



Suffolk Resilience Forum Radiation Emergency Plan

THIS PLAN COVERS THE FOLLOWING RISKS:

**FIXED CIVIL NUCLEAR SITES – REPPIR 19
CIVIL RADIATION MATERIAL IN TRANSIT – CDG 19
DEFENCE NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT - LAESI**

Author:	Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of Suffolk County Council/Suffolk Resilience Forum
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GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 2016/679 AND DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018

This plan does not include personal, sensitive, or special category data as defined under the General Data Protection Regulations. It does include data/information relevant to achieve planning arrangements and identifies how more specific personal data will be used during any emergency.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000

This document will be made publicly available through the SRF website. Where content has been redacted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) in the publicly available version, the paragraph number will be highlighted to show there has been a redaction and the relevant section of FOI referenced.

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS 2004 (IF REQUIRED)

This plan presumes disclosure of all environmental information, under Environment Information Regulations. Where exemptions are claimed under Environment Information Regulation 12 (5)a, this will only be where one of the responder agencies has judged that the information may adversely affect either international relations, defence, national security or public safety. Where such content has been identified, the paragraph number will be highlighted and the paragraph text removed from public versions of the plan.

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REVIEW

This plan will be reviewed by the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of Suffolk County Council and in conjunction with the Sizewell Emergency Planning Consultative Committee at least every 3 years. Earlier reviews will take place if there is a change in ionising work carried out at Sizewell, if there is a change in legislation, if there are changes in underpinning response capabilities or if information from other radiation emergencies and exercises where lessons are identified.

Any amendments will be issued by way of replacement page(s). Should significant changes be required, a complete re-issue of the plan will take place.

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This document is hyperlinked to navigate when viewed online

Material linked by website can also be found on the www.suffolkprepared.co.uk website

AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment No.	Date	Amended by	Reason
Issue 4	November 2020	Andy Osman	Complete reissue of off-site emergency arrangements to implement REPP19 and expanded to include MoD nuclear risks and radiological material in transit. Title change to reflect increased risk coverage
Issue 4.1	February 2021	Andy Osman	Minor changes to timelines in Annex 1
Issue 4.2	February 2024	Neal Evans	Interim update - Minor administrative updates and corrections

INTRODUCTION

1. Plan Aim & Objectives

1.1 The aim of this plan is to provide timely and effective emergency response and initial recovery actions to restrict public exposure to ionising radiation and spread of radioactive material within the environment from any radiation emergency within Suffolk.

1.2 The objectives of this plan are to:

- Introduction. Illustrate wider civil emergency plans that will be used during a response to a radiation emergency.
- Part 1. Describe the notification arrangements for responding agencies.
- Part 2:
 - Specify how the plan will be activated.
 - Indicate how agencies are required to initially respond.
 - Specify media coordination arrangements, including those required for providing the public with information during a radiation emergency.
 - Confirm public health protective actions and when and how these will be implemented.
 - Describe media coordination arrangements, including arrangements for providing the public with information during a radiation emergency.
- Part 3. Present subsequent response actions and arrangements for the expansion of the initial response for more severe accidents.
- Part 4. Describe how the initial recovery actions and how transition from response to recovery will be managed.
- Appendix B. Specify radiation emergency specific roles and responsibilities of responding agencies.
- Appendices C to F. State the hazards that the plan covers, and the assumptions used to plan the response.
- Appendix G. State which areas will receive prior information, how this will be provided and what it will cover.
- Appendices D to F. Confirm the key operator/carrier emergency response arrangements.
- Appendix I. Confirm radiation exposure limits for emergency responders.
- Appendix L. Specify arrangements for managing response during a concurrent security incident.
- Appendix O. State training and exercise requirements and how lessons identified will influence the review of this plan.

2. Radiation Emergency. A radiation emergency is defined¹ as:

A non-routine situation or event arising from work with ionising radiation that necessitates prompt action to mitigate the serious consequences:

- a. of a hazard resulting from that situation or event.
- b. of a perceived risk arising from such hazard or:

¹ The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 - Approved Code of Practice and Guidance – Health and Safety Executive and Office for Nuclear Regulation dated 2019 – Regulation 2(1)

- c. to any one or more of the following:
- (i) human life.
 - (ii) health and safety.
 - (iii) quality of life.
 - (iv) property.
 - (v) the environment.

3. Requirement

Fixed Civil Nuclear Sites - REPIR 19

3.1 This element of the plan is written in accordance with the following regulations of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (2019) (REPIR) which require Suffolk County Council to:

- Regulation 8 – Determine the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) for Sizewell B nuclear power station.
- Regulation 11 – Produce an adequate off-site emergency plan covering the Sizewell DEPZ and OPZ (Outline Emergency Planning Zone).
- Regulation 12 - Review and test the emergency plan at least every 3 years.
- Regulation 13 – Cooperate with EDF to prepare radiation emergency plans.
- Regulation 17 – Take reasonable steps to implement the emergency plan.
- Regulation 20 – Ensure emergency plan prioritises keeping effective doses below 100mSv reference level.
- Regulation 21 - Provide prior information to the public.
- Regulation 22 – Provide information to the public in the event of a radiation emergency.

3.2 This element of the plan also includes information and arrangements in accordance with following regulations under REPIR that EDF will:

- Regulation 7 – Provide a Consequence Report.
- Regulation 10 - Prepare an operator's emergency plan.

3.3 This plan also sets out the arrangements for managing a security initiated nuclear emergency at Sizewell.

3.4 A response to any radiation emergency is likely to involve multi-agency coordination within Suffolk, and potentially Norfolk for the most severe accidents. This plan has been developed and issued under the auspices of the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF) partnership. It dovetails with operator emergency plans and the Emergency Handbooks for Sizewell B produced by EDF under REPIR Regulations 7 and LC11. Collectively, the on and off-site emergency plans, supported by national arrangements, provide the integrated emergency response requirements for Sizewell.

3.5 Where this plan refers to 'Sizewell', it relates to Sizewell B Power Station.

Transportation of Civil Radioactive Material - CDG 19

3.6. This element of the plan is written in accordance with the following regulations of the Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Amendment) Regulations 2019:

- Regulation 3 – Provision of early warning and mitigatory activity to local authority.
- Regulation 9 – Determine reference levels to optimise emergency response.

Transportation of Defence Nuclear Material – LAESI

3.7 This element of the plan is written in accordance with the guidance within the MOD Local Authority and Emergency Services Information document that covers contingency arrangements to be implemented in the unlikely event of a radiation emergency, including those arising out of terrorist acts, during the transportation of defence nuclear weapons and Special Nuclear Material. This guidance recognises local responder action as follows:

- Alerting Emergency Services.
- Local emergency response coordination.
- Public information.
- Public protection actions.
- Planning for recovery.

4. Use of Coloured Text for Different Risks

The emergency response arrangements within this plan are either applicable across all radiation risks identified in para 2 above or are specific to a risk. Coloured text will indicate where hazard specific arrangements are in place as follows:

Applicable to all radiation risks – **black text**

Fixed nuclear site - Sizewell (REPPiR) – Amber Text

Civil radiation transport (CDG) – Blue Text

Defence nuclear transport (LAESI) – Green Text

5. National Guidance

This plan uses a range of guidance documents to develop and maintain effective radiation emergency arrangements; these are listed in the references in Part 5.

6. National Infrastructure Project Sites

This plan incorporates the following national infrastructure construction sites to ensure that additional people and transport associated with the sites can be accommodated within radiation emergency arrangements.

6.1 **Sizewell B Relocated Facilities.** EDF is relocating a number of existing facilities ancillary to the operation of the Sizewell B Power Station ('Sizewell B facilities'). The Sizewell B facilities are currently located on the proposed Sizewell C site and will be

relocated to new sites within and adjacent to the Sizewell B power station. Temporary emergency planning arrangements have been agreed with EDF and are shown at **ANNEX 1**.

6.2 **East Anglia TWO and East Anglia ONE North.** Scottish Power Renewables are planning to construct 2 offshore wind farms with associated onshore connections and links to national transmission grid. A Development Consent Order (DCO) application was submitted in October 2019. Temporary emergency arrangements will be agreed with Scottish Power Renewables prior to preparation and construction activity; these will be a temporary appendix to this plan.

6.3 **Sizewell C.** New Nuclear Build Generation Company (SZC) Ltd are constructing a new nuclear power station called Sizewell C next to the existing Sizewell B power station. A DCO was submitted on 27 May 2020. Temporary emergency arrangements have been agreed with the company prior to preparation and construction activity; these will be a temporary appendix to this plan. Emergency arrangements related to the site’s use as a nuclear power station will be started later in the construction under REPPIR 19 regulations and will form a permanent addition to this plan.

7. Wider Civil Emergency Arrangements

This document details radiation emergency response and recovery arrangements for Suffolk. Any response to such an incident or emergency will make use of existing SRF plans developed for wider civil emergencies and individual agency operational response plans as shown below:




Figure: Hierarchy of documents linked to the SRF Radiation Emergency Plan

8. Supporting Multi-Agency Emergency Response and Recovery Plans

Where relevant, SRF supporting plans will be signposted to indicate where further detail can be found, a summary is included in this document. Publicly available versions can be found on the SRF website: <https://www.suffolkprepared.co.uk/get-prepared/risk-advice/radiation/>. Full versions can be found on SRF Resilience Direct pages. Those likely to be used are:

8.1 **SRF Generic Response Plan.** This document provides detail of key terminology classified as an ‘emergency’ or ‘incident’, the standing

used to identify incidents

Major I

Suffolk emergency management command, control and coordination arrangements (including liaison/reporting with COBR), generic roles and responsibilities for responding agencies and arrangements for humanitarian assistance, telecommunications, mutual aid and the establishment and running of Strategic and Tactical Coordination Groups plus the Scientific & Technical Advice Cell and Media Coordination Cell.

The SRF Generic Response Plan is publicly available on the SRF website.

8.2 SRF Communications Plan. This document details how Suffolk responder agencies will provide information to the public during emergencies. It complements the hazard specific details of what information will be passed in relation to a radiation emergency contained within this plan.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.3 SRF Generic Recovery Plan. This plan details the multi-agency structures, high level processes and procedures required for the coordinated recovery from any major emergency in Suffolk.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.4 SRF Guide to Evacuation and Shelter in Suffolk. This plan provides outline guidance for large scale evacuation within Suffolk. It complements the detailed evacuation arrangements included within this plan for a reasonably foreseeable Sizewell radiation emergency and provides the start point for evacuation beyond that covered within this plan.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.5 SRF Mass Casualty Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for a mass casualty incident within Suffolk, where casualty numbers exceed the capacity of normal NHS Major Incident plans.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.6 SRF Mass Fatalities Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for dealing with mass fatalities from a Major Incident within Suffolk, where fatalities exceed the capacity of normal coroner arrangements.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.7 SRF Flood Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for managing flooding within Suffolk from either coastal, river or surface water flooding events. It will form the basis for a concurrent response to a radiation emergency that occurs at the same time as a flood event.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.8 SRF Severe Weather Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for managing severe weather, hot or cold, events within Suffolk. It will form the basis for a concurrent response to a radiation emergency that occurs at the same time as a severe weather event.

A public version is available on the SRF website.

8.9 SRF Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area Plans. These plans detail the arrangements for receiving and managing resources that may be required from beyond the county to respond to an emergency that has significant or wide area impact. They form the basis for how mutual aid will be received into the county for any emergency to allow this to be deployed in a controlled manner to assist with any response.

These plans are classified OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. No public version is issued.

8.10 SRF Strategic Coordination Centre Guidance. This plan covers the operation of the Strategic Coordination Centre (StratCC) to provide a location for the multi-agency coordination of any emergency.

- SRF STAC Plan – The SRF STAC plan is included within this guidance.

This plan is protective marked OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. No public version is issued.

8.11 SRF Tactical Coordination Centre Guide. This plan covers the activation of the Tactical Coordination Centre (TCC) to provide a location for the multi-agency coordination of any emergency.

This plan is protective marked OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. No public version is issued.

PART 1 - ALERTING

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

1. Declaration States.

The following declaration states are used off-site only:

1.1 **Perceived Incident**

An incident on-site that poses no risk to the public but which it might be conceivable that the public would be alarmed and could assume that a radiation emergency has occurred.

1.2 **Non-nuclear incident – 999 Response.**

A low level incident on site that requires the emergency services 'blue light response' but which does not involve any nuclear facilities and does not pose a risk of off-site impacts. The following declaration states used on and off-site have been agreed with EDF:

1.3 **Site Incident.**

A site incident is a hazardous condition which is confined in its effect within the boundary of the site security fence.

A declaration of a Site Incident will be considered by a SRF Executive meeting, either virtual or physical, as to whether a Major Incident needs to be declared.

1.4 **Off-Site Nuclear Emergency**

An off-site nuclear emergency is a hazardous condition which results, or is likely to result, in the need to consider urgent protective actions to protect the public outside the site security fence from a radiological hazard.

The nuclear operator will aim to make a declaration within 15 minutes of potential triggers being detected and assessed.

It has been agreed by the SRF that a declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) will automatically be declared at Major Incident.

2. Cancellation of Declaration

The process to cancel any declaration state once the conditions of the site have been brought under control is as follows:


2.1 **Site Incident.** The Site Emergency Controller may cancel the declaration; consulting with the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) if operational. This decision will be relayed to the Police to allow local responders to be briefed.

2.2 **Off-Site Nuclear Emergency.** The Site Emergency Controller, in consultation with the CESC and ONR may cancel the declaration. The SCG is to be informed of the decision through the Company Technical Advisor (CTA) to allow the wider response strategy to be updated. The SCG will agree to cancel any Major Incident declaration.


3. Emergency Responder Alerting/Notification Process

Alerting will be made by phone unless indicated.


3.1 **Perceived Incident.**




3.2 **Non-Nuclear Incident - 999 Response**



3.3 Site Incident



3.4. Off-Site Nuclear Emergency



3.5. **Alerting Information.** *The information in the METHANE report at **APPENDIX A** will be passed via email to all emergency services control rooms for a site incident or OSNE once the initial 999 call is made. Email addresses are in the SRF Alerting Directory. Suffolk Constabulary will upload email the METHANE to GOLD and SILVER generic Email accounts. The form will be uploaded onto RD by StratCC RD operators once the response page is activated.*

3.6. **Alerting the Public**

An Emergency Alert will be used to warn the public in the vicinity of Sz B that there is an imminent risk to life. The LRF Executive has pre-approved a message that will be sent by Suffolk Constabulary to the Cabinet Office Duty Watchkeeper for transmission following the declaration of an OSNE.

Issued by Suffolk Constabulary
Major Incident at Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station
A major incident has occurred at Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station on *Day, Date* at *Time*.
You must pay attention and follow all public safety advice given.
Updates and advice to keep yourself and others safe are available online at:
www.suffolk.gov.uk/sizewell
Please visit this website or follow Suffolk County Council on social media for the latest information or safety advice.

The Emergency Alert message will be transmitted to the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ), although the exact footprint is dependent on the position, number and range of mobile masts and the topography. The Alert is designed to target the transient population within 1.35km (0.8mile) of the site (eg visitors to Sizewell Beach) who are not registered to receive a telephone warning by EDF (PETIS) and do not have access to shelter or stable iodine tablets. Following transmission, the message can be viewed on Gov.uk/alerts to allow the public to validate the Alert, confirm what action is required to stay safe. Additional information is available online at www.suffolk.gov.uk/sizewell and includes the location of the Emergency Holding Area (EHA) at the Sizewell Sports and Social Club (SSSC) for those without access to shelter or stable iodine tablets. For the public within the wider DEPZ beyond 1.35km, it will reinforce the message that no immediate actions are required, but that families should collect children from schools and childcare facilities that will close as a precaution. At the first multi-agency meeting, the SCG will review the Alert to ensure that the public is responding as requested and that the message is valid and relevant. The content of the Alert can be modified and the Alert can be cancelled (all-clear issued) when the risk to life has recinded.

3.61. Within 1.35km (0.8mile).

Residents within 1.35km (0.8mile) of the site, including owners of the Vulcan Arms Public House, Beach View Holiday Park and Sizewell Hall, are asked on an annual basis to register for an automated telephone warning system managed by EDF (PETIS). The system allows EDF from the CESC to send a pre-recorded message to alert people who have registered to provide a warning of an incident or emergency at Sizewell within 1 hour of an OSNE declaration. The recorded messages are as follows:

On-Site Incident Message:

“I am informing you of a site incident at Sizewell 'B' power station. No action is to be taken. Keep listening to local radio and TV for further information.”

Off-Site Nuclear Emergency message:

“This is a Sizewell B power station message. An off-site nuclear emergency has occurred at Sizewell B power station, EDF. Please stay indoors, shut all doors and windows. Take your stable iodine tablets as directed in the Sizewell leaflet. Tune into local radio and television for information. The emergency services have been called and are responding. Press the hash key to repeat this message”


The Police will confirm with the operator that this automated warning has been provided and the message given.

The public alert following a declaration of an OSNE by the site will be reinforced by the Media Coordination Cell (MCC) via local radio and TV, and by social media.

- **1.35km (0.8mile) Transient.** Suffolk Constabulary will make arrangements to inform people on Sizewell Beach that they need to leave the area.
- **Wider DEPZ and beyond.** The Media Coordination Cell (MCC) will provide information and advice to people within the wider DEPZ beyond 1.35km, the Extended Emergency Planning Zone (EEPZ) and Outline Emergency Planning Zone (OPZ) as needed following any declaration from the site. This will reinforce the message that no immediate actions are needed by people in these areas, but to stay tuned in to local TV and radio for further information.

CIVIL RADIATION TRANSPORT

4. Any incident involving civil radioactive material in transit will be notified as follows:




5. The carrier should provide the emergency services with information on:

- ADR classification of goods being carried.
- Radiation and non-radiation hazards.
- Immediate advice on public protective actions.

The receiving emergency service control room for the incident will compile a METHANE report using information from the carrier or consignee in line with JESIP and share this with other control rooms and initial responder agencies.

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

6. Any incident involving defence nuclear material in transit will be notified as follows:



7. *The MoD JOC will provide the emergency services with information on:*

- *Details of the load.*
- *Non radiation hazards, e.g. aircraft HAZMAT.*
- *Suggested precautionary public protective actions.*

The receiving emergency service control room for the incident will compile a METHANE report using information from MoD Joint Operations Centre (JOC) in line with JESIP and share this with other control rooms and initial responder agencies.

ALERTING CONTACT INFORMATION

8. The SRF maintains an Alerting Directory on RD to allow emergency responders to alert each other in times of any emergency. This Directory is reviewed at least annually and will be used to complete alerting actions detailed in paras above. Corrections to alerting information contained in the SRF Alerting Directory and used by this plan must be notified to Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit via emergency.planning@suffolk.gov.uk.

