Establish shared situational awareness by using M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

<u>Decision Making</u> – Joint Decision-Making Model



Further information on JESIP can be found on the website http://www.jesip.org.uk.

Agency Roles & Responsibilities

Generic Roles & Responsibilities of all Agencies

- Utilise JESIP mechanisms in managing the coordination of response and recovery activities.
- Represent their organisation at relevant coordination structures (SCG, TCG, FCP, STAC etc)
- Support identification of vulnerable persons
- Support generation of situational awareness
- Support multi-agency coordination.
- Provide consistent public information before, during and after an incident.
- Maintenance of accurate policy/decision logs.
- Debriefing and implementing lessons identified.
- Contribution to recovery discussions and activities.

Single Agency Generic Roles & Responsibilities

a. Suffolk Constabulary

- The priority is the saving and protection of life, but as far as possible, preservation of the scene to safeguard evidence for subsequent enquiries or criminal proceedings.
- In most circumstances, coordinate the activities of those responding at and around the scene of a 'rapid onset' emergency.
- In conjunction with other emergency services, control access to the incident location through maintenance of cordons at appropriate distances.
- In conjunction with other emergency services, coordinate search activities for survivors and casualties in the immediate vicinity of a disaster scene, where necessary using support from the Armed Forces, or volunteers.
- Process casualty information and take responsibility for identifying and arranging the removal of fatalities on behalf of HM Coroner.
- Oversee criminal investigations and facilitate enquiries carried out by responsible accident bodies (Health & Safety Executive, Office of Nuclear Regulation, Air, Rail or Marine Accident Investigation Branches)
- Once lifesaving is complete, incident scene will be preserved as a crime scene
 until confirmed otherwise (unless the emergency has no element of human
 culpability e.g. sever weather or other natural phenomena).
- Assume overall control of terrorist related incidents at the scene, including additional measures to restrict access or to evacuate people.
- Family liaison
- Prevention of crime
- Facilitate access to national resources e.g. DVI, Casualty Bureau etc.

b. Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service

- Rescue trapped persons, save life, and protect property.
- Prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires.
- Manage issues associated with released hazardous materials and/or contaminants to remove/reduce public and emergency responder safety issues, including establishing inner/outer cordons and implementation of appropriate measures to mitigate against environmental damage.
- Assist agencies with salvage activities provided for life safety (including the removal of large quantities of water) where the capability exists with due regard for existing policy.
- Assist Ambulance Services with casualty handling where joint dynamic risk assessment identifies the need.
- Assist the police with the recovery of bodies in accordance with agreed MOU or joint dynamic risk assessment.
- Maintain and manage inner cordon gateways (with the exception of confirmed terrorist incidents)
- In consultation with the Ambulance Service, undertake mass decontamination of general public post (CBRN, Hazmat / Radiation etc)
- Facilitate access to specialist national resources, e.g. Tactical Advisors, High Volume Pumping, Urban Search and Rescue, Underwater Search and Recovery and Fire Special Operations Teams.

c. East of England Ambulance NHS Trust

- The medical assessment of the emergency.
- Coordinate the on-site NHS response including provision of MERIT and Medical Advisors (MAs),
- Identify and activate the resources needed to respond.
- Provision of specialist resources e.g. SORT, HART, tactical advice.
- Manage the NHS activities at the scene.
- Coordinate and manage the NHS communications on scene.
- Triage, decontaminate, stabilise, and administer initial treatment and assist with extrication of casualties.
- Transport casualties to hospital.
- Protect the health and safety of all NHS personnel on site.

The Ambulance Service has specific responsibilities to the NHS and other agencies when responding to civil emergencies.

 Immediately notify police and fire control centres of the exact location and nature of the emergency incident, including identification of specific hazards eg. chemical, biological, radiation or other known hazards (M/ETHANE – Refer APPENDIX C).

- Alert the appropriate receiving hospital(s) based on the circumstances and information received.
- Alert neighbouring ambulance services based on the circumstances and information received.
- Alert affected NHS Trusts and UK Health Security Agency based on the circumstances and information received.
- Offer effective support to neighbouring/associated agencies that are substantially affected by a major incident and return, rely on such mutual support as is needed/requested.
- d. <u>Suffolk Local Authorities</u> (Suffolk County Council, Babergh & Mid Suffolk District Council, East Suffolk Council, Ipswich Borough Council & West Suffolk Council)
 - Provide emergency/post incident highways management to support the emergency services on the SCC road network (County Council).
 - Provide Rest Centres for displaced people (District & Borough Councils).
 - Liaise with HM Coroner to confirm Emergency Mortuary & staff support requirements (County Council).
 - Provide access to local authority owned facilities to assist with the support to the emergency services e.g. catering, toilets or rest rooms (County or District & Borough Councils)
 - Collect waste (District or Borough Councils)
 - Manage disposal of waste (County Council)
 - Provide a link with non-emergency agencies and bodies e.g. Local Enterprise Partnerships, building proprietors and landowners. (County or District & Borough Councils).
 - Provide a focus for the coordination of voluntary organisations support (County Council).
 - Provide a range of immediate and long-term welfare support to those affected, through Emergency Receptions Centres. (County and District & Borough Councils).
 - Provide long-term support for communities e.g. anniversaries and memorials. (County and District & Borough Councils).

e. Director of Public Health

- In conjunction with UHKSA, provide public protection advice and information.
- Support public health Incident Management/Outbreak Control Teams (IMT/OCT).

f. HM Coroner

- Establishing the identity of fatalities.
- Determine the cause and circumstances of death.

g. Port Health Authorities (East Suffolk Port Health Authority)

• Responsible for infectious disease control, environmental protection, imported food control and hygiene on vessels.

h. NHS England

- Lead and coordinate the NHS response in conjunction with the local Integrated Care Board (ICB) including mobilisation of NHS resources.
- Ensure continuity of local health care services to those affected and unaffected.
- Provide a communication and reporting link to the Department of Health and Social Care.
- Coordinate health support to Local Authority Humanitarian Assistance in conjunction with ICB's.
- Coordinate health response across a wide geographical area.