PART 2 – IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS AND COORDINATION

PLAN ACTIVATION

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

10. *The reactor and associated plant systems at Sizewell B power station are fully equipped with automatic protection safety systems. Reactor and plant data indicators are displayed in the permanently staffed site main Control Room and provide detailed information to operator staff. These indication systems also include a perimeter fence radiation monitoring system. In the event of any information indicating abnormal conditions, the Shift Manager will carry out an immediate investigation and assessment. If the circumstances demand, the Shift Charge Engineer will initiate actions in accordance with the conditions for declaring a Site Incident or an OSNE, as detailed in the operator's On-Site Emergency Plan.*

11. Responsibility for Off-Site Plan Activation

- **Perceived/Site Incidents.** *On receipt of any notification of a perceived/on-site incident by the Sizewell B Operator, the Duty Inspector in the Suffolk Constabulary Contact and Control Room (CCR) will confirm receipt of the declaration with the site, Combined Fire Control and East of England Ambulance Control. Receiving agencies will make further alerting actions as set out in para 3. The SRF Partnership Manager, or JEPU Duty Officer if out of hours, will initiate an SRF Executive teleconference to consider the Incident and confirm multi-agency action beyond any emergency services response that may have attended the site (default dial in number in SRF Alerting Directory). The Sizewell element of this plan will not be implemented automatically for this type of declaration, but certain aspects may be brought to a higher readiness following the SRF Executive teleconference. Teleconference invitees:*

- *Suffolk Constabulary*
- *Suffolk Fire & Rescue*
- *Ambulance*
- *Suffolk County Council*
- *East Suffolk Council*
- *EA*
- *UK HSA East of England*
- *NHS England - East*
- *EDF*
- *ONR*
- *DESNZ*
- *MCGA (HM Coastguard)*
- *MHCLG RED*

- **Off-Site Nuclear Emergency.** *On receipt of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency declaration by the operator, the Duty Inspector in the Suffolk Constabulary CCR will:*
 - *Confirm the declaration by call back and confirm receipt by Fire & Rescue and Ambulance.*
 - *Declare a Major Incident.*
 - *Initiate the activation of the Strategic Coordination Centre (StratCC) - [SRF StratCC Guidance].*
 - *Confirm with Fire Control that the Suffolk TCG is being established.*

CIVIL RADIATION TRANSPORT

12. *The carrier or consignee of any package containing ionising radiation are responsible for alerting the emergency services in the event of an incident that might lead to a radiation emergency. Each carrier or consignee must have an emergency plan that sets out immediate actions by their staff at the incident scene to minimise risk to the public and to arriving emergency services and must identify how the carriers or consignees emergency response will be coordinated, including contacting local emergency services to provide relevant information about the radiation hazard.*

13. *Suffolk emergency response will be led by the lead emergency service agreed under JESIP after arrival at the incident scene. Elements of this radiation emergency response plan may be activated through an SRF teleconference or declaration of a Major Incident by one of the Suffolk emergency services.*

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

14. *In the event of an incident of this nature, the emergency services will be notified by the Joint Operations Centre (JOC). The MoD will activate the defence nuclear emergency organisation to support response at the scene and provide representation at multi-agency coordination centres if established. For incidents involving materiel transported by air, the IRF will deploy by air with the JOC providing initial information to responders with regard to the aircraft and radiation hazards and initial public protection advice.*

15. *Suffolk emergency response will be led by the lead emergency service agreed under JESIP after arrival at the incident scene. Elements of this radiation emergency response plan may be activated through an SRF teleconference or declaration of a Major Incident by one of the Suffolk emergency services.*

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS.

16. Immediate Response Checklist

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

*A checklist to guide initial radiation emergency response actions in the event of an OSNE at Sizewell B power station can be found at **APPENDIX B**.*

17. Public Protection.

17.1. **Principles.** Principles used within this plan to protect the public in the event of a radiation emergency are:

- All protection strategies should aim to do more good than harm (justification).
- Protection strategies should aim to avoid the occurrence of deterministic effects (avoid deterministic effects).
- Protection strategies for exposures below the thresholds for deterministic effects should aim to maximise the benefit achieved (optimisation).

In addition to radiation specific response activity, agencies must also sustain critical services to the public to prevent the creation of addition risks that may complicate or exacerbate any emergency response. Maintenance of critical services will be covered by individual organisational business continuity arrangements.

17.2 **Emergency Reference Levels.** UK HSA RCE Directorate has recommended Emergency Reference Levels (ERL)² to justify and optimise protective actions of sheltering-in-place, evacuation and administration of stable iodine. For each action, there is a lower and upper reference level of dose averted. ERLs recommended by UK HSA RCED for the planning of sheltering-in-place, evacuation and administration of stable iodine are given in the table.

Protective Action	Organ	Dose Averted (mSv)	
		Lower	Upper
Sheltering	Whole body	3	30
Evacuation	Whole body	30	300
Stable Iodine	Thyroid	30	100

Table 1. Recommended ERLs for Protective Actions.

17.3. **Reference Levels.** During any radiation emergency response and recovery actions will be aimed at keeping the effective dose³ to the public below 100mSv in year 1 and less than 20mSv for subsequent years. This will be managed by the SCG with advice available from STAC, which is facilitated and chaired by UK HSA East of England, in conjunction with radiation monitoring activity led by UK HSA RCED. Where the agreed reference level is at risk of being exceeded, the SCG or Recovery Coordination Group (RCG) will take further action to reduce exposure of identified groups using public protection countermeasure options below. This plan recognises the reference levels for the following groups of emergency workers:

- EDF.
- Suffolk Constabulary.
- Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service.
- East of England Ambulance Service.
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary.

2 Public Health Protection in Radiation Emergencies - PHE dated May 2019.

3 Effective dose is the overall dose to a [person from external and internal routes.

18. Public Protection Actions Options. The following protective actions are used in this plan:

18.1 **Prevention of Further Release**. The nuclear operator or carrier and the emergency services will work to ensure that the release of radioactive material is stopped or reduced as soon as possible. This essential activity will limit the hazard to public health and environmental impact.

18.2 **Stable Iodine Tablets**. The administration of stable iodine in tablet form is carried out to reduce or prevent uptake of radioactive iodine (radioiodine) by the thyroid, by saturating the thyroid with iodine which is not radioactive. Exposure to radioactive iodine which occurs either through inhalation or ingestion may increase the risk of thyroid cancer, particularly in children. The optimal period of administration of stable iodine is less than 24 hours prior to, and up to 2 hours after, the expected onset of exposure. Used during emergencies at nuclear installations, or research establishments and hospitals where radioiodine is the predominant radionuclide.

18.3 **Shelter**. Refers to staying indoor with doors and windows closed and ventilation systems turned off. Whilst any structure offers some degree of protection from airborne and deposited radioactive material, the level of protection depends upon the construction; the more open a structure the more susceptible people are to inhaling contaminants. The effectiveness of this protection measure reduces over time as buildings are not completely airtight and low levels of radioactive material may accumulate.

18.4 **Evacuation**. Where the risk to public health posed by a release of radioactive contamination is predicted or has been identified to be beyond the short-term protection which sheltering affords, a decision to evacuate areas around the incident site may be taken.

19. Pre-Agreed Urgent Public Protection Measures.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

19.1 **Shelter**. *It is unlikely that sheltering will be used for more than 48hrs in any Sizewell radiation emergency. After any period of sheltering in relation to a Sizewell radiation emergency with a confirmed release off-site, people may be advised to ventilate buildings once any airborne contamination has passed or has been terminated.*

- **Within 1.35km (0.8mile)** - *On declaration of an OSNE, the operator will automatically notify permanent residents within 1.35km of the site, visitors to the Vulcan Arms public house, including attached camp site, to Beach View Holiday Park and to Sizewell Hall plus Sizewell off-site substations (NG, SSE/EDS and RES managed), to shelter within an appropriately constructed building, via the automated telephone system. This will be reinforced by the MCC. Responders will identify areas for shelter by geographic features (e.g., road names), however consideration needs to be given to the way this information is communicated to the public as postcodes may not be familiar to holiday makers and other visitors to the area.*
- **Beyond 1.35km (0.8mile)** – *No immediate shelter action is pre-agreed beyond 1.35km (0.8 mile) on declaration of an OSNE. The 1st SCG meeting will*

determine where any extension of shelter might be needed, and arrangements are in place to implement additional shelter up to 15kms within 10-12hours.

19.2 Stable Iodine Tablets.

- **Within 1.35km (0.8 mile)** – Stable Iodine tablets can significantly reduce the exposure from radioactive iodine that may be released in the event of an incident at Sizewell B, there is no such risk from the Sizewell A site. To maximise effectiveness, the tablets must be administered promptly, ideally within 6 hours of exposure. Prompt access to these tablets is facilitated by pre-distribution to people within 1.35km of the site. This process is authorised by the Suffolk Director of Public Health and the distribution is administered by NHS England in conjunction with Ipswich & East Suffolk ICB.
- **Beyond 1.35km (0.8 mile)** – No immediate stable iodine distribution is pre-agreed. beyond 1.35km (0.8 mile) on declaration of an OSNE. The 1st SCG meeting will determine where any extension of stable iodine might be needed, and arrangements are in place to provide additional tablets up to 15kms within 10-12hours.
- *Stable iodine tablets will also be held as follows: [each pack holds 10 tablets or 5 adult doses]*

Location	Quantity
<i>1.35km (0.8mile) - pre-issue residents</i>	<i>26 packs</i>
<i>Sizewell off-site substation (NG)</i>	<i>2 packs</i>
<i>Galloper substation (RES)</i>	<i>2 packs</i>
<i>Greater Gabbard substation (SSE/EDS)</i>	<i>2 packs</i>
<i>Vulcan Arms</i>	<i>4 packs</i>
<i>Beach View</i>	<i>55 packs</i>
<i>Sizewell Hall</i>	<i>28 packs</i>
<i>Saxmundham Joint Police and Fire Station</i>	<i>200 packs</i>
<i>SFRS (Leiston Fire Station)</i>	<i>10 packs</i>
<i>EEAST (Waveney Depot)</i>	<i>30 packs</i>
<i>Ipswich Hospital</i>	<i>10 packs</i>
<i>Aldeburgh Hospital</i>	<i>30 packs</i>
<i>Sizewell Sports and Social Club – EHA use</i>	<i>20 packs</i>
<i>RMU stock</i>	<i>264 packs</i>
<i>In county Contingency Stock for EEPZ</i>	<i>2,600 packs</i>
<i>In County Total</i>	<i>3,283 packs (16, 415 adult doses)</i>

19.3 **Evacuation.**

- **Within 1.35km (0.8 mile) - Evacuation is *not* automatic on declaration of an OSNE and will only be used where people within 1.35km do not have access to permanent shelter or stable iodine. The following identified groups will be advised to evacuate by Police:**
 - Sizewell beach walkers (part of the beach is within 200m of the Sizewell B reactor building).
 - Users of Kenton Hills Car Park.
- **Beyond 1.35km (0.8 mile) – Evacuation is not an immediate action beyond 1.35km on declaration of an OSNE. The 1st SCG meeting will determine if additional evacuation measures are needed, and arrangements are in place to evacuate people up to 4kms within 10-12hours. Further detail on evacuation arrangements is at APPENDIX L.**

19.4 **Emergency Holding Area (EHA).** An EHA will be established at the Sizewell Sports and Social Club to provide a location where people who have been advised to evacuate from within 1.35km can be directed to by Police on OSNE declaration. The EHA will be set up within 1 hour of OSNE declaration to provide dry decontamination of people and provision of stable iodine. The EHA must be capable of holding at least 50 people, but with a potential surge capacity of 100 for up to 8 hours. Once an initial RMU capability is generated, people within the EHA will be transported to the RMU by Suffolk CC transport. Once people have been relocated to the RMU, the EHA facility will be shut down.

19.5 **Precautionary Action – DEPZ.**

- **Close.** In acknowledgement of likely parental action on declaration of an OSNE, the following young people related settings will be advised to close by Suffolk County Council to facilitate returning young people to family groups prior to any radiological risk.:

Children Centre	Leiston Children’s Centre, Waterloo Avenue, IP16 4HF
Children’s Nursery	Shining Stars, Leiston Children’s Centre, Waterloo Avenue, IP16 4HF
School - Secondary	Alde Valley Academy, Seaward Avenue Leiston, IP16 4BG
Further Education	Suffolk New College On The Coast, Seaward Avenue Leiston, IP16 4BG
School - Primary	Leiston Primary School, King Georges Avenue, IP16 4JQ
Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Little Avocets Nursery, Leiston Primary School, King Georges Avenue, IP16 4JQ

- **Prepare to Evacuate.** The following adult and childcare settings will be advised to prepare to evacuate by Suffolk County Council and East Suffolk Council on declaration of an OSNE. Evacuation of these groups is not automatic and would be part of any wider evacuation decision and implementation activity.

<i>Children's Home</i>	<i>Fern Lodge Children's Home, 2 King Edward Road, Leiston, IP16 4HQ</i>
<i>Sheltered Housing</i>	<i>Charles Adams Close, Leiston, IP16 4LP</i>
<i>Sheltered Housing</i>	<i>Paxton Chadwick Close, Leiston, IP16 4BJ</i>
<i>Care Home</i>	<i>Old Abbey Residential Home, Theberton Road, Leiston, IP16 4RF</i>
<i>Sheltered Housing</i>	<i>Margaret Ogilvie Almshouses, Thorpeness, IP16 4LY</i>
<i>Sheltered Housing</i>	<i>Ogilvie Almshouses, Church Lane, Aldringham, IP16 4QT</i>
<i>Care Home</i>	<i>Smyth House, High St, Leiston, IP16 4DY</i>
<i>Sheltered Housing</i>	<i>Ogilvie Homes, Goldings Lane, Leiston, IP16 4PS</i>
<i>Supported Housing</i>	<i>29 Ashfield Drive, Leiston, IP16 4EF</i>
<i>Supported Housing</i>	<i>Fridays Orchard, Haylings Road, Leiston, IP16 4ST</i>
<i>School - Private</i>	<i>Summerhill School, Westward Ho, Leiston, IP16 4HY</i>
<i>Sheltered Housing</i>	<i>Charles Miller Court, Cross Street, Leiston, IP16 4BY</i>
<i>Supported Housing</i>	<i>22 St Margaret's Crescent, Leiston</i>

19.6 **Non-Essential Staff – Sizewell A and Sizewell B.**

- **Sizewell A.** All Magnox site staff, including contractors and visitors, will take shelter and stable iodine as an immediate protection measure on being notified by Sizewell B of an OSNE. Detailed arrangements are covered in the Sizewell A emergency plan. Where Magnox emergency management consider appropriate to release non-essential staff, based upon hazard information on site or from discussions with Sizewell B ECC, Police are to be notified via Police CCR or Police SILVER if established.
- **Sizewell B –** All EDF site staff, including contractors and visitors, will take shelter and stable iodine as an immediate protection measure on declaration of an OSNE. Detailed arrangements are covered in the Sizewell B emergency plan. Where EDF duly authorised person consider it appropriate to release non-essential staff, based upon hazard information on site, Police are to be notified via Police CCR or Police SILVER if established.

In all cases, non-essential staff, contractors or visitors should not be released from shelter on-site if there is a risk of radiation present. Site emergency plans cover arrangements to sustain shelter posture for at least 12 hours while the initial emergency phase is brought under control. Where non-essential staff, contractors or visitors remain on-site and radiation is present, a phased relocation off-site will be planned in conjunction with the TCG.

19.7 **Suspension of Public Services within 1.35km.** All public services within 1.35km of the Sizewell B site should be suspended until such time that the extent of any radiation contamination is confirmed, and an assessment is made to safely restart such public services.

19.8 **Extending Urgent Public Protection Measures (Outline Planning).** If at the time of any radiation emergency the actual or projected radiation risk poses a risk beyond areas covered by urgent protective actions in paras 19.1 to 19.5, the SCG may decide to start additional public protection action using the information in **APPENDIX O**. This appendix includes information to assist decision making and to provide starting points for mobilising additional capabilities over a wider area. A specific evacuation option has been developed which is covered in **APPENDIX L**.

19.9 **Summary of protective actions:**

Zone	Size	Response Action Timeliness	Key Planned Public Protection Actions
Detailed Emergency Planning Zone	3-4kms from site	Immediate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shelter & Stable Iodine Within 1.35km (0.8mile). Evacuate transient or those without shelter within 1.35km (0.8 mile). Close child settings (e.g. schools, childcare centres, etc). Prepare Care Homes for evacuation. Establish Emergency Holding Area for 1.35km (0.8 mile) evacuees. Establish 1 x Rest centre. Establish RMU
Extended Emergency Planning Zone	15km radius from site	Implement within 12 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare to evacuate up to 4kms. Prepare to Establish 2 x large Rest Centres. Hold stable iodine in county to provide to evacuees
Outline Emergency Planning Zone	30km radius from site	Implement after 24hrs	Evacuation, Shelter or stable iodine beyond 15kms to 30kms

CIVIL RADIATION TRANSPORT

20. *No pre-agreed public protection actions.*

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

21. *Precautionary public protection actions are advised for defence nuclear transport incidents as follows:*

<i>Air:</i>	<i>Nuclear Weapon</i>	<i>Evacuate all within 600m radius. Shelter 5 km downwind (45deg arc)</i>
	<i>Uranium/Plutonium</i>	<i>Evacuate all within 100m radius. Shelter 1 km downwind (45deg arc)</i>
	<i>Tritium</i>	<i>Evacuate all within 100m radius. Shelter 600m downwind (45deg arc)</i>

Stable iodine is not required.

22. Contaminated Food and Water. The control of the management and consumption of foodstuffs and water is the responsibility of the:

- Food Standards Agency (FSA)
- Drinking Water Inspectorate.
- Relevant water companies.
- Control of private water supplies – relevant District or Borough Council.

A primary role of the Environment Agency (EA) in the initial response is to provide advice to the Drinking Water Inspectorate / local authority on the impact of radioactivity to water in the environment which may be used for drinking water.

Decisions about potential restrictions of consumption as a countermeasure will be made by the SCG, informed by the FSA or the STAC with FSA as a member.

Restrictions may be used over a wider area and for an extended period.

Communication of any restrictions and advice will be managed by the MCC in conjunction with the FSA, Drinking Water Inspectorate, local authority EHOs and Anglian or Essex and Suffolk Water.

23. Public Protection Countermeasure Advice.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

Immediate countermeasure advice on the declaration of an OSNE at Sizewell B power station is provided by the relevant Site Emergency Controller to Suffolk Constabulary. This will include confirmation to take pre-issued stable iodine tablets within 1.35km if the emergency was at the Sizewell B power station. Prior to the arrival of the CTA, the CESC will provide countermeasure advice to the SCG.

Countermeasure advice may also be provided by UK HSA RCED over the telephone while a local STAC is forming.

Once the STAC forms, an automatic generation on OSNE declaration, countermeasure advice will be provided and reviewed to inform the SCG.

CIVIL RADIATION TRANSPORT

While there are no pre-advised public protection measures for an incident involving a package containing ionising radiation, each carrier or consignee will advise through the driver/escort commander of any immediate public protection measures, which are likely to involve a cordon while the situation is assessed.