i. <u>UK Health Security Agency</u>

- Provide leadership for public health incidents.
- Provide risk analysis and assessment of emerging diseases, natural extreme events, chemical, radiological, and Chemical, Biological, Nuclear (CBRN) threats.
- Provide advice and information to protect the public.
- In conjunction with response partners, confirm the resources needed to provide relevant public protection measures.
- Ensure provision of high quality and timely public health data.
- Provide guidance to professionals in health, local government, and other sectors.

j. Environment Agency

- Prevent and minimise the environmental impact of the incident.
- Investigate the cause of the incident and consider enforcement action.
- Seek remediation, clean up or restoration of the environment.
- For Flooding Issue flood warnings and operate their flood defence assets to protect communities at risk.
- For Pollution Seek to prevent/control and monitor the input of pollutants to the environment.
- Other Emergencies Regulate and provide advice and support on waste disposal and environmental issues.
- Provide a communication and reporting link to DEFRA.

k. Maritime & Coastguard Agency

- Initiate and coordinate civil maritime search and rescue. This includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, in danger on cliffs, shoreline or in certain inland areas.
- Dealing with pollution at sea and assisting local authorities with shoreline clean up.
- Support emergency services and local authorities during emergencies e.g. flooding.

I. Harbour (Ports Authority)

The Harbour (Ports) Authorities in Suffolk are Associated British Ports (ABP) Ipswich, ABP Lowestoft and Port of Felixstowe.

They are responsible for planning for emergencies that may affect operations in the port or harbour area.

They will contribute to SRF response arrangements, e.g. provision of vessels, specialist knowledge or accommodation such as victim audit areas.

m. Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA)

- Prevent, control and where feasible, eradicate notifiable diseases.
- Prevent notifiable animal diseases form entering the human food chain and endangering public health, the economy and rural community.
- Ensure the safe disposal of products of animal origin intended for human consumption.

n. National Highways

- Assist police with general management and clearance of traffic incidents (A11/A14/A12 South, Copdock to Stratford St Mary, A47 – Lowestoft to Blundeston) including diversions.
- Provide coordinated traffic information to support the public awareness of traffic incidents.
- Liaison with Suffolk Highways authority.

o. <u>Utilities</u>

Cadent (gas), UK Power Networks (electricity), Anglian/Essex & Suffolk Water and British Telecom (lead telecommunications) provide key utility services within Suffolk and will during emergencies:

- · Work to reinstate mains supply.
- Assist in the identification of vulnerable people.
- Provide temporary measures until mains supply can be reinstated.

There are established sector-specific arrangements for emergency response and companies will work closely with emergency services and local authorities during the response and recovery phases.

p. Resilience & Emergencies Division (RED), Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)

In the event of an emergency, RED will immediately take steps to ensure that they can provide support to the local response, where necessary and as appropriate.

This could involve any, or all of the actions below, depending upon the nature of the incident.

- Establishing whether Strategic Co-ordinating Groups have been set up, or are on standby, then maintaining immediate lines of communication with them, including identifying whether there are likely to be issues arising or capability gaps emerging which may require central Government support or input.
- Deploying a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) once an SCG has been established unless alternative arrangements have been agreed.

In some cases, such as terrorism of nuclear emergency, the Lead Government Department (LGD) may deploy the GLO and RED as a Consequence Management Liaison Officer, as part of a multi-disciplinary Government Liaison Team (GLT)

- Ensuring a Strategic Local Recognised Information Picture (or other incident specific, nationally agreed reporting template) is developed and maintained for each SCG established to support local response efforts and to contribute to the national appreciation of the situation.
- Where an incident affects a number of LRF/SCG areas or has the potential to do so, develop and maintain a multi-SCG Strategic Recognised Information Picture (or other incident specific, nationally agreed reporting template) to add value to the local and/or national response.

APPENDIX D

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 Establishing and maintaining immediate lines of communication with the LGD and the Cabinet Office.

As part of this process, agreeing the level and frequency of ongoing reporting requirements including providing the local or Multi SCG Strategic Recognised Information Picture (to be agreed on a case-by-case basis with the LGD and Cabinet Office in situations where COBR is activated) to feed into the national picture coordinated by COBR or the LGD as appropriate.

- Maintaining an Operations Centre (OpC) to provide a focal point for the collection and collation of information on the situation, a point of contact for local responders, and to engage as necessary, other bodies to provide the local or multi-SCG picture to local responders and Government as necessary.
- Working with partners to identify priorities and providing advice to COBR and LGD's to support national discussions on the deployment of scarce resources across the affected areas.
- Facilitating mutual aid arrangements between LRF's.
- Assisting local responders to deliver coordinated and coherent public messaging by sharing Government's lines to take.
- Being ready, on request to provide information to local MPs in affected constituencies.
- Whilst the SCG is still standing, providing incident situation reports and advice to brief the LGD and organising Ministerial or VIP visits in consultation with local partners.
- Enabling the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from MHCLG RED GLO's to LGS officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any Recovery Coordinating Group(s) and undertaking actions as detailed above in bullet points 1 to 6 in the recovery phase via e.g. deployment of Recovery Liaison Officers and establishment of appropriate OpC arrangements.

q. <u>UK Armed Forces</u>

The UK Armed Forces' national structure, organisation, skills, equipment, and training can be of benefit to civil authorities in supporting planning for and management of the response to and recovery from emergencies.

The Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangement governs this support.

Suffolk contingency plans do not rely upon the UK Armed Forces for support activity but would consider early in the response to every significant incident, whether there is, or may later be, a role for the armed forces, and have access to military advisors for information on the capabilities that may be available.

Requests for support are routed through the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) East at HQ 7th Infantry Brigade & HQ East. See section(Mutual Aid) for additional detail.

r. US Armed Forces

The US Visiting Forces (USVF) based in Suffolk, primarily at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath, are also configured with organisation, skills, equipment, and training that could be of benefit to civil authorities in managing the response to and recovery from emergencies.

US Department of Defense direction on provision of Foreign Disaster Relief by USVF, governs this potential support.

Requests are routed through USAF representatives (USAF/UK Chief, International Relations) or, in their absence, the RAFRLO-EE or the JRLO East at East at HQ 7th Infantry Brigade & HQ East.

Specific off-site Major Incident arrangements have been developed for RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath to guide UK/US emergency response activity (available on SRF Resilience Direct site).

s. Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (DNEO)

The MOD DNEO works in conjunction with the SRF, to provide an effective response to an accident or incident, including those arising as a result of terrorist acts, involving defence nuclear assets.