Where assessment of the radiation hazard indicates a risk to the public, advice should be sought from UK HSA RCED on any subsequent public protection measures; these must be agreed via multi-agency teleconference or virtual SCG meeting as appropriate.

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

Immediate public protection countermeasure advice for an incident involving defence nuclear material being transported by air will be provided by the JOC to Police. On arrival of the MoD Immediate Response Force by helicopter, on scene advice will be provided to the emergency services to support response actions aimed at controlling any radiation release. Where the incident has been declared a Major Incident by Police, due to the potential severity of the public risk, the MoD will deploy Follow On Forces to both incident scene and also to the StratCC. A senior official, the Military/MoD Coordinating Authority, will be deployed to the StratCC to provide senior representation, including the provision of public protection advice alongside UK HSA RCED.

24. Initial Radiation Monitoring

Monitoring will be carried out after any radiation emergency for the following purposes:

- Activities associated with the immediate safety of people, including determination and confirmation of immediate public protective actions, and provision of
 - Public reassurance monitoring.
 - Establish environmental impact.
 - Determine food and water protective measures.

UK HSA CRCD will coordinate overall radiation monitoring activities in conjunction with national agencies that provide specific capabilities. These agencies are:

- **Environment Agency.** Adapt standing processes to an incident, including:
 - Monitoring of radioactivity in the environment in the vicinity of nuclear sites or radiological incidents - including dose rates, sampling and radiochemical analysis of environmental materials.
 - Radiochemical analysis of raw water sources including those which are used for drinking water supplies
 - Monitoring of radioactive fallout in air and rain.

- **UK HSA CRE Directorate**
 - Deploy radiation monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and undertaking measurements of radioactivity on or in people (in support of local resources).
- **Food Standards Agency**
 - Monitoring and sampling of food.
- **Suffolk County Council:**
 - Screening potentially contaminated non-food goods.
- **District/Borough Councils**
 - Monitoring food in the retail chain.
- **Essex and Suffolk Water & Anglian Water**
 - Safety of drinking water – including its radioactive content.
 - Identifying potentially contaminated water supplies.
- **MoD** (via MACA for civil nuclear)
 - Monitoring of radioactivity in the environment at the incident scene and in the downwind sector.
 - Supporting reassurance monitoring.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

- **EDF**
 - *Maintain site fence radiation detection monitors to detect gamma radiation leaving the site.*
 - *Provide vehicle borne radiation survey teams to:*
 - *Initially survey the area around the site in the event of a radiation emergency.*
 - *Subsequently support UK HSA CRCE defined monitoring strategy.*
- **RIMNET**
 - *Maintain automated gamma detection monitors locally out to 12km from the site to provide real time information during any radiation emergency.*

29.1 Sizewell Environment Monitoring

This plan uses a layered approach to monitoring the environment following a Sizewell radiation emergency. The approach uses a range of fixed, mobile, automated and manually read detection systems. This will be achieved as follows:

Immediately - *Confirm the release of radiation from the site. The Primary source of information is the site emergency plume gamma monitoring system which automatically provides the site operator with information which can be used to confirm an OSNE if it has not already been declared from assessment of the plant condition.*

From Declaration - *Automated monitoring of the wider area to provide an indication of the spread of radiation. The primary source of information is the automated radiation monitors located at fixed sites out to 12km from the site.*

Within 4hrs - Confirm the extent of radiation contamination around the site. Initial data is provided by two off-site survey vehicles controlled by the site. Once the CESC is operational the coordination of the vehicles and the analysis and onward communication of the information is transferred to the CESC. Additional off-site survey vehicles may travel from the other nuclear sites to provide more monitoring resource.

All available monitoring information will be used by UK HSA CRCE (in consultation with other responding organisations) to provide advice on the public protective actions via STAC (once established).

A map showing the locations of environmental monitoring locations is at [APPENDIX N](#).

25. Public Health

25.1 **Casualty Arrangements.** The designated receiving hospital for casualties from a radiation emergency in Suffolk is East Suffolk & North Essex NHS Foundation Trust (ESNEFT). They will be prepared to receive and treat contaminated casualties. Other hospitals may be used for treatment of casualties with other clinical needs.

25.2 **Worried Well/NHS 111.** It is anticipated that members of the public unaffected by any off-site emergency may seek information or advice in relation to their own wellbeing. Unless actually ill or injured, they should be discouraged from dialling 999 or self-presenting at any medical facility. Health related non-emergency calls should be directed to the 111 system.

The Director on Call for Ipswich & East Suffolk Care Boards (ICBs) has access to the 24/7 111 supervisor number. A script providing Sizewell radiation emergency related information to public callers can be supplied to the 111 call centre by UK HSA RCD and updated as required, via the ICB Director on Call, in order to address any queries received.

26. Initial Humanitarian Assistance

26.1 **Rest Centres.** Suffolk district and borough councils have a range of pre-identified Rest Centres that will be used to provide a place of safety for evacuated people in the event of any radiation emergency. These will be located outside of the area that could be potentially asked to take shelter immediately (1.35km).

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

26.2 **Rest Centre.** *A Rest Centre has been pre-identified for use in a Sizewell radiation emergency:*

*Riverside Centre, Stratford St Andrew, IP17 1LL, (East Suffolk Council lead)
- 300 seated*

This will be established on declaration of OSNE and will cater for any people beyond 1.35km who choose to self-evacuate rather than stay put and await further information; these people are very unlikely to have been exposed to radiation.

Where there is a requirement for further Rest Centres, these will be identified as needed from a list of pre-identified sites. Specific arrangements to support evacuation up to 4kms are included in Appendix K.

26.3 **Emergency Holding Area.** *An emergency holding area will be established by Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service in the Sizewell Sports and Social Club immediately on declaration of OSNE at Sizewell B. The facility will receive any person advised to evacuate from within 1.35km (0.8 mile) and provide initial dry decontamination, overseen by Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service, and stable iodine. People will be held at this facility until a Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU) is operational at which point they will be relocated from this location for more formal radiation monitoring, additional decontamination and health care as required.*

27. Exclusion Zones

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

27.1 **Air Exclusion Zone.** *The airspace around Sizewell is restricted to aircraft by The Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Nuclear Installations) Regulations 2007 - SI 2007/1929. This restricts flight over Sizewell within 2km of the site and below 2000ft, except for landing at or taking off from the helicopter landing area at the site with the permission of the Site Director. During any radiation emergency, the Police may request Department of Transport to increase this restriction under Section 96 of the Civil Aviation - Air Navigation Order 2005 if it is in the public interest.*

27.2 **Maritime Exclusion Zone.** *Restrictions on Maritime activities during a radiation emergency will be implemented and managed by the MCGA. 1.35km is the recommended minimum radius for an initial exclusion zone.*

COORDINATION OF RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

28. Integrated Emergency Response & Recovery. In order to achieve a combined and coordinated response to a radiation emergency in Suffolk by all relevant organisations and agencies, the existing national emergency management framework will be used. This allows local responders to coordinate response actions and to establish links with national emergency management structures to provide information and to manage any support provided. Local multi-agency coordination for any Suffolk radiation emergency will be led as follows:

- A local Senior Police officer will Chair the SCG.
- A Suffolk local authority executive officer will Chair the RCG.
- UK HSA East of England will Chair the STAC.
- Suffolk County Council will lead the MCC.
- Suffolk Constabulary will Chair the TCG.
- Emergency Services Operational Commanders will produce and agree a multi-agency response plan to provide a coordinated operational response.

28.1 **Information Sharing and Situational Awareness.** Information relating to any Suffolk radiation emergency will be shared via a dedicated RD response page that will be initially established as part of StratCC/TCG operations. This includes a rolling SITREP at the front of the RD response page to ensure that all agencies have access to the latest situation. Formal SITREPs to central government will also be available on this RD response page. A visualisation of the risk, confirmed hazards, agreed response actions (including public protect measures) and key locations for deployed responders will be displayed on RD mapping; this map will be maintained in accordance with SRF StratCC and TCG guidance. Access to the SRF RD response pages can be obtained as follows:

- Pre incident – via the SRF Partnership Manager.
- During a response – via StratCC Coordination staff.

29. Local Response. The SRF Generic Response Plan sets out the emergency management structure to be used for any radiation emergency. This operates at 3 levels:

- Strategic
- Tactical
- Operational on scene

Agencies required to attend the StratCC are listed in the next paragraph.

Arrangements for individual agency control rooms can be found in their respective Major Incident Plans.

30. National and Regional Agency Deployment. National and regional agencies will not be physically present at initial SCG and/or TCG meetings. This plan assumes that teleconferencing will be needed to engage with such agencies (default dial in number in SRF Alerting Directory) and assumes arrival as follows:

Agencies at Initial SCG/TCG (90mins post declaration)

- Suffolk Constabulary
- Suffolk Fire & Rescue
- East of England Ambulance Service
- Suffolk County Council
- East Suffolk Council
- MCGA (HM Coastguard)

Additional 2ndst SCG/TCG (4hrs post declaration)

- MoD/JRLO
- NHSE EofE
- EA
- ICB
- UK HSA East of England

Additional 3rd SCG/TCG (6-7hours post declaration)

- DESNZ
- MHCLG
- DEFRA
- **EDF**
- ONR
- UK HSA RCED
- Norfolk CC

Following Agencies always likely to be via virtual engagement:

- MCGA (HM Coastguard)
- Met Office
- UKPN
- Anglian Water
- Essex and Suffolk Water
- BTP
- Network Rail
- Norfolk CC
- Transport Carrier or consignee
- *Magnox Sizewell A*
- FSA

31. National Response & Recovery. The national response to a UK radiation emergency is covered in national guidance issued by DESNZ (fixed nuclear and civil nuclear transport risks) and MoD (Defence nuclear risks). Central government coordination will be led as follows:

31.1 **Response Phase:**

- *Sizewell emergency – DESNZ will be the lead government department.*
- *Civil nuclear transport emergency – DESNZ will be the lead government department.*
- *Defence nuclear transport emergency – MoD will be the lead government department.*

31.2 **Recovery Phase:**

- *Sizewell emergency – DEFRA will be the lead government department.*
- *Civil nuclear transport emergency – DEFRA will be the lead government department.*
- *Defence nuclear transport emergency – to be determined.*

32. **Regional Coordination**. If the radiation emergency is likely to affect a neighbouring LRF area, a Response Coordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened to assist with coordination and facilitate support at a cross-SCG level. In such circumstances or in the event of a potential emergency or escalating incident, the SRF will request that MHCLG convene a ResCG to bring together appropriate cross border representation. ResCGs are most likely to be managed via a teleconference. The SCG Chair or nominated representative would dial into any ResCG.

33. Scientific and Technical Advice

33.1 STAC. A physical STAC will be formed to provide advice to the SCG on any radiation emergency involving:

- *Fixed civil nuclear site.*
- *Defence nuclear material in transit.*

A virtual STAC may be formed to provide advice in the event of an emergency involving civil nuclear transport material in transit.

STAC advice guides decisions made by the SCG and information provided to the public by the MCC.

The site operator or carrier will initially provide advice in the very early stages before this role is taken over by the STAC.

Detailed arrangements for the STAC are in Part 4 of the StratCC Guide.

33.2 Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). A SAGE will be formed as part of COBR to provide coordinated scientific and technical advice to the central government response. Detailed arrangements for SAGE are at Annex D to the [UK Central Government Response - Concept of Operations](#).

34. Security Incidents

The Home Office are the lead government department for security related events or acts and in consultation with DESNZ and MoD has developed specific guidance in relation to the management of terrorist action that results in a radiation emergency.

This outline approach builds upon the existing arrangements and provide additional specialist capabilities relevant to the terrorist activities.

Single points of coordination at national and local level, i.e. COBR and SCG respectively, remain fundamental to effective response.

Additional arrangements that will be employed are at [APPENDIX M](#)

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

35. **Support to Sizewell On Site Response.** *The local emergency services will deploy a predetermined attendance to a OSNE declaration at Sizewell. This will comprise of the initial response capability and liaison officers to the Emergency Control Centre (ECC). Emergency services will access the site via the main site entrance, unless informed otherwise by the site, and will be met by EDF staff that will:*

- *Provide a brief on the incident to the emergency services ground commanders.*
- *Confirm radiation protection requirements.*
- *Facilitate access to the site for uniformed emergency services personnel with issued ID.*
- *Provide a safe route to the incident scene where intervention action is taking place by site personnel.*

COMMUNICATIONS

36. Media Coordination

36.1 **Purpose.** The SRF Communications Plan provides a framework which will:

- Ensure clear and timely information by appropriate means to the public.
- Provide appropriate procedures for dealing with the media in requesting assistance with provision of information to the public.

36.2 **Coordination.** A key element of media coordination is to ensure that a consistent understanding of the local, national and international communications related to any radiation emergency is established. The key elements to this are:

- Suffolk Media Communications Cell (MCC). This cell will be established at the Suffolk StratCC for any Sizewell OSNE by Suffolk County Council and may be set up for civil or defence transport incidents. The cell will be supported by communications officers from other Suffolk responders as set out in the SRF Communications Plan. The MCC will be led by Suffolk County Council. The cell will establish contact with communications officers from the operator and UK HSA, if not deployed to the StratCC to work virtually with these organisations. The MCC will:
 - Provide information to people likely to be affected by actions taken to manage any radiation emergency, including FAQs.
 - Monitor local media channels.
 - Agree media messages and other public information with the STAC Chair and SCG Chair.
 - Attend the SCG to update on media and public information activity.
 - Establish a Media Briefing Facility at Suffolk Constabulary HQ and manage activity within the facility.
 - Establish contact with the NCC to share understanding of local media activity and coordinate public information messages.
 - Coordinate local media messages during the response phase and into the initial recovery phase.
 - Coordinate visits by VIPs to Suffolk during any radiation emergency.
 - Utilise the Suffolk Emergency Helpline to handle non-emergency calls related to any radiation emergency, including provision of basic advice and information.
 - Media Briefing Centre. A facility will be established in the assembly hall at Suffolk Constabulary HQ to provide a central briefing point and work area for the media. Press conferences will normally be led by senior officers from Suffolk Constabulary, Suffolk County Council DPH, UK HSA East of England and the operator/carrier. NHS England or UK HSA CRCE may also be required to participate.
 - Media Centre. The Media Centre may be established at or near the incident scene:
 - To provide a location for the media to film or interview close to the incident. Liaison is required with the emergency services on scene to ascertain an appropriate area
 - Deployment of a communications officer may be requested by the TCG or Ground Commanders as they require assistance with managing the media in the area
- Any media in the incident area will be treated as members of the public for the purposes of protective actions. If shelter or evacuation has been implemented for the public, the media will not be allowed into the incident area/s. Media attendance at evacuation centres will also be facilitated by the MCC.
- Suffolk Emergency Helpline. A public helpline may be established by Suffolk County Council during any radiation emergency to act as a focal point for general advice and information. This capability will take a number of hours to fully establish and during this period, normal non-emergency numbers used by responder agencies and the operators will continue to be used. A call centre to operate the helpline will be staffed primarily by Suffolk County Council officers and augmented by specialist staff if needed. The call centre will use prepared scripts to provide advice to the public and

will be supported by the MCC to allow it to provide information as events unfold during any incident. A call centre will operate the Suffolk Emergency Helpline 0345 603 2814.

- Cabinet Office News Coordination Cell (NCC). During any radiation emergency, the Cabinet Office may establish an NCC as part of COBR to:
 - Check the consistency of messaging across government departments and agencies ensuring that they are not contradictory and are being released from limited sources.
 - Ensure that messages and speeches from Ministers and senior officials are not being made at the same time.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

36.4 Pre-Prepared Statements. *A pre-prepared statement will be used as follows immediately after any radiation emergency:*

MEDIA HOLDING STATEMENT FOR AN INCIDENT AT SIZEWELL B NUCLEAR POWER STATION

At xxxAM/PM today, an incident occurred at Sizewell B Power Station in Suffolk.

Emergency services are currently at the scene, assessing the situation with staff from the station.

As a precaution, non-residential schools and childcare settings within the DEPZ have been advised to close.

More information will be issued promptly to the public by the authorities once this assessment is completed.

Residents are advised to tune into local radio, television or monitor local news websites for further information in relation to this incident.

ENDS

- DESNZ Emergency Operations Centre. *During any radiation emergency, DESNZ as the lead government department will:*
 - *Take overall responsibility for ensuring that Ministers are briefed.*
 - *Take overall responsibility for handling national media and parliamentary interest.*
 - *Act as a focal point for media coordination at the national level in conjunction with the NCC.*
 - *Act as the focal point for coordinating media messages between central government and the Suffolk MCC.*
 - *Notify the European Community, the International Atomic Energy Agency and countries with which the UK has bilateral agreements about the emergency and its likely course and effects.*

37. Communication Systems. *During any radiation emergency, it is vital that information is passed effectively in voice and data formats to allow effective management of the incident. Communications systems likely to be used are as follows:*

Ground (Incident Scene)	AIRWAVE. Mobile Phone.
Tactical	AIRWAVE. Resilience Direct – up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE - Information sharing between Suffolk responders. Mobile Phone. Fixed telephone. E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE.
Strategic	Resilience Direct – up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE information sharing between all responding agencies. Mobile Phone. Fixed telephone. E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. Access to TiMS via EDF. Access to NAME via Met Office. Access to NERIMS via MoD.
Cross Border	Mobile Phone. Fixed telephone. E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. Resilience Direct - for information sharing.
Regional	Mobile Phone. Fixed telephone. E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. TiMS. Resilience Direct.
National	Mobile Phone. Fixed telephone. E-mail - up to SECRET (only when set up). Resilience Direct.

38. Key Contact Numbers.

38.1 **SRF Alerting Directory.** An SRF alerting directory is maintained to allow alerting of Suffolk emergency responders for any incident or emergency and supplements the alerting flowcharts in para 3. This protectively marked directory can be accessed via the SRF RD website.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

38.2 **Site Helpline Number.** EDF maintains a public helpline for use during emergencies. This can be called on **0808 100 1734** and will provide basic information on any incident at Sizewell B Power Station via automated message.