Specific guidance to responders is provided in the <u>Local Authority and Emergency</u> <u>Services Information (LAESI)</u> document.

t. Office for Nuclear Regulation

- Protecting persons against risks of harm arising from ionising radiations from UK nuclear sites.
- Protecting people from risks to health and safety from work activities on UK sites.
- Ensuring the security of civil nuclear premises.
- Protecting against risks relating to the civil transport of radioactive material in the UK by road, rail or inland waterways

APPENDIX D

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u. <u>Health & Safety Executive</u>

- Regulate safety, factories, farms, hospitals, schools, offshore gas and oil installations and onshore major hazard sites.
- Regulate safety of gas grid, power generation and distribution networks and domestic gas safety.
- Regulate workplace health and safety for emergency services and other responding agencies.
- Provide CBRN specialist or technical advice to support response and recovery.
- Carry out investigations where appropriate

v. <u>Food Standards Agency</u>

- Take action to ensure that contaminated food does not enter the food chain, implementing, as necessary, restriction orders under the EU's 'Council of Food Intervention Levels (CFIL)' regulations.
- Provide advice and information to the public regarding restrictions place on the consumption of foodstuffs and other reassurance messages.
- Ensure, in conjunction with the Environment Agency, the safe management of contaminated foodstuffs.

Mutual Aid & Other Assistance

Major incidents are often of a scale that exceeds county-based resources. In these cases, mutual aid arrangements provide a framework for the deployment of additional resources.

In the event that multiple agencies are expecting mutual aid assets, or a single agency is expecting a large number of resources, the Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area (MASHA) may be activated. For details refer to the SRF MASHA plan.

The following arrangements are in place:

a. Suffolk Constabulary

- Regional agreements for specific skill sets/assets.
- National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC), coordinate resources across the country.
- Police National Mobilisation Plan (PNMP). The Constabulary have an outline plan for managing an influx of officers from other Police Services e.g. accommodation, catering, administration, briefing etc.

b. Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service

- Regionally, a working agreement exists to provide cross border assistance.
- National Coordination Advisory Framework (NCAF) provides mutual aid assistance to any Fire & Rescue Authority in the UK in the event of a serious incident.
- National Resilience Fire Control act as a coordination point to mobilise resources and maintain a national overview of UKFRS assets available during an incident.

c. East of England Ambulance NHS Trust

 National Ambulance Coordination Centre coordinates requests for extra resources as a national response to the requesting service. This facilitates the minimum of interruption to the normal response of supporting ambulance services.

d. Local Authorities

MOU is in existence detailing mutual aid arrangements between all Suffolk Local Authorities in the following areas:

- Provision of rest centres.
- Request provision of support in relation to incident.

e. NHS

Mutual aid is provided via NHS England, East Anglia Mutual Aid Agreement, this provides a framework in which to:

- Request support for management of a Major Incident or Major Incident Standby.
- Ensure upward reporting of a request for mutual aid.
- Arrange assets in response to a request.
- Manage the reception of incoming resources.
- Organise the return of mutual aid resource.

f. Bristow on behalf of Maritime & Coastguard Agency

Search and rescue (SAR) helicopter provision.

Emergency Services will receive a service that provides SAR aviation assets to the most appropriate requests based on the need and according to prevailing conditions.

g. MHCLG RED

 Assist in managing requests/offers of mutual aid and central government support.

h. <u>UK Armed Forces</u>

There are no standing military forces to provide mutual aid and therefore it is not guaranteed. There is an expectation that full payment will be made for such support in line with HM Treasury rules. The exception to this is when there is imminent danger to life and in prescribed circumstances, when marginal costs may be charged.

This provision is governed by the Military Aid to a Civil Authority (MACA) arrangement. Details can be found at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2015-to-2020-government-policy-military-aidto-the-civil-authorities-for-activities-in-the-uk.

In the first instance advice should be sought from the JRLO East or RAFRLO EE.

They contribute to UK resilience by providing capabilities such as:

- Explosive ordnance disposal.
- After a terrorist attack where, armed military personnel may be deployed to locations, usually guarded by armed police officers, to enable these resources to undertake other duties.
- Assistance to civil authorities and structures when the need exceeds civil capabilities or capacity. In these circumstances, the following criteria should be met:
 - There is a definite need to act and the tasks to be fulfilled are clear.
 - Other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives have been discounted and either:
 - the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to complete the task, and it is unreasonable of prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.
 - the civil authority has all or some capacity, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from MOD.

Under exceptional circumstances, usually agreed at ministerial level, it may be necessary for the above conditions to be temporarily waived.

i. US Military

This provision is governed by the United States of America Department of Defense Directive 5100.46 dated 6th July 2012. This details the US policy for the provision of Foreign Disaster Relief by United States Visiting Forces (USVF).

Any request should be initiated by the SCG and made via the HQ USAFE-UK SCG representative, or in their absence the JRLO East or RAFRLO EE to the Commander of either 100 Air Refuelling Wing or 48 Fighter Wing.

Where prompt action is required to save human lives, the Commander of the relevant wing may authorise immediate aid in the absence of formal authorisation from the US Chief of Mission.

In all other instances, the request will be referred to the US Embassy and Department of Defense and the decision on provision will then lie with the UK and US Governments.

The UK MOD will be informed of the request by the JRLO East or RAFRLO-EE.

j. Voluntary Organisations & Community Emergency Groups

Numerous **voluntary organisations** (local, regional, or national) have the potential to provide additional capacity and specialist capability for any incident response or during the recovery phase.

The contact details and a Response Capability Directory for formal voluntary organisations is available on Resilience Direct (Response Section) https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/home/49752/1.4-Suffolk-VCSEP-Directory.

Whilst the support these organisations can provide is acknowledged, planning will not rely on availability unless this has been formally agreed.

As part of the national community resilience programme, Suffolk local authorities operate a **Community Emergency Group** system.

These groups are routinely supported by the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit (JEPU) and when available can offer support to a response by:

- Acting as a conduit for local information in the community.
- Providing practical support to local people who may be affected by the incident e.g. local Rest Centres.
- Maintaining support activities until such time as emergency responders can provide assistance.

These groups are activated and subsequently managed by the JEPU or relevant District/Borough Council Emergency Centre.

Further information of these groups can be found at https://suffolkprepared.co.uk/get-prepared/prepare-your-community/

k. Spontaneous (Convergent) Volunteers

These volunteers are defined as 'individuals who are unaffiliated with an official response organisation (organised voluntary sector or community emergency group recognised as part of the official response), yet without extensive preplanning, is motivated to provide unpaid support to the response and/or recovery to an emergency.'

If they are not properly managed, they can divert resources and attention away from response/recovery activities.

If they are not involved in official activities, they may also engage in providing emergency help separately from the official response, potentially placing themselves and those they aim to help, in danger.

At the earliest opportunity, a senior officer from the Local Authorities should assess the situation to determine the scale of spontaneous support. This should include discussions with pre-existing community groups.

Assessment and consultation may subsequently lead to the tasking the organised voluntary sector with engaging with spontaneous volunteers as required to support humanitarian assistance response.

If the situation is appropriate for the 'deployment' of this resource, consideration should be given to establishing a Volunteer Reception Centre (VRC) for dealing with the administration/management of volunteers.

A Spontaneous Volunteer Coordinator should be appointed and dependent on local authority resources, consideration should be given to approaching the SVCEP to assist in staffing/management of the VRC.


Communications links should be established between the TCG and Voluntary and Community Sector Coordinator.

All agencies at the scene should be made aware of the establishment of a VRC to direct spontaneous volunteers away from the immediate incident site.

A public communication message should be prepared for media/social media broadcast advising the approach/requirement.

APPENDIX F

Command Control & Coordination



Strategic Coordination Group Meetings format and Standard Agenda

Strategic Coordination Group Meetings Format

Joining by TEAMS – Please dial in 5 minutes prior to the meeting start time.

Hybrid and Virtual meetings will be recorded.

Please use plain English avoiding the use of abbreviations, acronyms and single agency terminology.

Meetings should be restricted to a maximum of 20 minutes

At the **FIRST MEETING** set the Battle Rhythm. This should be communicated to all elements of command, control and coordination.

Considerations.

- National crisis management structure timings
- ResCG (if activated) timings
- TCG to facilitate time to deliver operational effect
- MAIC to facilitate the gathering and dissemination of information. Including a timetable for the submission of agency reports eg/ 30 minutes before SCG.

Refer to relevant contingency plans. Please note, these will include a site or hazard specific agenda which should be utilised in place of the generic format below

Consider which representation needs to be at the meeting including any vetting criteria.

Consider any additional cells that may be required

Tactical Coordination (TCG)
Multiagency Information Cell (MAIC)
Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC)
Media Coordination and advice to the public
Recovery Coordination (RCG)

Consider other aspects of the response requirements

Vulnerable people	
Casualty Bureau/DVI/MIPP	
Use of legal advice	
Psychosocial support	
Humanitarian Assistance	
Stand Down	
Handover from Response to Recovery	

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Strategic Coordination Group Standard Agenda

- 1. Introductions by Chair
- 2. Consideration of an immediate Emergency Alert
- 3. Current position Situational Awareness
 - MAIC
 - TCG

ADJOURN AS NECESSARY TO UNDERTAKE ANY URGENT ISSUES. (no more than 5 minutes to brief staff or as directed by the SCG Chair)

- 4. Update from Agencies/cells by exception
- 5. Risk/Threat Assessment Set/review strategic objectives
 - STAC
 - Media strategy
 - MAIC
- 6. Powers, Policies and LRF plans
 - Emergency declaration and status of incident (this may be discussed earlier dependent upon the nature of the incident)
- 7. Options and Contingencies
- 8. Review and Confirm Actions
 - Appoint/Confer with the Recovery lead
- 9. Any other Business
- Time of next meeting including agency reporting timeline for completion of Sitrep
- 11. Stand down arrangement/Exit Strategy/Handover to Recovery (when appropriate)

All agencies are reminded to pass any required documentation to colleagues in the event of a handover/shift change and to retain any paperwork/policy logs connected to the incident for potential evidential purposes.

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

APPENDIX H

Incident Response Coordination Locations

Function	Location	What3Words
Strategic Coordination Centre		
Tactical Coordination Centre		

Terrorism Incident Response Arrangements

The framework for responding to and recovering from a terrorist incident will be the same as that used for non-malicious incidents.

The national Police CT network will lead the operational response, whilst the local Chief Constable will be responsible for the consequence management and overseeing the coordination of other responding agencies.

The Chair of the SCG and TCG will be a senior Police Officer and any terrorist incident that risks public safety would be declared a Major Incident by the Police.

The impact of terrorist incidents on public confidence and the possibility of further attacks, will make the provision of warnings, advice and information to the public is particularly important and will require close cooperation between the coordination and terrorist response structures. This will be achieved by Police representation at the various levels.

Appropriate information would be shared between the Police command structure and the SCG, including the STAC for CBRNe related incidents, to allow the development of a multi-agency strategy for consequence management response.

Executive representation at the SCG for a terrorist incident will be required to be vetted to NSV SC and NPPV2 levels. In some circumstances the Police Chair may use their discretion to share information with those representatives who do not have this clearance.

A Police/Security Services/Military specific sub-group to the SCG may be formed to facilitate any sensitive discussions and ensure operational actions are effectively delivered.

The Police will be the lead agency at the FCP, including the integration of any military support – Refer **Operation Temperer**.

Specific arrangements for a terrorist response at Sizewell or any incident involving radiation have been developed and can be found at **APPENDIX M** of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

Recovery activity will be undertaken as per the SRF Generic Recovery Plan

Humanitarian Assistance

This can be defined as those activities aimed at addressing the needs of people affected by emergencies, such as:

- The provision temporary shelter and support for evacuated persons.
- Provision of psychological and social aftercare and support in the short, medium, and long term (Eyre 2007) for those directly involved OR impacted by an incident.
- Provision of physical care to the injured in the initial stages of an incident.
- A centralised source of information and practical support from agencies, organisations, and government departments for those affected by an incident.
- A. <u>Immediate Assistance</u>. In the first few hours after an incident the responding agencies will look after those involved who fall in one of four categories:
 - 1. <u>Uninjured.</u> Those people involved in the incident but will not necessarily want or require full medical care.