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PART 3 – SUBSEQUENT RESPONSE ACTIONS

RADIATION MONITORING

39. Subsequent Radiation Monitoring

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

***Within 24hrs** - Confirm the extent of radiation contamination within 15km of the site. The prime source of information is vehicle survey teams coordinated by UK HSA RCED. Information gathered by UK HSA RCED and from those agencies coordinated by UK HSA RCED will place data onto RIMNET to allow this to be used to inform decisions on public protective actions.*

***Baseline/Within 24hrs** - A range of fixed radiation detectors is established around the site to provide historical data on activity around the site and to identify specific nuclides during an emergency. These systems require manual interpretation, and the information will be used to assess the scale of radioactive release compared with background levels and confirm the specific types of material that has been released.*

40. Radiation Monitoring. Monitoring people for radioactive contamination can be undertaken for those who may, or think they may, have been contaminated. This monitoring is coordinated by UK HSA RCED and may involve the following facilities:

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

- Dedicated People Monitoring Facilities. A Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU) will be established on declaration of OSNE at Felixstowe Leisure Centre. This will not be available before 6hrs and will take up to 24hrs for full operational capability. The initial radiation monitoring capability will provide for up to 25% of evacuated people – i.e., up to 1725 people. Further detail on the RMU set up is at [**APPENDIX Q**](#).
- Hospital A&E. A&E departments in local hospitals may receive people who think that they might have been contaminated by radioactivity. In these cases, hospitals will follow existing arrangements for managing contaminated people. **IT IS NOT THE INTENTION TO DIRECT PEOPLE TO HOSPITALS.**
 - NHS Facilities. People may present at any NHS facility concerned about radioactive contamination. Where possible these people should be directed to the RMU.

People monitoring may be conducted as follows:

- External Contamination Monitoring. Direct measurements for external contamination can be carried out using handheld or portal type monitoring equipment. Handheld equipment can be used on people and on physical items such as bags or cars. Such equipment can detect gamma, beta and alpha radiation. Where external contamination is found, decontamination and internal monitoring may be advised by UK HSA RCED.

- Internal Monitoring. Internal contamination of radionuclides which emit penetrating radiation can be measured by placing a detector close to the body. If the radionuclides do not emit radiation that can be detected through the skin, then samples can be taken to measure concentration; this indirect measurement is conducted at a laboratory.
- Blood Cell Count. Where people may have received high levels of ionising radiation, various techniques can be used to assess any dose by the analysis of blood samples.

DECONTAMINATION

41. Decontamination. Before this can take place, people must be removed from the contaminated zone; this will usually be upwind of any contamination. Arrangements can be put in place as follows:

- Casualty. The East of England Ambulance Service may undertake casualty decontamination to reduce radiation levels before onwards transport to hospital. Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service may support this activity.
- Mass Decontamination. Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service can provide mass decontamination capability at the request of the East of England Ambulance Service. Initial capability is based within the county (300 people per hour). Further capability can be drawn from neighbouring Fire & Rescue Services in line with national mutual aid arrangements within 60 mins to 120 mins. Mass Decontamination facilities are most likely to be set up at the RMU location.
- Vehicles. There is no current process for vehicles. In such cases, the vehicle will be deemed contaminated for insurance purposes and subsequent loss action. The vehicle will be set aside at the decontamination centre and subsequently removed as contaminated waste.

Further guidance on decontamination of buildings and open environment issued by DEFRA CBRN Emergencies using national guidance: [Guidance on decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and open environment](#)

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

42. Temporary Accommodation. Longer term accommodation, beyond 12hrs - 24hrs, for evacuated people will be coordinated by the relevant Suffolk district or borough council, supported by neighbouring councils as needed under Suffolk Local Government mutual aid arrangements.

43. Longer Term Humanitarian Assistance. Longer term humanitarian assistance arrangements are detailed in the SRF Generic Response and the SRF Generic Recovery Plans.

LIVESTOCK

44. Advice to farmers will follow the DEFRA guidance 'Nuclear Accidents and the Farmer – Livestock and Crop Management'. Key elements:

- Farm animals are unlikely to suffer as a direct result of radiation exposure.
- Livestock will not normally be evacuated.
- Farmers may need special provision to allow short term entry into evacuation areas for watering, feeding and milking. This approach should follow emergency worker arrangements for radiation protection.
- DEFRA guidance provides specific advice for different type of livestock farming to delay onset of welfare problems.
- Minimal action should be taken by arable farmers to safeguard crops – these will likely be covered by food restrictions.
- All farmers should maintain records of any loss for future compensation.

MUTUAL AID

45. This plan uses existing arrangements for requesting additional support from the following agencies:

- **Police** - National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC). Request generated by Suffolk Constabulary.
- **Fire & Rescue** - Fire and Rescue Service National Coordination Centre (FRSNCC). Request generated by Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service.
- **Ambulance** - National Ambulance Coordination Centre (NACC). Request generated by East of England Ambulance Service.
- **NHS** - NHS Mutual Aid Arrangements. Request generated by NHS England, Midlands and East - East Team.
- **Local Authorities** - MoU for Suffolk Local Authorities Mutual Aid. Request generated by requiring local authority.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

A Sizewell radiation emergency will require Suffolk local authority mutual aid if the 4km evacuation option is enacted. This has been pre-agreed between Suffolk local authorities using existing Rest Centre volunteer staff arrangements.

- **Search & Rescue** - Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre. Request generated by Suffolk Constabulary if on land and MCGA if at sea.
- **UK Military** - Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA). Request generated by SCG and passed via JRLO.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

There is an identified need to fill a specialist capability gap, a MACA request may be triggered by the 1st SCG meeting in accordance with MOD Joint Service Publication

- **US Military** - USAF Department of Defence Directive 5100.46. Request generated by SCG and passed via USAFE executive officer at the StratCC or JRLO if no USAF presence.

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PART 4 - INITIAL RECOVERY ACTIONS


PLANNING FOR RECOVERY

46. Planning for recovery from a radiation emergency will start shortly after the initial response with the formation of a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) at the Strat CC. This will be led by a local authority executive officer from Suffolk County Council. Recovery is integral to response to a radiation emergency. Responders need to consider recovery from the start otherwise decisions made in the response phase may have a profound influence on the ability to recover successfully. Planning for nuclear recovery needs to be:

- Risk-based.
- Proportionate.
- Flexible, scalable and non-prescriptive.
- Open to lessons learned from previous events.
- Inclusive; and,
- Coordinated.

For further information on the principles for nuclear recovery planning see the [National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance Part 3- Recovery](#).

Figure 1 Organisation of recovery effort in the response phase



TRANSITION FROM RESPONSE TO RECOVERY

47. All Radiation Incidents

The transition phase refers to the process and the time period during which there is a progression to the point at which an incident can be terminated. During this period, the relevant prerequisites that should be fulfilled before moving from the response phase to the recovery phase are gradually addressed. The transition phase commences as early as possible once the source has been brought under control and the situation is stable; the transition phase ends when all the necessary prerequisites for terminating the incident have been met. The termination of a nuclear or radiological incident marks the end of the emergency and therefore the emergency exposure situation, and the beginning of either an existing exposure situation or a planned exposure situation.

The transition phase may last from a day to a few weeks for a small-scale incident but could last a month to a year for a large-scale incident e.g. an emergency at a nuclear installation resulting in significant off-site contamination. It is not driven by urgency and allows for adapting, justifying and optimizing protection strategies as the emergency evolves and for interested parties to be consulted.

The transition from the emergency exposure situation will occur gradually in specific areas within the whole affected area. In this case, the transition phase will end when the final area that was in an emergency exposure situation has transitioned to an existing exposure situation. The transition of this final area to an existing exposure situation will also denote the overall termination of the emergency.

48. Local Level. The SCG should discuss and agree criteria for the handover of coordination from the SCG to the RCG. This will not be an immediate priority for the SCG, but handover criteria should be agreed early in the response. In addition to the requirements laid out in the Handover Certificate, Annex A of the SRF Generic Recovery Plan the below criteria should be used to assess the readiness for handover from the SCG to the RCG during a radiation emergency:

- The release of radioactivity has stopped
- There is no significant risk of further radiological release
- Urgent public protective actions have been lifted
- Non-radiological consequences relevant to the termination for the emergency should be identified, and actions to address them should be considered.
- The sharing of any information and data that were gathered during the response phase and are relevant for recovery has been organised and shared with organisations
- Consultation with interested parties is required before the termination of the emergency
- A strategy for community engagement is in place and links with the community representatives have been established
- A registry and programme of those individuals who have been identified as requiring longer term medical follow-up should be established before the termination of the emergency
- A strategy for mental health and psychosocial support for the affected population has been developed
- Infrastructure essential to support community recovery is functioning normally (communications, transport, utilities health and social services)
- Consideration should be given to the arrangement of any radioactive waste arising from the emergency
- Consideration has been given to the compensation of victim for damage due to the emergency

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

- *The onsite incident has been contained.*
- *Emergency Service response onsite is terminated (does not include investigative actions).*

Other considerations:

- Elected members have been briefed on the potential long-term impacts of the event and consulted on the recovery strategy and delivery plan.
- Communication with responding agencies and the community about the handover.
- Once the handover criteria have been met, the SCG Chair will invite the RCG Chair to take over coordination of activity and a formal handover certificate signed [see SRF Generic Recovery plan].

CIVIL RADIATION TRANSPORT

The consignor of class 7 goods involved in a radiation emergency must prepare a handover report and provide a copy of the handover report to the recovery authority. The timing of the transition to the recovery phase will be determined by the emergency services responding to the emergency in consultation with the local authority and not by the carrier or consignor.

49. National level. During the response phase, DEFRA, Cabinet Office and other relevant departments will consult on what support is likely to be needed by local responders during the recovery phase. This will influence the national support structures put in place and will include:

- A continued presence (physically or virtually) from a Government Liaison Officer in the RCG
- Establishing a Ministerial Recovery Group.

Lead Government Department for both response and recovery will observe local transition arrangements. A formal handover between departments will occur when:

- The emergency is contained and there is no significant risk of resurgence.
- Public safety measures are in place and working effectively.
- The Ministerial Recovery Group (MRG) is established and pro-active at the national level.
- The Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) is established and pro-active at local authority level.

RECOVERY STRATEGY

50. In order to implement the recovery process effectively and to make balanced, reasoned decisions at each step, it is important that responders fully understand the radiological and other long-term consequences of a radiation emergency. An important part of the RCG during the response phase is to develop a recovery strategy to be communicated to the SCG. A start point strategy can be found in the [SRF Generic Recovery Plan](#). However, the following aims specific to this risk could be used:

- Minimise risks to people and environment.
- Assist the community in returning to a new normality as soon as possible.
- Provide reassurance and build confidence.
- Establish clear objectives for remediation and when to stop.
- Manage wastes contaminated with radioactivity.




Figure 2 National and Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance Part 3 Recovery

For a more detailed explanation of each step refer to the [National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance Part 3- Recovery](#).

Immediate challenges for the multi-agency recovery following a radiation emergency effort will be to:

- Support sectors of the population temporarily evacuated or permanently relocated as a result of the event.
- Understand the extent and level of contamination based on available monitoring and sampling capability and what it means for long term radiation exposure.
- Understand the potential long-term impact on infrastructure, business, activities, agriculture, food production, drinking water and leisure.
- Identify where access to contaminated areas needs to be restricted, where remediation is necessary and where ‘doing nothing’ is the best long-term option.
- Coordinate remediation activities on the ground. These will include monitoring, hazard assessment, clean up, waste disposal and clearance monitoring of public and private assets.
- Manage communications with the public, media and stakeholders.
- Manage the expectations of the public and stakeholders.

- Establish a decision-making process which is open, transparent and involves representatives of the affected community.
- Establish effective processes for compensation claims; and,
- Manage the long-term impacts on the local economy.

RECOVERY STRUCTURE

51. The initial recovery structure will be confirmed early into any response by the RCG Chair at an SCG meeting following an impact assessment. This will ensure that the right organisations are invited to participate. The structure provides a starting point and can be flexed accordingly. It is recommended that a member of the RCG is appointed to track the development of advice by the STAC to ensure that any implications for longer term recovery are identified and understood.




Figure 3 Organisation of recovery effort during the recovery phase of a nuclear incident

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

The MOD will continue to support and work with the local authority in the same manner as they had with the lead agency in the response phase. MOD personnel will remain until it is agreed that their role has ceased.

RECOVERY ACTIVITIES

52. [UK Recovery Handbooks for Radiation Incidents 2015](#) has been developed to assist in the management of contaminated food production systems, inhabited areas and drinking water supplies following a radiation incident.

RADIATION MONITORING

53. UK HSA RCE Directorate undertakes radiation monitoring coordination during the emergency phase. This role will continue in the early recovery phase. Longer term arrangements for radiation monitoring and its coordination will depend on the monitoring priorities as recovery progresses and will be agreed by RCG.

[The Radiation Recovery Record Form](#) (RRRF) should be used whilst following one, or all the handbooks. The form has been designed to record decisions made to provide a clear, auditable record of the decision-making process.

53.1 **Environmental Monitoring.** The monitoring of radioactivity present in the environment as a result of a radiation emergency will continue throughout the Recovery Phase coordinated by the Environment and Waste subgroup. The Environment Agency has contractors who carry out environmental monitoring programmes in support of their regulatory responsibilities.

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

MOD will assist other authorities with remediation.

53.2 **Personal Radiation Monitoring.** The health services locally are responsible for activating local facilities for monitoring in relation to people, specifically to provide reassurance to members of the public. This will be delivered through the activation and operation a RMU when required.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL

Monitoring resources from nuclear operators would be made available to provide assistance in undertaking personal monitoring as part of public reassurance measures.

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

MOD can provide advisers to assist in establishing monitoring priorities should assistance with additional monitoring of those who have been de-contaminated during evacuation be required. Additionally, MOD can assist with monitoring of members of the public who think they have been contaminated.

53.3 **Food Monitoring.** The FSA is responsible for arrangements for monitoring and food sampling and assessing the results to define any area to be subject to food advice and restrictions. The local authority would be responsible for the provision of Environmental Health Officers responsible for monitoring food in the retail chain and Trading Standards Officers responsible for screening potentially contaminated non-food goods.

[Food Production Systems Handbook](#) focuses on the management of contaminated food productions systems following a radiation incident agricultural and domestic food productions are considered. It provides decision-makers and other stakeholders with guidance on how to manage the impacts of a radiation incident and will assist in the development of a recovery strategy.

53.4 **Drinking Water.** Water supply companies and authorities are responsible for ensuring the potability of drinking water supplied to their customers – including its radioactive content – and identifying potentially contaminated water supplies. Local Authorities are

responsible for ensuring the continued safety of private drinking water supplies serving multiple premises.

[The Drinking Water Supplies Handbook](#) focuses on the management of drinking water as supplied to the public i.e. at the tap and not that in drinking water sources such as reservoirs. It provides decision-makers and other stakeholders with guidance on how to manage the impacts of a radiation incident on drinking water supplies and will assist in the development of a recovery strategy.

53.5 Inhabited Areas. Following a radiation incident, contamination may occur in an inhabited area. As a consequence, many types of surfaces and areas could be affected which require specific types of management options to reduce external doses and doses from inhalation of resuspended material. Clean-up may result in large volumes of contaminated material requiring disposal. The [Inhabited Areas Handbook](#) provides decision-makers with guidance on how to manage many facets of a radiation incident as well as tools to assist in the selection of recovery strategy.

53.6 Animal Welfare. To be issued.

53.7 Radioactive Waste Disposal

Environment Agency Role

Advise on the management and disposal of wastes contaminated with radioactivity. Advise DEFRA on the regulatory matters relating to the management and disposal of radioactive wastes.

Food Standards Agency Role

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) can advise on the disposal of contaminated foodstuffs to ensure it unfit food does not re-enter the food chain. In the event of a significant beyond design basis accident, the FSA would work in conjunction with the food and farming industries, local authorities, interested Government departments and other response agencies to agree an appropriate disposal strategy.

COMMUNICATION AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT

Before the termination of the emergency, the following should be discussed with and communicated with the public and other interested parties as appropriate:

- The basis for the termination of the emergency and an overview of the actions taken and the restrictions imposed.
- The need to adjust imposed restrictions, to continue protective actions or to introduce new protective actions, as well as the expected duration these actions and restrictions.
- Engagement with community representatives on options for clean up or addressing public concerns about the risks associated with radioactive contamination in the environment.
- Any necessary modifications to people's personal behaviours and habits.
- Options for the implementation of self-help actions.
- The need for continued environmental monitoring and source monitoring after the termination of the emergency.
- The need for continued efforts to restore services.

For further guidance refer to the [SRF Communications Plan](#).

FINANCIAL LIABILITY

54. The Government agreed in March 2012 to implement changes to the Paris Convention on nuclear third-party liability. The changes will extend the scope of the damage for which compensation can be claimed, in addition to personal injury and loss of life ("personal injury") and property damage, to include:

- Economic loss arising from property damage.
- the costs of measures of reinstatement of the impaired environment.
- loss of income deriving from a direct economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment.
- the costs of preventive measures.

55. Claims will be considered and compensated on a first come-first served basis. There will be a limit of 10 years from the date of an occurrence (or event) for claims against an operator for property damage and the new categories of damage. Claims against an operator for personal injury will be extended to 30 years. Radiation-induced personal injury arising from preventive measures will benefit from the longer 30 years limitation period but the 10-year limitation period will apply to claims for 'ordinary' personal injury caused by preventive measures.

56. Operator liability for claims will be €1200 million; this will be introduced at €700 million and will rise annually by €100 million per year over 5 years. Operators are required to have insurance or other financial security to cover their third-party liabilities under the Paris Convention.

DEFENCE NUCLEAR TRANSPORT

The MOD will generally be liable to meet personal injury or property damage claims where the injury or loss is attributable to a Defence radiation emergency involving the release of radioactive material from MOD owned nuclear assets or facilities.

EXIT STRATEGY

57. The RCG will stand down once there is no longer the need for regular multi-agency coordination and the remaining issues can be dealt with by the individual agencies as part of their normal business. See SRF Generic Recovery Plan for the generic criteria which must be met before the RCG stands down. For a radiation emergency the following criteria should also be considered:



- The level and extent of radioactive contamination in the environment have been broadly mapped meaning that risks to health are understood. The risks are considered within tolerable limits agreed by the multi-agency group and key stakeholders.
- The need for advice and reassurance for the affected communities is understood.