They will be removed from the hazard area to a **Survivor Reception Centre**.

See table below.

2. <u>Injured</u>. Will need to be rescued from the scene as quickly and safely as possible on a triaged basis.

Ambulance and Fire and Rescue Services will work together to remove casualties from the scene.

The Ambulance Service will initiate pre-hospital care and the transportation of patients to receiving hospitals. Names of those injured will be collated to inform the Casualty Bureau.

3. <u>Deceased.</u> HM Coroner has the responsibility for identifying those who have died, the cause and the time of death.

The Emergency Services have procedures to provide evidential continuity of the handling of the deceased.

If possible, bodies will be transferred to local hospital mortuary facilities. However, if a large number of deaths occur, bodies may be removed to a Victim Audit Area where they will be retained before transfer to an Emergency Mortuary, with arrangements for external support – Refer **SRF Mass Fatalities plan.**

4. <u>Evacuees</u>. In the event of the evacuation of large areas, this will be coordinated by Suffolk Constabulary. Evacuated people will be directed to a **Rest Centre** within easy reach of the incident site.

See table below

B. Other aspects of Humanitarian Assistance. These are as follows:

1. <u>Vulnerable People.</u> Cabinet Office Guidance 'Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis' (2025)

https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/home/347500/Vulnerable-Persons-Guidance-Mar-24

defines vulnerable people as:

'People who are less able to help themselves in the circumstances of an emergency, who must be given special consideration in plans."

Response and recovery strategies for dealing with incidents consider the specific needs posed by vulnerable people. It is recognised that all people have the potential to become vulnerable if they are removed from their established support mechanisms,

Many vulnerable groups or individuals will be known to existing service providers/statutory authorities ie. nursing homes, day centres, residential care homes, sheltered housing, individuals known to social care, health organisations or on utility providers Priority Services Registers.

There are others who for a variety of reasons are more difficult to identify such as those individuals who live in the community, are homeless or are visitors to the area.

There is no central list of vulnerable people, instead information held by many different agencies will need to be brought together at the time of an incident ideally by the MAIC, or just prior in the event of rising tide emergencies, to ensure that people receive appropriate support.

Identifying, planning for, and providing for the needs of these groups will involve a number of partners sharing a large amount of complicated and changing information. The SRF has therefore developed specific guidance (available on Resilience Direct) which assists with the identification of vulnerable groups and individuals.

It provides a flexible process for collating and sharing information between Category 1 and 2 responders whilst maintaining confidentiality and details additional measures or actions to assist these groups or individuals. This protocol includes a 'list of lists.' This list provides:

- Contact details for these organisations These can also be found in the SRF Alerting Directory.
- Lists type of vulnerability.
- Lists vulnerable establishments.
- 2. <u>Psychosocial Care</u>. During, and following, a major incident, individuals impacted may need a range of support and care services. In particular, those directly affected, their families, witnesses and the personnel of agencies involved in the response and recovery, may need a range of psychosocial care interventions. This specialist area has responsibility for:
 - Planning for appropriate psychosocial support of everyone affected.
 - Coordinating the activities of agencies and organisations involved in this aspect.
 - Coordination, appropriate training, and supervision of agencies and organisations involved.
- 3. <u>Community Help Point & Long-Term Assistance</u>. At the time of any emergency response and in the immediate aftermath, local authorities may establish a **Community Help Point**(s) (CHP) close to the incident scene.

See table below.

4. <u>Casualty Bureau</u>. This will be provided by Suffolk Constabulary. It is an initial point of contact for collating information relating to persons believed to have been involved in an emergency.

See table below.

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The following is detail on potential on HA facilities that may be required.

Title	Purpose	Timescale/Location/ Activation Contact	Lead Organisation/Plan	Notes
Casualty Bureau	 Initial point of contact for receiving/assessing information about victims to trace and identify people. Reconcile missing persons. Collate accurate information for dissemination to appropriate parties. Inform the investigation. 	Immediate (if needed) LOCATION Police national arrangements	Suffolk Constabulary Use National Police Casualty Bureau arrangements	 A telephone helpline number will be issued via the media to facilitate a response to enquiries from relatives and friends. The Bureau will remain open until such time as all casualties have been identified, all next of kin have been informed and enquiries have diminished to a level that can be dealt with as

APPENDIX J

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Community Help Point (CHP)	 To signpost to other sources of information and support such as Rest Centre, FFRC, SuRC, HAC etc Initial point of contact for those affected by events or who are having difficulty finding more formal support. 	ASAP LOCATION: Close to scene of the incident, either a designated building or use of a vehicle or temporary structure.	Local AuthorityJERP	Staff will be highly visible and will work with any FCP established to support communities in the initial period after the incident
Friends & Family Reception Centre (FFRC)	 Assistance in reuniting family & friends with survivors. Provision of resource to register, interview & provide shelter for family & friends. Provide timely & accurate information about the incident. Record details of persons believed to be missing to support the Casualty Bureau. Collect forensic samples to assist identification and or investigation processes. 	Within 12 hours. LOCATION: As agreed between Suffolk Constabulary & the following hospitals: - Ipswich - James Paget (Gt.Yarmouth) - Norfolk & Norwich University - Queen Elizabeth (King's Lynn) - West Suffolk (Bury St Edmunds	 Suffolk Constabulary in consultation with the local hospitals Representatives of faith communities may be consulted. Police FFRC Guidance 	

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	Provide initial advice & direction about obtaining practical & emotional support to families & friends.			
Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC)	 Act as a one-stop shop for information & assistance to those either directly or indirectly by the emergency. This could include: Survivors Bereaved families & friends. Family & friends of those still missing. Wider community. 	Within 72 hours	 Suffolk County Council as Chair of HAC Management Group SRF HAC Plan (pending publication as @ January 2025) 	

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Rest Centre (RC)	Temporary accommodation of evacuees/homeless survivors with overnight facilities.	 Overnight, duration maximum of 48 hours. LOCATION: Pre-identified venues countywide designated by the Local Authority at the time of the incident 	 Local Authority Rest Centre arrangements included in Local Authority JERP SRF Evacuation & Shelter Plan 	 Managed by the relevant District/Borough authority and will provide temporary accommodation and welfare for evacuees and homeless survivors. Local Authorities will record attendance at Rest Centres and plan for longer term housing for those who have no alternative housing options.
Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC)	 Short term shelter and first aid provision for survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment. Investigative evidence gathering. Provision of survivor information for the Casualty Bureau. 	Immediate (short term duration) LOCATION: Secure area close to the incident scene.	 Suffolk Constabulary supported by Local Authority. Police SuRC Guidance 	 These people may be potential witnesses; the police will collate details for subsequent investigation and Casualty Bureau use. Short term use. May migrate to a Rest Centre if required

APPENDIX K

Marine Mass Casualty Rescue Operation-Op Waypoint

(Based on HM Coastguard V3 document)

This appendix provides information on the management of the transfer of casualties following a maritime incident to shore side responders at predesignated locations and will be coordinated by the MCA via the National Maritime Operations Centre at Fareham which includes both air and maritime assets

The MCA will coordinate the maritime aspects and the police the shoreside response.

Notification of such an incident is received as an 'Operation Waypoint' alert from the MCA to the Police Control Room, this will provide a verbal assessment of the scale of likely impact.

Further cascade of the information will follow standard SRF notification arrangements.

An e mail containing a Situation Report will be sent as soon as practicably possible. This will contain information on which decisions can be made re the level of response required.

Suffolk has identified two locations that meet the MCA landing point criteria, these are as follows:

- Lowestoft Outer Harbour South of harbour entrance, Yacht Basin, RNLI Pontoon (incorporating Royal Norfolk & Suffolk Yacht Club as the Survivor Reception Centre and Royal Green for casualty handling aspects.
- Lowestoft Outer Harbour North of the harbour entrance; Trawl Dock, Waveney Dock and Hamilton Dock - in conjunction with the yacht basin, can also accept vessels with varying freeboards using the commercial pontoons supporting the windfarms (SSE & Scottish Power) and fisheries activity. SSE also has a pre-designated helicopter landing point within the Outer Harbour area.

These locations are recorded on the Incident Management System in Coastguard Operations Rooms.

Outline Mass Casualty Management

The NHS England and NHS Improvement Concept of Operations for managing Mass Casualties defines the incident for health services as 'an incident (or series of incidents) causing casualties on a scale that is beyond the normal resources of the emergency and healthcare services' ability to manage.'

Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) guidance defines the incident as: "A disastrous single or simultaneous event(s) or other circumstances where the normal major incident response of Category 1 organisations must be augmented by extraordinary measures in order to maintain an effective, suitable and sustainable response"

They are usually caused by sudden onset events and **exclude casualties resulting** from infectious disease outbreaks or severe weather.

Standard procedures as outlined previously in this document will be used to manage the overall incident (SCG/TCG/RCG), appropriate representation on these groups will provide the relevant information required in relation to the mass casualty aspects. Response to an incident of this nature, will require coordination of a number of partner agencies from Suffolk, regionally and nationally.

As previously stated, a Mass Casualty event would automatically be declared a major incident.

East of England Ambulance Service

- EEAST will activate mutual aid agreements to obtain additional resources.
- Management of on-scene triage arrangements.

NHS

NHS organisations have plans in place to increase capacity across the emergency care pathway to maximise the outcome for casualties.

Medical treatment facilities will be expected to expand their capacities by:

- Cancelling or rescheduling elective surgical procedures.
- Discharging non-critical patients to create initial bed capacity of 10% and a further 10% within the next 12 hours.
- Diverting non-critical patients to other facilities.
- Activate mutual aid arrangements including any national resources available.

APPENDIX L

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Local Authorities

- Assist health organisations with the rapid discharge of patients from acute care settings, by creating capacity in social care structures.
- Support the police with establishment of Survivor Reception and Friends and Family Reception Centres.
- If required, establish a Humanitarian Assistance Centre.

Police

- Will activate Casualty Bureau arrangements to coordinate information on the dispersal of casualties and advise those enquiring after friends and family where they can be located.
- In conjunction with Acute Trusts establish Friends and Family Reception Centres.
- In conjunction with Local Authorities establish Survivor Reception and Friends and Family Reception Centre

Media Coordination Cell

 Ensure clear communications to direct people to the correct services or locations (FFRC, HAC etc) for support

Operational Responders	Tactical Responders	Strategic Responders
Threat, hazard & risk	Tactical command, control	Strategic & tactical
assessment	& coordination structures.	parameters.
Rescue & recovery of	Resource management	Decision re early setting
casualties	and capabilities versus	up of casualty bureau.
	capacity.	, ap, a
Triage, treatment &	Identification of strategic	International/national
transportation	& tactical holding areas.	media management.
Scene & environmental	Scene management	Communications & press
protection		strategy-tailored
		messaging considering
		both mainstream & social
		media.
Evacuation & shelter	Intelligence &/or	National reporting.
	evidential gathering	
	opportunities.	
Survivor Reception, Rest,	Warning & informing	Political sensitivities.
Friends & Family		
Reception &		
Humanitarian Assistance		
Centres.		
Preservation of evidence	Public reassurance	Impact on infrastructure.
Health & wellbeing of	Coordination &	Critical National
casualties and	distribution of medical	Infrastructure (including
responders	counter measures	those with international
		consequences)
	Logistics – the	Political sensitivities &
	displacement/loss of	international relations.
	people, places, transport	
	etc	
	Community impact	Legislation & policies
	assessments	
	Liaison with and	Public health impacts and
	coordination of transport	long-term monitoring
	providers to assist with	
	casualty movement, if	
	appropriate.	
		Balance between
		investigation & multi-
		agency consequence
		management.
		Wider consequences.

Telecommunications & ICT

Telecommunications systems in use today, are generally robust in nature and will normally only fail catastrophically if there are several factors combining to reduce their resilience. Past events where telecommunications issues have been identified include:

- Electrical power failure, this would include mains power failure, generator failure, portable equipment and 'back up' battery failures.
- System overload and excessive demand.
- Failure of telephone operating companies' systems.
- A natural event such as flooding or severe weather.
- Human intervention such as terrorism or accidental infrastructure damage.
- Severe space weather.

If a significant impact on telecommunications systems affects an agency's ability to maintain critical services, a major incident may be declared. Once declared the major incident will be managed and coordinated according to the process outlined in this plan.