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PART 5 – SUPPORTING INFORMATION - APPENDICES

Appendix A	METHANE - Sizewell
Appendix B	Initial Response Checklist - Sizewell
Appendix C	Radiation Emergency Roles and Responsibilities
Appendix D	Background Risk Information - General
Appendix E	Background Risk Information & Planning Assumptions – Sizewell
Appendix F	Background Risk Information & Planning Assumptions – Civil radiation transport
Appendix G	Background Risk Information & Planning Assumptions – Defence nuclear transport
Appendix H	Public Warning and Informing - Sizewell
Appendix I	Demographic Assessments - Sizewell
Appendix J	Radiation Protection
Appendix K	Key Emergency Services Locations - Sizewell
Appendix L	Evacuation 4km – Sizewell
Appendix M	Security Incidents
Appendix N	Environmental Monitoring – Sizewell
Appendix O	Outline Emergency Planning – Sizewell
Appendix P	Training & Exercise – Sizewell
Appendix Q	Radiation Monitoring Unit
Distribution	
Glossary	
Amendment Record	
References	

METHANE - SIZEWELL

BY E-MAIL NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Page : 1 Date:		
To: E-Mail:	Suffolk Constabulary CCR ccr.supervisor@suffolk.pnn.police.uk	
From: Main Control Room Sizewell B Power Station		Direct Tel: xxx Direct FAX: xxxxx
M Major Incident	Who Declared Major Incident Time of Declaration Wind Direction from / Wind Speed	Name:..... Time : Draw Arrow for Direction from Speed: m/s 
E Exact Location	Exact Location (Where is the event taking place)	Conventional Plant..... Reactor..... Other.....
T Type of Incident	What type of Incident is it?	Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) <input type="checkbox"/> Site Incident <input type="checkbox"/> Security Alert <input type="checkbox"/> Fire <input type="checkbox"/> Chemical <input type="checkbox"/> Medical <input type="checkbox"/>
H Hazards	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	Hazards are..... Advised public protection measures: Urgent public protective actions apply (OSNE) <input type="checkbox"/> Other.....
A Access	Access to Site (Which RVP will be used)	Main Gatehouse <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative Gate <input type="checkbox"/> Offsite ERC <input type="checkbox"/>
N Number of Casualties	Number, types and severity of casualties	
E Emergency Services	Emergency Services present and those required	Police on scene <input type="checkbox"/> Required <input type="checkbox"/> Fire & Rescue on scene <input type="checkbox"/> Required <input type="checkbox"/> Ambulance on scene <input type="checkbox"/> Required <input type="checkbox"/> Other (eg EOD):

APPENDIX B

INITIAL RESPONSE CHECKLIST – SIZEWELL OSNE

Event	Decision Point - Action Lead	Timing
Incident occurs - clock starts		
Nuclear Emergency Declaration	Classify emergency - Site operator	Incident + 15mins
Declaration		
Notify local responders	Site operator	Declaration +15mins
Notification of Nuclear Emergency Received– Email and Phone by Operator	Declare Major Incident - CCR Open StratCC - CCR Initial Call Out - CCR	Declaration +15mins
Provide urgent public protection advice - Operator By Email	Confirm automated telephone message sent by EDF to 1.35km shelter/stable iodine area - CCR	Declaration +60mins
StratCC, TCG & Media Coord Initial Operational capability	When Emergency Services, local NHS and Local Authorities executives in attendance plus core Media staff (Police, LA)	Declaration + 60mins
Issue of Initial public information/media release covering urgent protective actions	SCG Chair Media Coord	Declaration + 60mins
Before 1 st SCG Meeting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm information in Notification METHANE with Site and /or CESC. • Confirm Site Emergency Services Liaison in place. • Confirm TCG location being activated • Confirm ES RV location activated • Confirm Rest Centre at Stratford St Andrew being activated. • Requirement for Media Briefing Centre • Beach and camp sites being evacuated • Information on Casualties 	SCG Chair Police, Fire & Rescue and Ambulance Exec Fire & Rescue Fire & Rescue East Suffolk Council Suffolk CC – Comms/Media Coord lead Police Ambulance	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm RMU need and any associated MACA request • Confirm RMU resources being deployed • Confirm whether incident security related. • Confirm protection advice to education settings in DEPZ • Confirm protection advice to care settings in DEPZ • Confirm protection advice to home care customers. • Confirm protection advice to sheltered housing schemes. • Confirm transport for EHA available. • Confirm whether non-essential staff, contractors and visitors remain on site. • Assist with evacuating vessels within 1.35kms 	<p>SCG Chair</p> <p>UK HSA / NHSE/Fire/Ambulance// LAs</p> <p>SCG Chair</p> <p>Suffolk CC</p> <p>Suffolk CC</p> <p>Suffolk CC</p> <p>Suffolk CC</p> <p>Suffolk CC – Transport</p> <p>Sizewell A and Sizewell B ECCs</p> <p>MCGA</p>	
<p>Activate Emergency Holding Area</p>	<p>Fire & Rescue</p>	<p>Declaration + 60 mins</p>
<p>Receive initial radiation monitoring results at site fence/near site from operator</p>	<p>SCG Chair STAC Chair</p>	<p>Declaration + 60mins</p>
<p>Consider virtual STAC teleconference</p>	<p>STAC Chair</p>	<p>Declaration + 60mins</p>
<p>1st SCG Meeting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confirm prediction of off-site hazard - does this fit current public protective actions? 	<p>SCG Chair</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1st SCG Meeting- based upon information from Site (via METHANE Email) and/or CESC (via Phone) - Further Evacuation? - Need to extend pre-agreed public protection measures (Outline Planning) - Caused by security incident? 	<p>Within 90mins</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Declaration + 90mins

- Confirmation of public protective actions - where and what	- 1 st SCG Meeting- based upon advice from Site (via email) and/or CESC (via Phone)	- Declaration + 90mins
- Confirm other C2 locations in place	- 1 st SCG meeting - TCG - FCP - UK HSA RCE Directorate - DESNZ - EDF CESC	- Declaration + 90mins
- Confirmation of RCG Chair	- 1 st SCG Meeting - either East Suffolk Council or SCC lead depending upon predicted hazard	- Declaration + 90mins
- Media Briefing Centre	- 1 st SCG Meeting - location. Nominated Talking Head	- Declaration + 90mins
StratCC and TCG fully functional	When all organisations with a response role in this plan are present or have established effective communications to discharge their strategic coordination role	Declaration +2hrs
Issue of 1 st public information/media release	After 1 st SCG Meeting - based upon advice from Site and on prepared statement in SRF Comms Plan	Declaration + 2hrs
1 st SITREP to COBR	SCG Chair/StratCC Coord - RD for COBR	Declaration + 2hrs
STAC Fully Operational	STAC Chair	Declaration + 3hrs
ONR and National attendees	StratCC Coord - Each needs to be briefed on current SITREP on arrival.	Declaration + 3hrs
Before 2 nd SCG Meeting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm vulnerable groups at risk • Confirm of actual off site contamination area from survey activity • Confirm relocation of any non-essential people from Sizewell A or Sizewell B 	Police, Health, Local Authorities Company Technical Advisor & UK HSA RCE Directorate TCG	
2nd SCG Meeting	SCG Chair	Declaration + 3hrs
2 nd Public Information/ Media release	Media Coord lead	Declaration + 4hrs
Media Briefing Centre established	Media Coord lead	Declaration + 4hrs

Implement radiation monitoring strategy within DEPZ	SCG Chair STAC Chair ONR UK HSA RCE Directorate Operator	Declaration + 4hrs
RMU Initial operating capability	UK HSA/NHSE/Fire/Ambulance/MoD/ LAs	Declaration + 6hrs
Mass Decon capability available	SFRS	Declaration + 6hrs
Implement radiation monitoring strategy within EEPZ, if appropriate	SCG Chair STAC Chair ONR UK HSA RCE Directorate Operator	Declaration + 12hrs
Establish RMU full operating capability	UK HSA RCE Dir/East Suffolk Council	Declaration + 24hrs

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RADIATION EMERGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **Roles and Responsibilities.** The SRF Generic Response Plan details the core civil emergency roles and responsibilities for responders. Sizewell nuclear emergency response specific roles responsibilities are as follows:

1.1 Local Coordination

- **EDF (for Sizewell B site)**
 - Implement On-Site Emergency Plan.
 - Notify local responders of any Site Incident or OSNE - see paras 3.1 to 3.3.
 - Provide immediate advice on public protective actions.
 - Notify people within the 1.35km shelter/stable iodine area via automated telephone warning.
 - Provide initial advice on the hazard and protective actions remotely from the Central Emergency Support Centre.
 - Deploy a Company Technical Advisor to provide a company presence at the StratCC to take over provision of advice from the CESC.
 - Identify a company communications officer to work with the MCC.
 - Deploy a company health physicist to the STAC.
 - Deploy vehicle survey teams to initially conduct radiation survey in the immediate vicinity of the site and then subsequently as required by the UK HSA CRCE defined monitoring strategy.
 - Participate in the RCG.
 - Liaise with Suffolk County Council on matters which allow On-Site Emergency Response plans to dovetail with this Off-Site Emergency Plan.
 - Notify Suffolk County Council of changes to On-Site Emergency Plans and of changes to site hazards and risks which have a material impact on offsite emergency arrangements.
 - Remove non-essential staff from site where safe to do so.
- **Suffolk Constabulary**
 - Implement Police Major Incident Plan for Sizewell.
 - Notify local responders of any Site Incident or OSNE - see notification flowchart at para 3.1 to 3.3.
 - Declare a Major Incident.
 - Activate the StratCC for an OSNE.
 - Identify a SCG Chair and deploy to StratCC.
 - Identify a TCG Chair and deploy to Landmark House.
 - Identify a Police Strategic Commander.
 - Identify a Police Tactical Commander.
 - Collation of information and records relating to the incident, including policy log at SCG during response phase.
 - Deploy a Police communications officer to the MCC.
 - Deploy Police Liaison Officer to the Site ECC.

- Deploy police officers to evacuate people from Sizewell beach and Beach View Holiday Park.
 - Prepare to coordinate the evacuation of the DEPZ.
 - In conjunction with Suffolk Highways manage movement into and out of the DEPZ to control the risk to the public.
 - Arrange with DfT any further flight restrictions in the Sizewell area if the hazard assessment indicates a greater risk area, after SCG decision.
 - Notify the MCGA to establish a sea exclusion zone of at least 1km and be prepared to increase this distance if the hazard assessment indicates a greater risk area.
 - Consider establishing a Casualty Bureau.
 - Prepare to investigate the incident to establish any criminal activity if no criminal activity supports ONR investigation.
 - Provide victim identification in support of the Suffolk Coroner.
 - Prepare the Assembly Hall at Police HQ to act as an MBC.
 - Manage radiation exposure of officers deployed to incident scene.
 - Identify and initiate Police mutual aid to deliver an effective response.
 - Alert neighbouring Police Forces of an incident at Sizewell.
 - Participate in the RCG.
- Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service
 - Implement Fire & Rescue Service Major Incident Plan for Sizewell.
 - Activate TCG facility at Landmark House, Ipswich for an OSNE.
 - Deploy a Fire & Rescue Strategic Commander with Command Support to the StratCC.
 - Deploy a Fire & Rescue Tactical Commander and TacAD to the TCG.
 - Deploy a Fire & Rescue Service Liaison Officer to the Site ECC.
 - Deploy mass decontamination capability to RMU to support the ambulance service with decontamination.
 - Establish EHA at Sizewell Sports and Social Club.
 - Coordinate firefighting, search and rescue and other preventative measures identified by Joint Dynamic Risk Assessment in order to contain or prevent escalation of the incident.
 - Request CHEMET forecast from the Met Office.
 - Support site emergency response in managing hazardous material issues and mitigate environmental impacts.
 - Manage radiation exposure of fire-fighters deployed to incident scene.
 - Support investigations where fire has been involved.
 - Initiate necessary mutual aid and national support through National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) for an effective response and maintenance of mission critical activities across Suffolk.
 - Support the RCG.
 - East of England Ambulance Service
 - Implement East of England Ambulance Service Major Incident Plan
 - Deploy an Ambulance Strategic Commander, staff officer, NILO and loggist to the StratCC.
 - Deploy an Ambulance Tactical Commander, NILO and loggist to the TCG.

- Deploy an Ambulance Service Liaison Officer and NILO to the Site ECC.
 - Provide on scene direction on casualty extraction, triage, stabilisation, initial treatment and transport from site to hospital.
 - Coordinate on site operational response of the NHS.
 - Prepare to support any investigation where casualties are involved.
 - Identify and initiate Ambulance Service mutual aid to deliver an effective response.
 - Deploy specialist assets/PPE/decontamination equipment.
 - Liaise with Ambulance RPA (UK HSA RCE Directorate).
 - Liaise with UK HSA East of England
 - Conduct NHSE and CCG notification and liaison.
 - Consider Ambulance Service response to routine business within affected zone.
- Suffolk County Council
 - Implement Local Authorities Joint Emergency Response Plan for Sizewell.
 - Deploy a County Council Strategic Manager and advisor to the StratCC.
 - Deploy a Public Health senior manager to provide public health assurance to the SCG.
 - Deploy a communications officer to Chair the MCC.
 - Lead the provision of information to the public.
 - Deploy a liaison officer to the TCG.
 - Activate the County Council ECC.
 - Activate Media Coord facility at StratCC.
 - Advise schools (non-residential), early years settings and Further Education sites within the DEPZ to close on OSNE declaration.
 - Advise residential adult care homes, children's care homes, sheltered housing schemes and people covered by home care to prepare to evacuate on OSNE declaration.
 - Collation of information and records relating to the incident, including policy log at RCG during recovery phase.
 - Identify and be prepared to deploy transport to support evacuation.
 - Notify neighbouring County Councils of an incident at Sizewell.
 - Prepare to provide social care support for evacuated people at Rest Centres.
 - Confirm location of Emergency Mortuary.
 - Activate Suffolk Emergency Helpline.
 - Identify and initiate mutual aid to deliver an effective response.
 - Liaise with Police to manage/coordinate the availability of transport routes in and out of the DEPZ.
 - Provide radioactive and conventional waste collection and disposal service as advised by the EA and UK HSA RCE Directorate.
 - Maintain County Council critical services within the county.
 - Prevent County Council staff from entering any contaminated area. County Council staffs are not classed as radiation workers, nor are they cleared for emergency radiation exposures.
 - Update off-site Emergency Response plan to dovetail with on-site Emergency Plans.
 - Notify Sizewell operators of changes to off-site Emergency Plans to allow changes to on-site Emergency Plans to be considered.

- Ensure that agreed emergency arrangements in the Sizewell Off Site Plan have been implemented via the SCG.
- Be prepared to Chair RCG if better placed than East Suffolk to do this.
- Support RCG and where set up RCG Subgroups.
- East Suffolk Council
 - Implement Local Authorities Joint Emergency Response Plan for Sizewell
 - Deploy a District Council Strategic Manager to the StratCC.
 - Assume the role of RCG Chair at the StratCC (unless agreed on day of incident that Suffolk CC is better placed to do this).
 - Deploy a liaison officer to the TCG.
 - Deploy an Environmental Health Officer to the STAC.
 - Activate and then operate Rest Centre at Stratford St Andrew on declaration of OSNE.
 - Be prepared to activate then operate a Rest Centre at Lowestoft Leisure Centre when directed by the SCG.
 - Be prepared to activate and support operate the radiation Monitoring Unit at Felixstowe leisure centre when directed by the SCG.
 - Prepare to coordinate the activation of a further 4 Rest Centres.
 - Identify and initiate mutual aid from neighbouring district and borough councils using the Suffolk Mutual Aid Agreement to deliver an effective response.
 - Advise Sheltered Housing Schemes to prepare to evacuate on OSNE declaration.
 - Be prepared to support food and water restrictions directed by the FSA or EA.
 - Be prepared to provide advice on dangerous buildings and structures.
 - Be prepared to provide longer term accommodation for evacuated people.
 - Maintain East Suffolk Council critical services.
 - Prevent District Council staff from entering any contaminated area. District Council staffs are not classed as radiation workers nor are they cleared for emergency exposures.
 - Participate in the RCG.
- Ipswich Borough Council
 - Establish and operate a Rest Centre at Kesgrave Community Centre on declaration of OSNE as part of RMU arrangements.
- Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils
 - Be prepared to establish and operate a Rest Centre when directed by the SCG.
- West Suffolk Council
 - Be prepared to take over running of Stratford St Andrew rest centres from East Suffolk Council when directed by the SCG.

- Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit
 - Support local authority implementation of Joint Emergency Response Plan Action Card for Sizewell.
 - Deploy a local authority advisor to the StratCC.
 - Deploy a Tactical Manager to the County Council and East Suffolk Council ECCs.

- Environment Agency
 - Provide advice on radiological aspects of environmental contamination to all relevant participating organisations during the incident.
 - Provide agency representatives at the StratCC and national centres, including DEFRA Environment Operations Centre and SAGE.
 - Advise on appropriate disposal of radioactive waste.
 - Advise DEFRA Divisions on technical and regulatory aspects of the response.
 - Provide information to the public and the media, in consultation with the Lead Department and the strategic command at the Media Coordination Centre.
 - Manage flows of regulated waters if appropriate, to minimise impact.
 - Ensure safety of any Agency staff who may be involved.
 - Check for breach of site operator's permit, where relevant
 - Pursue relevant regulatory investigations in accordance with the Agency's statutory duties.
 - During the Recovery Phase, the Environment Agency will specifically:
 - Support the work of the Recovery Coordinating Group to assist the community in returning to normality.
 - Advise on the impact of radioactive contamination in the environment.
 - Work with partner organisations to identify feasible remediation options and support the development of a Recovery Strategy.
 - Advise on the management and disposal of wastes contaminated with radioactivity.
 - Advise DEFRA on the regulatory matters relating to the management and disposal of radioactive wastes.
 - The Agency's broader responsibilities including fisheries, conservation, water resources, waste regulation and water quality (rivers, estuaries and sea out to 3 miles) could come into play at some stage during the early response or during the short to long-term remediation. More extensive statutory powers could be involved if an incident also involved significant chemical contamination.
 - The Agency does not have a specific statutory duty to monitor controlled waters for radioactive contamination. But in the event of an environmental incident involving a release of radioactive substances to controlled waters, the Agency would arrange sampling and radiochemical analysis with a view to protecting the environment and advising downstream users and abstractors.

- NHS England and NHS Improvement – East of England
 - Deploy an NHS England Strategic Manager to the StratCC.
 - Coordinate the NHS capability needed to support the local health response to a radiation emergency.
 - Identify and initiate NHS mutual aid to deliver an effective health response.
 - Participate in the RCG.
- Public Health England

RCCE Directorate

 - Participate in the SCG/STAC/TCG and RCG.
 - Deploy specialist staff to the StratCC.
 - Provide expert radiation protection advice (including on public protective actions) to the STAC and SCG.
 - Provide interpretation of the public health implications of hazard assessments and predications to the SCG.
 - Be prepared to participate in media briefings at the MBC.
 - Deploy radiation monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and measurements of radioactivity on or in people (at the RMU).
 - Provide expert advice on radiation issues in the RCG.
 - Undertake national radiation monitoring coordination role.

East of England

 - Participate in the SCG/STAC/TCG and RCG.
 - UK HSA East of England to set up and facilitate STAC facility at StratCC.
 - Deploy a UK HSA East of England Health Protection Consultant as Strategic Manager/STAC Chair. Be prepared to participate in media briefings at the MBC.
- Ipswich & East Suffolk ICB
 - Support NHS England and NHS Improvement in discharging their responsibilities.
 - Provide Tactical Leadership to the Health Economy in Suffolk.
 - Attend Recovery Working Groups as required.
- Maritime & Coastguard Agency (HM Coastguard)
 - Coordinate the exclusion of maritime traffic initially within 1.35km during an OSNE
 - Be prepared to deploy a MCGA Strategic Manager to the StratCC. Normally coordination during an emergency will be done virtually from the SCG to NMOC.

- DEFRA
 - Consider early engagement with RCG structures being formed alongside response structures at the StratCC.
 - Provide advice to the SCG on animal welfare issues.
 - Coordinate activity to minimise the impact of radiation on food production, farming and fisheries.
 - Coordinate activity with water companies to preserve safe drinking water supply to the public.
 - Participate in the RCG when formed.