If a major incident has not been declared, the agency experiencing the outage should manage it in accordance with their respective business continuity plans. However, they may choose to inform the SRF of the outage, this information may be cascaded to wider partners as required.

The table below outlines the various levels of degradation to telecommunication systems that may take place and the options that may be available to mitigate the impacts.

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Service Degradation Level	Systems Available
1 Normal Operations	 Mobile telephony includes pagers, e-mail, Resilience Direct (RD), Airwave, VHF/UHF radio, Resilient Satellite Network (RSN).
2 No Mobile Telephony	e-mail,RD, Airwave,VHF/UHF radio,RSN.
3 No mobile or Fixed line Telephony	 Email, RD, Airwave, VHF/UHF radio, RSN.
4 No IT Electronic Voice/Data Systems	 VHF/UHF radio, RSN, RAYNET/SVOG members with VHF radio repeater capability
5 Loss of VHF/UHF Radio	• RSN
6 Loss of all Communications	Runners or Couriers

Overview of Telecommunications Capabilities

Voice

Fixed Landlines

Inter-agency routine telecommunications generally use fixed landlines through a commercial contract; however, all providers utilise elements of the BT national infrastructure.

Although generally resilient, experience has shown a failure of this infrastructure due to an emergency event i.e. severe weather/flooding may lead to local or widespread loss of landline communications.

Where appropriate, BT can provide assistance via BT National Emergency Linkline (08457 555 999) as follows:

Mobile Telephones

Many agencies are now heavily reliant on the mobile telephone network for daily operational management.

SRF organisations have differing service providers and signal coverage in Suffolk, is not 100% of the geographic area for any one provider. Additionally, during a large-scale incident there is a possibility that the network infrastructure could reach capacity locally, temporarily limiting communications.

There is also the possibility of malicious damage, damage caused by a natural event or loss of electrical power that may degrade the network.

Expected loss of mobile network service (voice & data) is within **4 hours** following a loss of power.

If power/broadband is available, the main Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) have 'Network Status' web pages that provide information on areas affected by disruption:

Operator	Web Address
<u>EE</u>	https://myaccount.ee.co.uk/networkchecker/checkservice
<u>Vodafone</u>	https://www.vodafone.co.uk/network/status-checker
<u>O2</u>	https://status.o2.co.uk/
<u>3</u>	http://www.three.co.uk/Discover/Network/Coverage

Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS)

MTPAS is a national scheme to provide privileged access on the mobile telephone network in the event of network congestion. Selected mobile telephones held by Entitled Organisations are provided with a MTPAS Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card by MNOs.

When alerted of an emergency incident, MNOs may apply restrictions at the incident scene, so that users of MTPAS SIMs will continue to connect to the network if network congestion is identified. Clear arrangements exist for the Police to inform MNOs of a major incident and to request that privileged access is given to MTPAS SIM cards. The holder of a MTPAS SIM card must have either an operational role at the scene_of an emergency incident, or directly support those with an operational role at a tactical or strategic level within the geographical area of the incident.

MTPAS is only activated under very special circumstances and at the discretion of the MNO, following notification by the Police Gold Commander¹ of an emergency incident. Activation is implemented network-by-network, access class by access class and only to a specified geographic area for the shortest possible period of time. More detailed guidance for the use of MTPAS and a Notification of a Major Incident Proforma, can be found within the Cabinet Office document 'Process for the

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¹ A request for the complete block all calls other than via access classes 10 - 15 can only be made by the Police with the sign off of a Senior Officer who may be higher than the Gold Commander of a particular incident. This is in accordance with Part 3 of the Police Act. (Cabinet Office MTPAS Management Process v4 2017)

Management of the Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) V4 Feb 2017 held by each user organisation.

Airwave

The Airwave radio core network provides secure voice and data communications within and between the emergency services.

Airwave core network base stations are highly resilient, secure and remotely monitored with the ability to operate for up to **7** days with an autonomous power capability.

The Airwave "handheld" network – providing coverage for low powered handheld sets, is **not generally power-resilient**. The gateway function on vehicle sets and fixed stations can provide localised hand-held coverage.

Resilient Satellite Network (RSN).

RSN is a government supplied resilient satellite telephone on a network that extends across all Local Resilience Fora, providing voice only communications with central government departments and between Resilience Forums.

RSN telephones in Suffolk are only located at Suffolk Constabulary HQ, due the need for a fixed antenna dish

<u>RAYNET</u>

RAYNET is a nationwide voluntary group of qualified radio amateurs who can provide emergency radio communications for the emergency services and local authorities. RAYNET can provide specialist VHF/UHF radio communications assistance across Suffolk.

In addition to voice communications, RAYNET can offer data links and Personal Management Radio (PMR) repeaters, it is also possible to provide Wi-Fi links, these services would require some pre-planning in support of events and these services may be requested by groups outside of the Suffolk area in a cross border/national incident and this spread of the resource should be considered.

Single agency requests for support should be made to the Suffolk RAYNET Controller using the contact details in the SRF Alerting Directory.

During a multi-agency incident, requests for all voluntary organisations will be coordinated by the Voluntary & Community Sector (VCS) Coordinator, located at the TCG.

APPENDIX M

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Resilience Direct

<u>https://www.resilience.gov.uk/</u> is an online private 'network' which enables civil protection practitioners to work together – across geographical and organisational boundaries – during the preparation, response and recovery phases of an event or emergency.

It is used by participating SRF agencies to afford a dedicated interactive computer resource, providing up to date information and graphical interpretation of a multiagency incident/event (including mapping).

It also facilitates information being shared simultaneously with partner agencies up to Official Sensitive level.

The system is operated using agreed SRF protocols.

MOD

The MoD possesses a range of communications equipment, trained operators and vehicles, and may be able to provide assistance.

If the SRF anticipates, identifies or predicts a capability gap in the response to a loss of communications, advice on the possibility, availability and capabilities of military aid can be sought from the Armed Forces' Joint Regional Liaison Officer for the East of England (JRLO E).

If MACA is required, the JRLO or RAFRLO is the first point of contact for any request and will facilitate the request process and provision of any MACA authorised by MOD.

OUTLINE CYBER RESILIENCE RESPONSE

Cyberattacks are usually managed internally by the affected organisation using its IT /Information Security department and established Business Continuity Plans. Every organisation—whether in the private or public sector—should designate a senior manager to serve as the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO).