- Food Standards Agency
 - Deploy a liaison officer to the StratCC.
 - Determine level of radioactive contamination within the food chain.
 - Take action to ensure that contaminated food does not enter the food chain via Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985 (FEPA) restriction order.
 - Provide public advice and information on food restrictions in conjunction with the MCC.
 - Following advice from the EA, ensure contaminated foodstuffs are disposed of safely.
 - Participate in the RCG.

- MHCLG RED
 - Deploy to the StratCC to act as the GLO at the SCG.
 - Where necessary, assist in the coordination between Government and local bodies by facilitating discussions and contact and by acting as a liaison point.
 - Compile a situation reporting on local consequence management ensuring MHCLG and DESNZ Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) (and HO if appropriate) are fully briefed.
 - Participate in the RCG.

- DESNZ Government Liaison Team (GLT)
 - Deploy liaison staff to the StratCC and be part of the wider Government Liaison Team (which includes MHCLG and Home Office in a CT incident)
 - Act as a link to RIMNET/ Radiological Response Emergency Management System (RREMS) to share hazard data with the SCG.
 - Participate in the RCG.

- ONR
 - Deploy to the StratCC to provide independent advice, where appropriate, on all matters relating to:
 - Technical advice on the course of the emergency on-site.
 - Prognosis for the development of the incident and implications off-site.
 - The source term for the emergency.
 - The end of the on-site emergency.

- To ensure Government (principally through DESNZ) is kept fully informed on all matters relating to advice provided above.
- To participate as a member of the STAC, where the primary role will be to provide advice on all matters relating to advice provided above.
- Met Office
 - Met Office EMARC provide PACRAM forecast to EDF Energy CESC and UK HSA's RCCE via email within 30 minutes of OSNE declaration
 - Met Office Advisor to dial in via telephone to the StratCC meetings
 - STAC members to share relevant NAME long-distance modelling information with SCG as appropriate. *The interpretation of a NAME 'radiological model' rather than and 'area at risk model' (such as PACRAM) is more complex and therefore dissemination of radiological outputs is not recommended without Subject Matter Expert (SME) guidance (for example via STAC). We suggest UK HSA RCCE or EA share NAME model output with SCG members via screenshot or MS Teams.*
 - Met Office to provide updated weather and PACRAM information for STAC, as required.
- UK Military (JRLO) – Fixed Civil Nuclear and Civil Radiation Transport
 - Deploy to Strat CC to support the GLO / GLT and to provide situational awareness to MoD through the military chain of command.
 - Provide advice on military capabilities.
 - Be prepared to define military capability required in the event of civil capability gaps, and to facilitate request(s) for military aid accordingly, in order to augment the emergency response.
- UK Military (NEO) – Defence Nuclear Transport
 - Deploy Immediate Response Forces and Follow on Forces.
 - Form HQ DNEO in MoD London to coordinate central government response.
 - Deploy MoD Incident Coordinator to incident scene to join JESIP operational structure created by emergency services.
 - Deploy MoD/Military Coordinating Authority official to StratCC to join SCG.
 - Provide initial public protection advice from JOC and then provide support to STAC.
 - Support radiation monitoring activity being coordinated by UK HSA RCE Directorate.
 - Support Radiation Monitoring Units.
 - Support local media communications activity at the MCC.
- UK Power Networks
 - Provide virtual advice to the SCG on the implications for local electricity supply following a radiation emergency.
 - Be prepared to deploy a Strategic Commander if there is an impact or a potential impact on local electricity supply.

- National Grid, SSE Ltd and Renewable Energy System Ltd
 - Ensure staff at the Sizewell off-site substations are prepared for a radiation emergency.
 - Provide virtual advice to the SCG on the implications for national electricity supply following a radiation emergency.
- BT
 - Provide virtual advice to the SCG on the implications for telecommunications supply following a radiation emergency.
 - Be prepared to deploy a Strategic Commander if there is an impact or a potential impact on telecommunications supply.
- Water Companies (Anglian Water and Essex & Suffolk Water)
 - Deploy a liaison officer to the StratCC.
 - In conjunction with DEFRA provide advice to the SCG on public water supply and sewage.
- DEFRA CBRN Emergencies
 - Provide advice, guidance, management support and access to specialist suppliers able to carry out decontamination operations.
- Network Rail
 - Provide virtual advice to the SCG on the implications for rail operations on the East Anglia network following a radiation emergency.
 - Be prepared to deploy a Strategic Commander if there is an impact or a potential impact on rail operations.

1.2 Regional Coordination

- MHCLG (ResCG)
 - Develop a shared understanding of the evolving situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges.
 - Assess the emergency's actual and/or potential impact.
 - Review the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required.
 - Ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure a complementary approach.
 - Support coordination of a coherent and consistent public message in conjunction with the MCC and NCC.
 - Identify any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area.

1.3 National Coordination

- Cabinet Office (COBR)
 - In conjunction with LGD, agree which elements of COBR need to be activated.
 - Establish single, authoritative overview of situation.
 - Coordinate CRIP process with government departments and Res CG/ MHCLG RED GLO.
 - Prioritise central government impact management activity.
 - Provide generic updates to national responders.
 - Provide central government recovery coordination activity.
 - Activate the NCC to provide public information in conjunction with the MCC.
 - Activate SAGE to provide coordinated scientific and technical advice to impact management activity.
 - Consider activation of a Logistical Operations Cell to coordinate cross government sourcing and distribution of resources.

- DESNZ
 - Act as the Lead Government Department (LGD) for a civil nuclear emergency in England, Scotland, or Wales. DESNZ will work closely with Scottish Government who retain responsibility for off-site consequence management at Scottish civil nuclear sites.
 - Activate its Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) in London
 - Provide accurate, timely briefing and situational awareness for UK Government Ministers and manage UK parliamentary interest
 - Coordinate national public messaging.
 - Manage RIMNET/RREMS and monitor the delivery of the Joint Agency Modelling (JAM) process and products.
 - Send DESNZ personnel to the Strategic Coordination Centre (England and Wales) as part of the MHCLG-led Government Liaison Team (GLT) to provide a communications link between central government and the local response, including requests for national support. The GLT, along with the MOD Joint Regional Liaison Officer if military assistance is required, will act as an escalation route for additional assistance needed to support the local response.
 - Liaise with international organisations (International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission, and countries with bilateral arrangements) on notification, information sharing and any offers of aid.

Coordinate the deployment of national-level assets.

- EDF (CESC) - Fixed Civil Nuclear
 - Activate CESC.
 - Coordinate provision of resources and supplies to sustain the company response on site.
 - Coordinate off site environmental monitoring and provide interpreted information to the STAC on the nature of the radiation hazard.
 - Align operator media response with the MCC.

- Animal and Plant Health Authority (APHA)
 - To be issued.

BACKGROUND RISK INFORMATION & PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS – GENERAL

1 It is important to understand the risk of radiation emergency alongside all other risks that might occur within Suffolk. All risks from natural and man-made hazards are assessed by the Suffolk Resilience Forum. A public Community Risk Register has been produced and risks are reviewed regularly on a rolling basis. The current Suffolk Community Risk Register can be found at the following link:

<https://www.suffolkprepared.co.uk/get-prepared/community-risk-register/>

Currently the highest risks within Suffolk are from:

- Severe weather.
- Flooding.
- Pandemic Flu.

2 While radiation emergencies have the potential to cause significant impacts, the likelihood of an emergency occurring is very low. The design of nuclear power stations is based upon the fundamental requirement of safety. The safety case for licensed nuclear operations is independently verified by the ONR; this must demonstrate that the plant is safe in normal operation and that any non-standard operations do not immediately lead to nuclear emergencies.

3. Nuclear power plant designs utilise a defence in depth philosophy making use of redundant systems to provide back up if one system fails, diversity of systems to avoid a common failure in one affecting many, and segregated systems to avoid damage due to external events such as fire. This approach is the first line of mitigating any risk of nuclear emergency at Sizewell and is led by each operator and regulated by the ONR.

4. The design of packaging for transporting radioactive materials provides protection for materials in transit.

5. Defence nuclear material is transported by specially trained staff who follow stringent safety procedures. UK nuclear weapons are not moved by air. Occasional movements of US nuclear weapons are conducted by air using multi-engine aircraft. The RAF maintains a response team and the MoD JOC is at a state of readiness throughout the flight.

BACKGROUND RISK INFORMATION & PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS – SIZEWELL1. Fixed Nuclear Sites**Suffolk Licensed Nuclear Site Information**

1.1. Sizewell A Site is owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, and operated by Magnox Ltd. Sizewell A ceased generating electricity in late 2006, was declared nuclear fuel free in 2015 and is currently being de-commissioned. REPPiR 19 does not apply to this site with regards to operator duties.

1.2 Sizewell B Power Station is owned and operated by EDF. Sizewell B generates electricity for supply to the 'National Grid' using one water-cooled nuclear reactor of the 'Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) design rated at 1191MW output. The station was commissioned in 1995 and it currently has a 35-year operational lifetime.

Consequence Report

1.3 Each nuclear operator at Sizewell is required to evaluate and identify all hazards in their work with ionising radiation that have the potential to cause a radiation emergency. Once identified, the operator must then make a further assessment to evaluate a full range of consequences of such radiation emergency. The conclusions of the consequences assessment are provided to Suffolk County Council in a Consequence Report; this document also includes advice on the minimum area for detailed emergency planning.

National Security Risk Assessment

1.4 Annex C of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) 2023 identifies a range of beyond design basis accident scenarios for a radiation release from a UK nuclear reactor (NRR Risk Matrix 28). The reasonable worst-case scenario, based upon a UK PWR accident, indicates that additional public protective actions may be required within 12 hours of the declaration of an OSNE.

On Site Emergency Plans.

1.5 Each Sizewell nuclear site maintains an Operator Emergency Plan to cover detailed arrangements that each site would take to manage any emergency, including radiation emergencies. The key elements to on-site emergency plans are as follows:

- Activation of site emergency arrangements.
- Warning and safe withdrawal of staff and visitors to pre-arranged assembly points.
- Rapid notification of emergency services and other agencies needed to assist with bringing the incident under control and protecting the public from significant exposure to radiation.
- Deployment of specialist emergency teams to assess and minimise the consequences of any nuclear emergency.
- Assess the risk and extent of any potentially hazardous situation.
- Implement measures to protect staff and visitors.

- Take steps to protect the environment through emergency intervention activities.
- Minimise and then terminate any release of radioactive material.
- Provide specialist advice to local emergency responders on immediate actions to protect the public.
- Provide information to Suffolk County Council to help to inform the public
- Maintain a record of events.
- Ensure the safety of unaffected plant.

These emergency arrangements also include specific security response actions to counter the threat of terrorist related activity. Site security arrangements are supported by operational response procedures maintained by CNC and are aligned with counter terrorist response arrangements maintained by Suffolk Constabulary to ensure that a timely and integrated response is delivered to any threat. This operational response will be managed within the command, control and coordination structure outlined further in Appendix L.

Sizewell Response Planning Assumptions

Immediate Action (derived from SZB CR):

- Evacuation - out to 200m (219 yds).
- Shelter - out to 1.35km (0.8 mile).
- Stable Iodine - out to 1.35km (0.8mile).
- Food monitoring out to 35km (21.7 miles) – subject to FSA confirmation on day of emergency.

Within 12 hours (derived from NSRA):

- Be prepared to evacuate up to 4km and increased shelter and stable iodine up to 15kms along a 3-sector radial arc.

After 24 hrs (derived from default outline planning)

- Implement or extend evacuation up to 30km.
- Extend shelter up to 30km.
- Extend provision of stable iodine up to 30km.

Sizewell B Emergency Response Centre

1.6 The role of the Sizewell Emergency Response Centre (ERC) is to:

- Provide an alternate ECC.
- Allow storage of deployable back up equipment for use on site.
- Support environmental monitoring.
- Provide additional ACP equipment.
- Provide a staging post for additional backup equipment from wider EDF fleet that would be automatically deployed in an OSNE.

The ERC may be activated by EDF for both Site Incidents or OSNE; when activated the site will automatically deploy response teams to ERC. When activated, EDF will share information on major equipment or people moves with local responders to allow coordination

with an off-site response. Further information on the ERC is contained within the SZB Emergency Handbook.

Sizewell Emergency Planning Zones.

1.7 There are 3 emergency planning zones around Sizewell. The following table indicates size and timeliness of associated emergency response actions.

Zone	Size	Response Action Timeliness	Key Planned Public Protection Actions
Detailed Emergency Planning Zone	3-4kms from site	Immediate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shelter & Stable Iodine Within 1.35km (0.8mile) • Evacuate transient or those without shelter within 1.35km (0.8 mile) • Close child settings (eg schools, childcare centres, etc) • Prepare Care Homes for evacuation • Establish Emergency Holding Area for 1.35km (0.8 mile) evacuees • Establish 1 x Rest centre • Establish RMU.
Extended Emergency Planning Zone	15km radius from site	Implement within 12 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare to evacuate up to 4km • Prepare to Establish 2 x large Rest Centres • Hold stable iodine in county to provide to evacuees.
Outline Emergency Planning Zone	30km radius from site	Implement after 24hrs	Evacuation, Shelter or stable iodine beyond 15km to 30km

APPENDIX F

**BACKGROUND RISK INFORMATION & PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS – CIVIL
RADIATION TRANSPORT**

1. Civil Nuclear Material in Transit

To be issued.

APPENDIX G

**BACKGROUND RISK INFORMATION & PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS – DEFENCE
NUCLEAR TRANSPORT**

1. Defence Nuclear Material in Transit

To be issued.

PUBLIC WARNING AND INFORMING - SIZEWELL1. Public Information - DEPZ

Suffolk County Council is responsible for providing 'prior Information' to the public within the DEPZ and this is led by the County Council Communications Team supported by the Suffolk JEPU. Information is provided in a z-card format for households, a poster format for businesses; both groups also receive the UK HSA CRCE leaflets on 'Basic Concepts of Radiation' and Nuclear Emergencies – Information for the Public'. All information provided within the DEPZ is also provided online: www.suffolkprepared.co.uk/get-prepared/risk-advice/radiation

Prior information distributed within the DEPZ is intended to give householders and others a sufficiently clear understanding of the actions that they might be asked to take in a radiation emergency so that, should an event occur, the necessary measures can be implemented smoothly and speedily. This information includes:

- Basic facts about radiation and its effect on persons and the environment.
- The various types of radiation emergency and their consequences for the public and the environment.
- Emergency measures to alert, protect and assist the public in the event of a radiation emergency.
- Appropriate information on actions to be taken by the public in the event of a radiation emergency to cover:
 - sheltering and associated actions.
 - distribution and taking of stable iodine tablets.
 - evacuation arrangement.
 - longer term advice on consumption of food and drink.
- Agencies responsible for implementing emergency measures
- A map of the emergency planning zones and public information zone.
- Sources of additional and more detailed information from other public sources.

2. Sizewell Visitors

In order to ensure that transient groups are given prior information as far as reasonably possible, signs have been placed at the approaches to Sizewell Beach car park which is a focal points for walkers and holidaymakers.

3. Public Information – EEPZ and OPZ

A separate leaflet has been produced to provide information to people beyond the DEPZ up to 30km. This is available in an electronic form on the SRF website link above and in hard copy form free on a request basis to the Suffolk County Council. This outline information includes:

- Basic facts about radiation and its effect on persons and the environment.
- The various types of radiation emergency and their consequences for the general public and the environment.

- Summary of actions that might be taken by the public closer to Sizewell in the event of a radiation emergency to cover:
 - sheltering and associated actions.
 - distribution and taking of stable iodine tablets.
 - evacuation arrangements.
 - longer term advice on consumption of food and drink.
- Summary of arrangements for protecting public for beyond reasonably foreseeable emergencies.
- Agencies responsible for implementing emergency measures.
- A map of the emergency planning zones and public information zone.
- Sources of additional and more detailed information from other public sources.

4. Vulnerable Groups. A range of vulnerable groups/individuals have been identified within the DEPZ:

4.1 Schools (non-residential), early years settings (nurseries, children's centres) and further education sites are grouped together as settings that will be advised to close on declaration of an OSNE. Each location has been written to by Suffolk County Council to provide targeted prior information.

4.2 Residential school, Adult Care Homes, Children's Care Homes, Sheltered Housing schemes and adults receiving home care are grouped together as settings that will be advised to prepare to evacuate on declaration of an OSNE. Each location has been written to by Suffolk County Council to provide targeted prior information.

5. Information during Emergencies.

5.1 The County Council, in conjunction with other local and national responders, will provide information to any member of public within Suffolk to ensure that they are informed of the facts of the radiation emergency and the measures to be taken for public health. The information will be aimed at those directly affected by the emergency; this is likely to include people who have been advised to shelter and take stable iodine tablets, to evacuate, or to refrain from eating or selling foodstuffs they have grown themselves.

5.2 The information will be provided:

- On the Suffolk Resilience Forum website: www.suffolkprepared.co.uk and linked on local responder services websites by Suffolk Constabulary, Suffolk County Council and East Suffolk Council.
- By TV (BBC East and ITV Anglia).
- By Radio (BBC Radio Suffolk, Heart FM radio).
- To the National Farmers Union for communications with local farmers.
- Once the radiation emergency has been brought under control, a 'community information point' may be established by East Suffolk Council with the support of Leiston Town Council, the Police, Suffolk Public Health and site operators. The purpose of this will be to provide a place for local communities to visit to find out information or to identify community concerns. This would be established at the King Georges Community Centre, Leiston unless the risk indicates that this is not appropriate.
- At Rest Centres opened by East Suffolk Council to assist people who have been evacuated or who have self-evacuated.

5.3 The County Council is responsible for updating information and for maintaining consistency of information via the Media Coord Cell through the channels identified above. The information provided will cover:

- The type of emergency – refer to declaration states in Part 1, para 1.
- The characteristics of the hazard, e.g. its origin, its extent, the risk to public health and the likely development of the risk. This information will be displayed in both map and text format
- Advice on public health protection:
 - Confirmations of any shelter, evacuation or taking of stable iodine requirements. This will be explained in both map and text format.
 - Restrictions on consumption of foodstuffs and water supply.
 - Basic rules on hygiene and personal decontamination.
 - Special warnings for particular groups at increased risk.
- Requests by local responders for public protection or environmental protection actions.
- Where an incident does not lead directly to a release of radiation but there is an increased risk of such, precautionary advice may be given to:
 - Tune in to local TV and radio and monitor the SRF website.
 - Be alert and prepared to take action.
 - Vulnerable groups on water and food consumption.
 - Farmers regarding stock and crops.

5.4 If the assessment of the hazard leads to the implementation of public protection measures that extend beyond Suffolk, the County Council Emergency Control Centre will contact the relevant neighbouring County Council emergency planning team and advise them of the requirement to provide information to the public relevant to any incident at Sizewell.