Role and Responsibilities of the SIRO

Oversight and Decision-Making: The SIRO is charged with overseeing the organisation's information risk policy. In close consultation with the IT/Information Security Manager, they decide on the extent and scope of responses to cyber incidents.

<u>Incident Management:</u> During a cyberattack, the SIRO plays a pivotal role in executing the organisation's response plan. This involves ensuring that internal processes and business continuity measures are strictly followed. In cases where an attack spans multiple agencies or poses a significant public risk, the SIRO may also coordinate with multi-agency response teams.

<u>Reporting</u>: It is the SIRO's responsibility to ensure that all breaches—including cyberattacks—are reported to the <u>Information Commissioner's Office</u> (ICO) within the required timeframe, typically within 72 hours.

External Notifications and Coordination

National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC): The NCSC should also be informed within 72 hours of a cyber incident. Detailed guidance on where and how to report such incidents is available on GOV.UK, and more comprehensive cybersecurity guidance can be found on the NCSC website - www.ncsc.gov.uk

<u>Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF):</u> During a cyber incident, the affected organisation should notify the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF), who in turn will update all relevant partners.

If the situation demands, the SRF is empowered to facilitate a Multi-Agency Meeting (MAM – refer section 4.2) to manage the broader impact across agencies. In scenarios where the incident may cause serious public harm or affect multiple organisations, a major incident should be declared, activating the designated command structures at section 5.

APPENDIX O

Glossary

Abbreviation	Description
<u> </u>	<u> </u>
AAIB	Aviation Accidents Investigation Branch
ABP	Associated British Ports
APHA	Animal & Plant Health Agency (executive agency of
	DEFRA)
BCM	Business Continuity Management
Bronze	Single agency operational level of crisis management
BT	British Telecom
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CCR	Contact & Control Room – Police
	Council for Food Intervention Levels (EU requirement in
CFIL	relation to radiation incidents)
CFRA	Chief Fire & Rescue Advisor
CGOC	Coastguard Operations Centre
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
COMAH	Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 205
	Authority that is associated with a role or rank within an
	organisation to give direction to other people from the
Command	same organisation.
Command	
	Command CANNOT be exercised by one organisation
	over another.
	Application of authority and the capability to manage
	organisational resources to deliver defined objectives.
Control	
	Control may be delegated to another organisation for a
	specified period of time to attain a defined objective.
Coordination	Integration of individual activity in order to achieve mutually agreed collective objectives.
COP	Common Operating Picture
COP	Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards
CRCE	(UKHSA)
CRIP	Common Recognised Information Picture
CRR	Community Risk Register
C-TAC	Cyber Tactical Cell
CT	Counter Terrorism
DBT	Department for Business & Trade
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
DESNZ	Department for Energy Security & Net Zero
DHSC	Department of Health & Social Care
DNO	Defence Nuclear Organisation
DSIT	Department of Science, Industry & Technology
DVI	Disaster Victim Identification
EA	Environment Agency (executive agency of DEFRA)
EEAST	East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust
	Lact of England / imbalance Convice (4) to Trust

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

EDDO	OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
EPDO	Emergency Planning Duty Officer (JEPU)
FCP	Forward Command Post/Forward Control Post
FFRC	Friends & Family Reception Centre
FOB	Forward Operating Base (APHA Control Centre)
FRA	Fire & Rescue Authority
FRS	Fire & Rescue Service
GLO	Government Liaison Officer
GLT	Government Liaison Team
GOLD	Strategic level of decision making (single agency)
HAC	Humanitarian Assistance Centre
HART	Hazardous Area Response Team (Ambulance)
HSE	Health & Safety Executive
ICB	Integrated Care Board (Health)
IMT	Incident Management Team (Public health incidents)
JEPU	Joint Emergency Planning Unit (Suffolk Local Authorities)
JERP	Joint Emergency Response Plan (Suffolk Local Authorities)
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer (Military)
LGA	Local Government Association
LGD	Lead Government Department
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
MA	Medical Advisor (Ambulance)
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authorities
MAIB	Marine Accident Investigation Branch
MAHP	Marine Accident Hazard Pipeline Regulations
MAIC	Multi-Agency Information Cell
MCA	Maritime & Coastguard Agency
MCC	Media Coordination Cell
MERIT	Medical Emergency Response Incident Team
MHCLG	Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MTPAS	,
NCAF	Mobile Telephony Priority Access Scheme National Coordination & Advisory Framework (FRS)
	National Disease Control Centre
NDCC NFCC	
NECC	National Fire Chiefs Council
NILO	National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (Fire & Ambulance
NIMOC	Service)
NMOC	National Maritime Operations Centre
NPCC	National Police Chiefs Council
NPoCC	National Police Coordination Centre
NRFC	National Resilience Fire Control
OCT	Outbreak Control Team (Local Authority Public Health)
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
RAFRLO-EE	RAF Regional Liaison Officer East of England
RAIB	Rail Accident Investigation Branch
RAYNET	Radio Amateurs Network
RC	Rest Centre
RCG	Recovery Coordination Group
RD	Resilience Direct (national web-based information sharing
_	system)

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

RED	Regional & Emergencies Division (MHCLG)
REPPIR	Radiation (Emergency Preparedness & Public Information)
	Regulations
ResCG	Response Coordinating Group (Regional)
RMU	Radiation Monitoring Unit
RNLI	Royal National Lifeboat Institution
RSN	Resilient Satellite Network
SAR	Search & Rescue
SCG	Strategic Coordinating Group
SILVER	Tactical level of crisis management (single agency)
SITREP	Situation Report
SORT	Special Operations Response Team (Ambulance)
SRF	Suffolk Resilience Forum
STAC	Science & Technical Advice Cell
Strat.CC	Strategic Coordination Centre
SuRC	Survivor Reception Centre
TCC	Tactical Coordination Centre
TCG	Tactical Coordinating Group
UKFRS	UK Fire & Rescue Services
UKHSA	UK Health Security Agency
USAFE-UK	United States Air Force Europe – UK
USVF	United Stated Visiting Forces
VCSEP	Voluntary & Community Sector Emergencies Partnership
VRC	Volunteer Reception Centre
WoW	Working on Wednesday (business as usual working for the SRF)