5.5 A telephone helpline may be established by EDF during any incident to provide basic information via automated message on **0808 100 1734**.

DEMOGRAPHIC ASSESSMENTS - SIZEWELL

1. Map of Sizewell DEPZ.



2. Sectors

To aid the identification of areas where public protective actions might be applied during a radiation emergency, the DEPZ has been split into sectors that are based upon 22 1/2-degree radials divided by 1km. The sectors are centred upon the operating Sizewell B power station.

3. Assessment of DEPZ

An assessment of the DEPZ has been conducted to identify:

- Population - permanent and transitory.
- Commercial properties.
- Potential vulnerable groups - schools, childcare provision, care homes, camping/caravan sites.
- Local essential operational infrastructure.

This assessment is used before any emergency to identify resources needed for prior information and pre-issued stable iodine tablets and to be able to implement public protective actions immediately during any emergency - either by entire emergency planning zone or by specific sectors that can be published in the form of post code areas.

4. DEPZ Summary:

- | | | |
|-------------------------|------|---------------------|
| • Permanent Population | 6158 | (56 within 1.35kms) |
| • Private Properties | 2750 | (25 within 1.35kms) |
| • Commercial businesses | 309 | (10 within 1.35kms) |

Vulnerable Groups

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|---|
| • Further Education college | 1 | |
| • Schools | 3 | |
| • Pre School/Children’s Centres | 3 | |
| • Children’s home | 1 | |
| • Sheltered Housing schemes | 6 | |
| • Supported Housing schemes | 3 | |
| • Care Homes | 2 | |
| • Transient Population | 1770 - 3200 | |
| • Conference Centres/Retreats | 2 | (including up to 150 mentally or physically disabled) |
| • Caravan/Camp Sites | 4 | |
| • Holiday Homes | 6 | |
| • Beach Huts | 12 | |

Essential Operational Infrastructure

- | | | |
|-----------------|-----|-----------------------------|
| • Ambulance | Nil | |
| • Fire & Rescue | 1 | |
| • Police | 1 | |
| • NHS | 1 | |
| • EA | 3 | Flood defence assets and FW |

Utilities

- Anglian Water 1 (plus 9 inline pumping stations)
- Essex & Suffolk Water 1
- UKPN Nil
- Gas (Cadent / National Grid) Nil / Nil
- BT 1

5. DEPZ Assessment

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
Within 1km	41	19	370 – 1200	4	1 x Campsite
A1	Nil	Nil	Suffolk Coastal Path Sandlings Walk	Nil	Nil
B1	N	N	Suffolk Coastal Path	N	N
C1	N	N	Suffolk Coastal Path	N	N
D1	N	N	Suffolk Coastal Path	N	N
E1	N	N	Suffolk Coastal Path	N	N
F1	N	N	Suffolk Coastal Path	N	N
G1	14	6	Suffolk Coastal Path	N	N
H1	23	11	Suffolk Coastal Path Sz 'A'; 270 Mon-Fri, 100 – Sat-Sun, Silent Hrs – 4 Visitors Mon – Fri 10 VA C/S – avg 10 persons Sz Beach Car Park Sz Beach Public Toilets	4 (Sizewell T Artists loft Workshop VA Public House & Campsite)	VA Campsite 5 Campervan / Caravan pitches – Average 10 persons
I1	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs)	Nil	Nil
J1	4	2	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs)	Nil	Nil
K1	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs)	Nil	Nil
L1	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) RPW 10	Nil	Nil
M1	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) RPW 10	Nil	Nil
N1	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs)	Nil	Nil

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

Issue 4.2 – Feb 2024

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
Ⓞ	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs)	Nil	Nil
Ⓟ	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) Sandlings Walk	Nil	Nil

VA C/S - Vulcan Arms Caravan site. Sz (Sizewell) Belts & Marshes (105 Hectare site - Suffolk Wildlife Trust), RPW- Reckham Pits Wood. Suffolk Coastal Path (National Trail). Sandlings Walk (Long Distance inland trail)

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
Within 2km	83	40	1100 – 2000 PBH + 400 - 650	18	2 x camping/caravan sites 1 x Conference Centre 12 x Beach Huts
A2	Nil	Nil	Suffolk Coastal Path MNR 400 – 650 PBH 800-900	Nil	Nil
B2- G2 over sea	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
H2	9	5	Suffolk Coastal Path Beach View Caravan Park - up to 400 Sizewell Hall Christian Conf Centre & campsite - up to 200 Beach Huts	14	1 x camping/caravan sites 1 x Conference Centre & campsite 12 x Beach Huts
I2	20	11	Sizewell Common Aldringham Common	1	Nil
J2	11	5	Aldringham Common	Nil	Nil
K2	12	4	Nil	1	Nil
L2	27	13	Leiston Common Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) RPW 10	2	Nil

SRF Radiation Emergency Plan

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
M2	Nil	Nil	Leiston Common Sandlings Walk Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) RPW 10	Nil	Nil
N2	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) RPW 10 Sandlings Walk MNR 400 – 650	Nil	Nil
O2	4	2	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) RPW 10 Sandlings Walk MNR 400 – 650 (Public BH 800-1000)	Nil	Nil
P2	Nil	Nil	Sz Belts & Marshes 90 avg visits – 900 (Charity runs) Sandlings Walk MNR 400 – 650 Public BH 800-900	Nil	Nil

SW Sizewell Belts & Marshes (105 Hectare site - Suffolk Wildlife Trust), SH - Sizewell Hall

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
Within 3km	2665	1175	550 – 800 PBH + 400 - 650	109	2 x schools 1 x Pre School 2 x Sheltered Housing 1 x Further Education 1 x Care Home 1 x Residential 'Retreat' 1 x Fire Stn + 1 x Police SNT 1 x sewage treatment works

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
A3	Nil	Nil	Suffolk Coastal Path MNR 400 – 650 (PBH 800-1000)	Nil	Nil
H3	9	5	Suffolk Coastal Path NHWT up to 150	Nil	1 x Residential 'retreat'
I3	11	6	Aldringham Common	Nil	Nil
J3	24	13	Aldringham Common	Nil	Nil
K3	1621	689	Open market Youth club Sports Centre King Georges Community Centre Sizewell Sports & Social club Crown St Car Park	82	2 x schools 1 x Pre-School Nursery 2 x Sheltered Housing 1 x Further Education College 1 x Fire Stn (inc Police SNT)
L3	978	451	Holiday homes x 1 Leiston Caravan Site – Not in current use)	23	1 x sewage treatment works (AW)
M3	16	8	Sand Ings Walk	3	1 x Care Home
N3	10	5	Sandlings Walk	1	Nil
O3	6	3	Sandlings Walk	1	Nil
P3	Nil	Nil	MNR 400 – 650 (PBH 800-1000)	1	Nil

RPW - Reckham Pitts Wood (Suffolk Wildlife Trust) NHWT - Ness House Wardens Trust (Mentally & physically handicapped centre)
 SWM - Sizewell Marshes (Suffolk Wildlife Trust)

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Transient Population	Commercial Properties	Vulnerability/Essential Operational Infrastructure
Within 4km	3340	1506	550 – 750 PBH + 400 - 650	178	1 x Independent School 1 x Pre-School 1 x Children's Centre 1 x Care Home 4 x Sheltered Housing 3 x Supported Housing 1 x GP surgery 1 x BT exchange 1 x Water Tower 1 x Campsite
A4	Nil	Nil	MNR 400 – 650 (PBH 800-1000) Suffolk Coastal Path	1	Nil
I4	Nil	Nil	Sandlings Walk Suffolk Coastal Path	Nil	1 x Sheltered Housing
J4	31	13	Aldringham Common	2	1 x Sheltered Housing
K4	1900	840	1 x B&B 3 x holiday homes	37	1 x Care Homes 1 x Sheltered Housing 2 x Supported Housing 1 x Water Tower (E&SW)
L4	1409	653	Applefields Caravan site – 30 pitches + 15 tents Mar - Dec 1 x B&B 2 x holiday homes	117	1 x Independent School 1 x Pre-School 1 x Children's Centre 1 x Sheltered Housing 1 x Supported Housing 1 x Campsite 1 x GP Surgery 1 x BT exchange
M4	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
O4 & P4			Minsmere Levels MNR 400 – 650 (PBH 800-1000)	1	Nil

Within 5km	75	35	Nil	2
K5	2	1	N	1
L5	19	9	N	1

6. DEPZ Vulnerable Groups

Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (GRID Ref)	Number of People
	Within 1 km				
H1	Camping/Caravan Site	Vulcan Arms Public house, Sizewell Gap, Sizewell, IP16 4UD	01728 830748	TM 474627	5 Caravans – up to 10 people
	Within 2 km				
H2	Camping/Caravan Site	Beach View Holiday Park, Sizewell, IP16 4TU	01728 830724	TM 475 623	73 static caravans, 50 touring caravans (Mar – Jan) Hard accn – 12 people
H2	Camping/Caravan Site	Sizewell Hall Christian conference and camping centre, Sizewell, IP16 4TX	01728 830715	TM 474 619	Hard accn (all year) – 84 people Self-Catering cottages x 2 (up to 11 people), Staff cottages x 2 (up to 8 people) 60 – 80 tents (Jul – Aug)
H2	Beach Huts			TM 475 625 - 626	Beach huts x 12
	Within 3 km				
H3	Private Residential Learning for specific needs (Physical/Mental)	Ness House Wardens Trust, Sizewell Hall Road, Aldringham Cum Thorpe, IP16 4UB	01728 830007	TM 475 611	4 bedrooms for up to 16 people, 1 accessible flat for up to 5 people 50 tents (Feb – Dec) up to 150 persons. Open for conferences, weddings & school groups

	Health all age ranges					Hall can hold 150 people Conferences, weddings, school groups.
K3	Children's Home	Fern Lodge Children's Home, 2 King Edward Road, Leiston, IP16 4HQ	01728 666728 (Off) 07470 898218 (Man') (Able Healthcare)	TM 440 625		3 Children 6 staff
K3	School - Secondary	Alde Valley Academy, Seaward Avenue, Leiston IP16 4BG	01728 830570 07950 146148 Head 07734 212935 Dep'	TM 451 621		45 staff + 385 students
K3	Further Education	Suffolk New College On The Coast, Seaward Avenue Leiston, IP16 4BG	01728 642900 07469 183735 (ooh) 01473 382200 (Ipswich Campus)	TM 451 621		40 pupils 7 staff
K3	School – Primary (Avocet Academy Trust)	Leiston Primary School, King Georges Avenue, Leiston, IP16 4JQ	01728 830745 01728 746405 (HQ)	TM 450 624		55 staff + 249 students
K3	Pre-School Nursery	Little Avocets Nursery Address as above	01728 830745 01728 746405 (HQ)	TM 450 624		2 staff 10 pupils
K3	Sheltered Housing	Charles Adams Close, Leiston, IP16 4LP	Flagship properties – 0808 168 4555	TM 449 624		86 (43 x 1-bedroom bungalows)
K3	Sheltered Housing	Paxton Chadwick Close, Leiston, IP16 4BJ	Flagship properties – 0808 168 4555	TM 449 324		48 (32 1 & 2 bed Bungalows)
	Within 4 km					
K4	Care Home	Smyth House, High St, Leiston, IP16 4DY	01728 831373	TM 444 623		18
K4	Sheltered Housing	Ogilvie Homes, Goldings Lane, Leiston, IP16 4PS	01394 388746	TM 445 617		24 x 1 & 2 bedroom bungalows
K4	Supported Housing	29 Ashfield Drive, Leiston, IP16 4EF	0208 502 3933 (HQ) 07484 227917 (Man') 07484 227927 (Dep') Heritage Care	TM 441620		2 MH&LD clients
K4	Supported Housing	Fridays Orchard, Haylings Road, Leiston, IP16 4ST	01728 833884 01473 836160 (HQ) United Response	TM 444621		6 MH&LD clients

L4	Children's Centre	Leiston Children's Centre Waterloo Avenue, Leiston, IP16 4JG	01728 642930	TM 449 624	10 staff + 45 students
I 4	Sheltered Housing	Margaret Ogilvie Almshouse, Thorpeness, IP16 4LY	01394 411234 (Off) 07501 494516 (Man') 01473 218818 (HQ) Orwell Housing	TM 472600	122-bedroom cottages
J4	Sheltered Housing	Ogilvie Almshouses, Church Lane, Aldringham, IP16 4QT	01728 830535 Ogilvie Charity HQ 01394 388 746 07867 548893	TM 452602	19 2-bedroom cottages 28 residents
L4	Pre-School Nursery	Leiston Children's Centre and Shining Stars Day Care Centre, Waterloo Avenue, Leiston, IP16 4JG	01728 832502 Alpha Nurseries 01473 322600 (Ips)	TM 449 624	25 pupils 5 staff
L4	School (Private)	Summerhill, Westward Ho, Leiston, IP16 4HY	01728 830540 Office 01728 830030 Head 07903 938188 Ooh	TM 443 630	100 (Staff & students)
L4	Sheltered Housing	Charles Miller Court, Cross St, Leiston, IP16 4BY	Housing21 0370 1924910 (Off) 07739 268355 (Man') 03333 216450 (Ooh)	TM 444 624	30 (28 x 1-3 bedroom flats)
L4 - DEPZ	Supported Housing	22 St Margaret's Crescent, Leiston	0208 502 3933 (HQ) 07484 227917 (Man') 07484 227927 (Dep') Heritage Care	TM 438627	1 (Health Service funded MH&LD client/s)
L4	Caravan & Campsite	Applefields Caravan Park, The Orchard, Abbey Road, Leiston, IP16 4RE	017828 833501	TM 441 631	30 Caravan Pitches, 15 Tent Pitches 1 st Mar – 30 th Nov

7. DEPZ – Transient Population

Within the DEPZ there are a number of listed addresses providing accommodation, the table below lists only those which have 5 or more rooms or can accommodate 10 or more people.

Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (GRID Ref)	No of rooms / more than 10 persons
K3	PH	Crown Inn, Leiston	01728 830860	Tm 447 625	Currently NA Refurbishment TBC 5 rooms – 14 guests
K4	B&B	Field End, Leiston	01728 833527	TM 445 621	5 rooms – 10 guests
L4	PH	The Royal Standard, Leiston	01728 831221	TM 445 625	
L4	Hotel	White Horse, Leiston	01728 830694	TM 443 626	13 rooms - 36 guests
L4	B&B	Home from home	01728 833333	TM 440 626	7 rooms – 13 to 14 guests

8. DEPZ – Essential Operational Infrastructure

Agency	Infrastructure	Location/Sector	Impact of Loss	Agreed Mitigation	Point of Contact
Police	Police Office (Leiston Fire Station)	TM 448625 K3	Local SNT Team		Contingency Planning Officer Suffolk Constabulary
Fire & Rescue	Leiston Fire Station	TM 448625 K3	On call Fire Station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Firefighters are classified as radiation workers under IRR17 for dose limits Pre-identified informed volunteer firefighters can operate under REPIR for higher emergency exposure dose limits. Radiation protection procedures in Fire Site Specific Plans / Major Incident Plans. RPA provided under annual contract arrangements. 	Resilience Manager Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service
NHS	Leiston GP Surgery (Main Street) IP16 4ES	TM 443 626 L4	Community healthcare (7028 registered patients)	Patients to be directed to alternative GP surgery if closed through shelter or evacuation.	Emergency Planning & Resilience Manager - Suffolk ICB

	Leiston Pharmacy, 62 High St, Leiston, IP16 4BZ	TM 445 623			
Environment Agency	Minsmere Sluice	Minsmere Reserve TM4787366103	This is the main outfall for the whole Minsmere catchment. It protects properties and it stops saltwater entering nearby designated conservation sites.		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Westleton Ranguage	TM4724167200 P4	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Thorpeness	TM4651359520 I5	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Anglia Water [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]	Leiston-Valley Rd IP16 4AS Sewage treatment Works (STW) Inline Pumping stations	TM450 630 L3	Environmental Pollution Loss of services/toilet facilities Loss of access for periodic maintenance	Sites are telemetered. Remote alarms provide ability to monitor facilities. Tankering can be carried out for pump failures. Response & Recovery Plan to manage impact.	Anglian Water
		K3 x 2			
		L3 x 1			
		L4 x 2			
		K4 x 5			


Essex & Suffolk Water [OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE - provided in	Sizewell A and B Flowmeters	TM 470 629 J1	Conceivable loss of supply to NPS. Protected assets under SSAOA	Security and Emergency Planning Advisor Essex and Suffolk Water
	Leiston Outfall	TM 454 634	Discharge point only	

commercial confidence]	Leiston Tower	L2 TM 441 617	Periodic regulatory sampling Approx. 12500 customers	Rezoning from Coldfair Green and Saxmundham WTWs
		K4		
BT [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]	Leiston BT Exchange	TM 445624 L4	Supply's communications to Sizewell power station and will provide additional line in an emergency	BT Openreach

Information in highlighted rows above is removed from the public version of this plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs and Section 43 - Commercial interests.
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EXTENDED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE

1. Map of Sizewell EEPZ. Area shown in green on map below (blue is DEPZ).



2. Sectors

To aid the identification of areas where public protective actions might be applied during a radiation emergency, the EEPZ has been split into sectors that are based upon 22 ½ degree radials divided by 1km out to 5km and then divided by 2km out to 15km.

3. Assessment of EEPZ

An assessment of the EEPZ has been conducted to identify:

- Population – permanent and transitory
- Commercial properties
- Potential vulnerable groups – schools, child-care provision, care homes, camping/caravan sites
- Local critical infrastructure.

This assessment is used before any emergency to identify potential capabilities needed to respond to a worst case accident.

4. EEPZ Summary (from DEPZ to 15kms):

- Permanent Population 25,000
- Private Properties 12,000
- Commercial businesses 2,000

Vulnerable Groups

- Schools 17 1 private, 1 adult,
 - Pre School/Children’s Centres 13 11 Pre School, 2 Children’s Centres
 - Sheltered Housing 8
 - Care Homes 10 Inc 1 Adult Centre, 1 Children’s Home
- Transient Population
- Caravan/Camp Sites 55
 - Hotels/B&Bs 25
 - Beach Huts 344
 - Holiday Homes/Second homes 850

Essential Operational Infrastructure

- Ambulance 1
- Fire & Rescue 4
- Police 3
- EA – Flood warning Nil
- NHS 11
- EA 27 Flood defence assets and FW

Utilities

-
- Anglian Water 10 Excludes inline SPS
- Essex & Suffolk Water 10
- UKPN 5
- Gas – Cadent Nil

Gas – National Grid

Nil

• —
• —

- BT

Nil

5. EEPZ Demographics

Sector	East Suffolk		
Within 3km	16	8	4
A3			3
H3			
J3			
M3	14	7	1
N3	2	1	
O3			
Within 4km	593	315	71
A4			
H4	85	47	6
I4	267	150	50
J4	51	28	
L4			
M4	12	6	4
N4	83	39	2
O4	87	41	6
P4	8	4	3
Within 5km	1073	488	54
A5	8	4	3
H5			
I5	66	37	11
J5	101	55	10
K5	739	319	14
L5	28	12	
M5	13	6	4
N5	107	50	12
O5	6	3	
P5	5	2	
Within 6-7 km	3623	1782	225
A6-7	119	62	13
I6-7	2271	1204	119
J6-7	84	41	4
K6-7	202	88	9
L6-7	38	17	3

M6-7	80	37	7
N6-7	340	170	29
O6-7	454	235	38
P6-7	35	18	3
Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Commercial Properties
Within 8-9 km	3611	1841	507
A8-9	26	13	3
I8-9	623	387	246
J8-9	11	5	
K8-9	317	143	49
L8-9	1563	801	137
M8-9	662	310	44
N8-9	113	55	12
O8-9	256	108	8
P8-9	40	19	8
Within 10-11 km	5131	2262	269
A10-11	26	12	
I10-11	151	68	5
J10-11	736	345	18
K10-11	2807	1211	74
L10-11	591	246	55
M10-11	736	341	41
N10-11	65	30	51
O10-11	19	9	18
P10-11	26	12	7
Within 12-13 km	3750	1796	285
A12-13	819	485	135
I12-13	21	10	5
J12-13	248	112	1
K12-13	207	101	13
L12-13	439	192	33
M12-13	385	179	21
N12-13	361	163	25

O12-13	690	283	31
P12-13	580	271	21
Within 14-15 km	7212	3513	611
A14-15	4052	2092	357
I14-15	754	365	64
J14-15	224	100	16
K14-15	553	234	22
L14-15	393	170	28
M14-15	247	107	21
N14-15	389	174	50
O14-15	344	160	26
P14-15	256	111	27

6. EEPZ Vulnerable Groups

Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (Grid Ref)	No of people
	Within 3km				
M3	Care Home	Old Abbey Residential Home, Theberton Rd, Leiston, IP16 4RF	01728 830944	TM 450 641	Residential & Dementia 40 Residents
M3	School Adults	Pro Corda, Leiston Abbey, Theberton, Leiston, IP16 4TD	01728 831354	TM 444 642	Adult Education Centre, non-residential
	Within 4 km				
I4	Sheltered housing	Margaret Ogilvie Almshouse, Thorpeness, IP16 4LY	01394 411234 (Off) 07501 494516 (Man) 01473 218818 (HQ) Orwell Housing	TM 472600	12 x 2 bedroom cottages
I4	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	43 in total			
J4	Sheltered housing	Ogilvie Almshouses, Church Lane, Aldringham, IP16 4QT	01728 830535 Ogilvie Charity 01394 388746 07867 548893	TM 452602	Sheltered housing (19 x 2 bed cottages)
M4 (M5)	Caravan Site	Cakes and Ale Holiday Park, Abbey Lane. Theberton, IP16 4TE Site Split broadly M4 Touring Sites	01728 831655	TM 433639	250 Pitches Touring sites 50, 1 st Apr – 31 st Oct

		M5 Static Sites			Static Sites 200, 1 st Mar – Jan 15 th Lodges x 4 (2 rental 1 st Mar 30 th Nov, 2 staff (All year) Avg max visitors/ static owners, Jun – Aug & PBH 500- 600, avg no. per pitch 2.5
O4	Camping/ Caravan Site	East Bridge Farm, Certified Site, Eastbridge, IP16 4SN	01728 830729	TM 452 659	5 caravan, 10 tents (Apr - Sep)
O4	Caravan Site	The Eels Foot Inn, Eastbridge, IP16 4SN	01728 830154	TM 452661	5 Pitches (Apr – Oct)
O4	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	4 in total (Theberton x 4)			
P4	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	3 in total (Minsmere x 3)			
	Within 5km				
A5 and A6 / 7	Camping/ Caravan Site	Cliff House Holiday Park, Minsmere Road, Dunwich, IP17 3DQ	01728 648282	TM 476689	99 static, 114 touring Pitches
I5	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	8 in total (Aldringham cum Thorpe x 8)			
J5	Care Homes	Aldringham Court Nursing Home, Aldeburgh Road, Aldringham, IP16 4QF	01728 832191	TM 446 605	45 residents
J5	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	4 in total (Aldringham cum Thorpe x 4)			
K5	School	Coldfair Green Primary School, Judith Avenue, Knodishall, IP17 1UY	01728 830649	TM 436 606	12 staff 139 students
K5	Pre School / Nursery	Knodishall Playgroup, the mission Rooms, School Road, Knodishall, IP17 1UD	01728 831328	TM 433 611	Est 3 staff 12 children
K5	Care Home	Pear Tree Lodge Residential Home, Leiston	01728 830562	TM 435611	36 residents

		Road, Knodishall, IP17 1UQ	Hellendoorn Healthcare Limited		
K5	Caravan Site	Briarwood Farm, Judith Avenue, Coldfair Green, Knodishall, IP17 1UT	01728 832525 / 07999 668597	TM 440 607	5 Pitches Mar - Oct
K5	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	3 in total (Knodishall x 3)			
M5 (M4)	Camping/ Caravan Site	Cakes and Ale Caravan Park, Abbey Lane. Theberton, IP16 4TE Site Split broadly M4 Touring Sites M5 Static Sites	01728 831655	TM 433639	See M4 Ref details as above at 4km
N5	Caravan / Camping site	Lion Public House, Leiston Road, Theberton, IP16 4RU	01728 830185	TM437658	6 pitches
N5	Caravan / Camping site	Theberton Caravan Park, Leiston Road, Theberton, IP16 4RA		TM435660	12 pitches
N5	Caravan / Camping site	Fisher's Field CL, Turney House, Church road, Theberton, IP16 4SA	01728 82373	TM439660	5 pitches (Feb – Nov)
N5	Caravan / Camping site	Sycamore Park, Main Road, Theberton, IP16 4RA	01728 635830	TM435660	20 pitches (Mar – Jan)
N5	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	3 in total (Outlying locations)			
	Within 6-7 km				
A6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	7 in total (Dunwich x 6) (Outlying -x 1)			
A6 / 7	Caravan / camping site	Tower Bungalow, Minsmere Road, Dunwich, IP17 3DF		TM474695	5 pitches
I6 / 7	Care Home	Garrett House Residential Home, 43 Park Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5EN	01728 453249	TM 460 567	45 residents
I6 / 7	Sheltered Housing	The Plantation, Leiston Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5GQ	Flagship 0808 1684555	TM 459 573	20 x 1 bed bungalows
I6 / 7	Sheltered Housing	Northfield Court, St Peter's Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5LU	01491 821170 Cognatum Estates	TM 463 305	24 x 2 and 3 bedroom flats
I6 / 7	Camping/ Caravan Site	Church Farm Holiday Park, Church Farm Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5BH	01728 453433	TM 463573	85 touring pitches, 295 Static pitches (Apr - Oct)

I6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	48 in total (Aldeburgh x 48)			
J6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	1 in total (Outlying x 1)			
J6	Caravan site	Chapel Barn Farm, Leiston Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5QE		TM447589	12 static, 10 touring, 15 tents
K6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	3 in total (Friston x3)			
M6 / 7	Camping/ Caravan site	Peak Hill Farm Caravan, Sheep Meadow, Honeyput Lane, Theberton, IP16 4TG	01728 602248	TM416651	5 pitches
M6 / 7	Holiday Homes	1 in total (Outlying location)			
N6 / 7	School - Primary	Middleton Community Primary School, 1 Rectory Road, Middleton, IP17 3NW	01728 648251	TM 430 678	Est. 8 staff 37 students
N6 / 7	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Sunflower Montessori Nursery School, Causeway Farm, The Causeway, Middleton, IP17 3NH	01728 648352	TM 426 679	7 staff 28 children
N6 / 7	Camping/ Motor home Site	The Bell Inn, The Green, Middleton, IP17 3NN	01728 648286	TM 429678	5 Pitches (Apr – Sep)
N6 / 7	Camping/ Caravan Site	Golden Acres Certified Site, Leiston Yoxford Road, Middleton, IP17 3LY	01728 648680 07840 931409 07784 787762	TM 423672	5 Pitches 10 tents (Apr – Oct)
N6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	9 in total (Middleton x 8) (Outlying x 1)			
O6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	19 in total (Westleton x 18) (Outlying x 1)			
P6 / 7	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	1 in total (Outlying x 1)			
	Within 8-9 km				
A8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest	1 in total (Outlying x 1)			

	houses, hotels				
A8 / 9	Beach Huts	Dunwich x 1			
I8 / 9	School - Primary	Aldeburgh Primary School, IP15 5EU	01728 452150	TM 462 562	30 staff 105 students
I8 / 9	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Sunflower Montessori Nursery School, Crescent Road, Aldeburgh	01728 542559 01728 648352	TM 462 563	6 staff -est 20 children
I8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	124 in total (Aldeburgh x 124)			
K 8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	12 in total (Friston x 10) (Outlying x 2)			
L8 / 9	Care Home	Chantry House Residential Home, Chantry Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1DJ	01728 733833	TM 386 629	24 residents
L8 / 9	Camping/ Caravan Site	Happy Days Retro Vacations, Wardspring Farm, Leiston Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1TG	01728 603424 or 07824 999115	TM 402630	14 Pitches (Mar – Oct)
L8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	6 in total (Sternfield x 1) (Saxmundham x 5)			
M8 / 9	Camping	Boundary Farm Glamping, East Green, Kelsale, IP17 2PH	01728 602094 or 07888 696454	TM406659	2 units (Mar – Oct)
M8 / 9	School - Primary	Kelsale Primary School, Carlton Road, Kelsale, IP17 2NP	01728 602297	TM 385 643	36 staff 163 students
M8 / 9 and M10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Saxmundham Sports and Recreational Ground, Carlton Park, Saxmundham, IP17 1AT	07716884322	TM 384638	75 Pitches (Apr – Oct)
M8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	6 in total (Kelsale x 4) (East Green x 2)			
N8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	2 in total (Outlying x 2)			
O8 / 9	Care Home	Norwood House Care Home, Littlemoor Road, Middleton, IP17 3JZ	01728 668600	TM 414 677	71 residents
O8 / 9	Sheltered Housing	Fairfields, 27 Henley Close, Darsham, IP17 1EY	0333 321 4041 First Port	TM 382 634	37 x 1 and 2 bedroom cottages

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O8 / 9	Care Home	Priory Paddocks Nursing Home, Priory Lane, Darsham, IP17 3QD	01728 668244	TM 415 703	40 residents
O8 / 9	Camping/ Caravan Site	Mill Hill Farm Caravan and Camping Park, Westleton Road, Darsham, IP17 3BS	01728 668555	TM 422692	96 Pitches (Apr – Oct)
O8 / 9	Camping/ Caravan Site	Green Farm CL, Brussels Green, Darsham, IP17 3RN	01728 668486	TM424703	5 pitches (Mar -Sep)
O8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	1 in total (Outlying x 1)			
P8 / 9	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	2 in total (Outlying x 2)			
	Within 10-11 km				
I10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	2 in total (Outlying x 2)			
J10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	14 in total (Outlying x 14)			
J10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Tumbleweed Certified Location, Iken, IP12 2EU	01728 688141	TM 418554	5 Pitches (Mar – End Oct)
K10 / 11	School - Primary	Snape Community Primary School, IP17 1QG	01728 688373	TM 395 585	14 staff 42 students
K10 / 11	School - Private	Britten Pears School for Advanced Musical Studies Snape Maltings Concert Hall Snape Bridge Tunstall Suffolk IP17 1SP	01728 687100	TM 392 574	Occasional residential courses for young adults.
K10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Croft Farm CL, Hulver Lane Snape, IP17 1QW	01728 688254	TM388592	5 pitches – all year
K10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	23 in total Outlying x 23)			
L10 / 11	School – Secondary	SET Saxmundham, Seaman Avenue, Saxmundham, IP17 1DZ	01728 633910	TM 380 629	82 staff 491 students
L10 / 11	School - Primary	St Mary's Primary School, School Lane, Benhall, IP17 1HE	01728 602407	TM 383 614	17 staff 101 students
L10 / 11	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Benhall Pre-school, School Lane, Benhall, IP17 1HE	01728 605940	TM 383 614	9 staff 24 children

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L 10 / 11	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Meadow Brook Preschool, Seaman Avenue, Saxmundham, IP17 1DZ	01728 604768	TM 380 629	18 staff 63 children
L10 / 11	Children Centre	The Meadow Children's Centre, Seaman Avenue, Saxmundham, IP17 1DZ	01728 652110	TM 381 629	11 staff -est 36 children -est
L10 / 11	School - Primary	Saxmundham Primary School, Brook Farm Road, IP17 1XQ	01728 602205	TM 381 635	47 staff, 273 students. May include Brook Farm Playgroup.
L10 / 11	Adult Day Centre	The Fromus Centre, Seaman Avenue, Seaman Avenue, Saxmundham, IP17 1DZ	07968 160706	TM 380630	Any number Day Centre for adults, families etc. Some may be vulnerable.
L10/11	Supported Housing	Fairfield Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1FH	0208 502 3933 – HQ 07484 227917 – Mgr 07484 227927 - Dep	TM385634	Residential for 3 clients
L10 / 11	Care Home	Tru Care Ltd, 55 Rendham Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1EJ	01728 603495	TM 378 632	Residential Home for 18 and Home Care office
L10 / 11	Sheltered Housing	Swan House Sheltered Housing, Saxon Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1EE	01728 603916 Orwell Housing	TM 380 634	24 x 1 and 2 bedroom flats
L10 / 11	Children's Home	Compass Children's Home, Ada House, Saxon Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1EF	01728 633 068 07720 428 948	TM 380634	6 children 12 staff -est
L10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Marsh Farm Caravan Site, Sternfield, Saxmundham, IP17 1HW	01728 602168	TM 386607	45 Pitches
L10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Whitearch Touring Caravan Park, Main Road, Benhall, IP17 1NA	01728 604646	TM 379610	50 Pitches (Apr – Oct)
L10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	5 in total (Saxmundham x1) (Outlying x4)			
M10/11	Supported Housing	88 Beaumont Cottages, Kelsale-cum-Carlton, IP17 2NW	01728 748322	TM385646	Residential for 1 client
M10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Mill Farm Leisure Camping and Caravanning Site, Rosemary Lane, Kelsale cum Carlton, IP17 2QS	01728 603006 07837 689036	TM 379648	10 Pitches
M10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Lonely Farm Camping and Caravan Site, Carlton, IP17 2QP	01728 663416	TM 365654	30 Pitches (Easter – Oct)
M10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Carlton Meres Country Park, Rendham Road, Carlton, IP17 2QP	01728 440925	TM 366652	326 static, 70 touring Pitches
M10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	3 Maples Park CL, Rendham Road, Carlton, IP17 2QN	01728 605547	TM368645	5 pitches all year
M10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	By A12, Kelsale		TM375643	

M10 / 11	Holiday homes	3 in total (Outlying x 3)			
N10 / 11	School - Primary	Yoxford And Peasenhall Primary School, High Street, Yoxford, IP17 3EU	01728 668291	TM 395 688	12 staff 66 students
N10 / 11	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Yoxford And Peasenhall Nursery, High Street, Yoxford, IP17 3EU	01728 668291	TM 395 688	3 staff 12 students -est
N10 / 11	Caravan Site	Sunflower House CL, Brook Street, Yoxford, IP17 3HB	01728 668106	TM 396685	5 pitches all year
N10/11	Caravan Site	Darsham Cottage CL, Darsham	None found	TM408701	5 pitches all year
N10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	11 in total (Yoxford x 9) (Outlying x 2)			
O10 / 11	Caravan Site	Hill Farm CL, Hill Farm, Lymballs Lane, Darsham, IP17 3QH	01728 668608 or 07949 949480	TM 414710	5 pitches
O10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Haw Wood Farm Caravan and Camping Park, Darsham Road, Hinton, IP17 3QT	01502 359550	TM 424715	25 static, 65 touring Pitches (1 Mar – 14 Jan)
O10 / 11	Caravan site	High Lodge, Haw Wood, Hinton, IP17 3QT	01986 784347	TM??	19 lodges catering for 2 – 6 pers
O10 / 11	Camping/ Caravan Site	Priory Farm CL, Darsham IP17 3QD	01728 668459	TM 415704	5 pitches all year
O10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	1 in total (Outlying x 1)			
P10 / 11	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	3 in total (Outlying x 3)			
	Within 12 – 13 km				
A12 / 13	Care Home	St Barnabus Care Home, Godyll Road, Southwold, IP18 6AJ	01502 722264	TM 504 762	15 residents
A12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Southwold Camping and Caravan Site, Ferry Road, Southwold, IP18 6ND	01502 722468	TM 503750	100 Pitches (Mar – Nov)
A12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Riverside Caravan site, The Street, Walberswick, IP18 6UB	01502 478019	TM 4974 (4 fig grid)	Summer holidays only 15 tents

					21 caravans
A12 / 13	Holiday Homes	63 in total (Southwold x33) (Walberswick x25) (Outlying x5)			
A12 / 13	Beach huts	Southwold x 300 Walberswick x 59			
I12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	High House Fruit Farm, Sudbourne, IP12 2BL	01394 450263	TM 430527	Cottages sleeps 5, 5 Pitches (May – Sep)
I12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	2 in total (Outlying x 2)			
K12 / 13	Camp site	Blaxhall YHA camp site	01728 688206 0345 3719305	TM 369570	6 Pitches (Mar – Oct)
K12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	The Forge Certified Site, Church Road, Blaxhall, IP12 2DH	01728 688346 07771656542	TM 364572	5 Pitches
K12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	2 in total (Blaxhall x2)			
L12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Mollett's Farm Certificated Location, Mollett's Farm, Main Road, Benhall, Saxmundham IP17 1JY	01728 604547	TM 367603	5 Pitches
L12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	5 in total (Outlying x5)			
M12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Alde Garden, The White Horse, Low Road, Sweffling, Saxmundham, IP17 2BB	01728 664178	TM 344642	8 tents (1 May – 30 Sep)
M12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Birds and Bees, Rendham Hall Farm, Rendham, IP17 2AW	01728 573563	TM353657	16 tents
M12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	White House Farm Certified Location, Peasenhall, Sibton, IP17 2NE	01728 660260	TM 363676	5 Pitches (Apr – Oct)
M12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	2 in total (Swefflingham x1) (Rendham x1)			
N12 / 13	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Sibton Nursery School, Yoxford Road, Sibton, IP17 2LU	01728 660200	TM 361 695	6 staff 20 children
N12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	8 in total (Outlying x8)			

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O12 / 13	School - Primary	Bramfield Primary School, Bridge St, Halesworth IP19 9HZ	01986 784205	TM 401 737	24 staff 91 students
O12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	6 in total (Outlying x6)			
O12 / 13	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Bramfield Stepping Stones, Village Hall, Bridge Street, Bramfield, IP19 9HZ	01986 784586	TM 401 737	4 staff 18 children
O12 / 13	Camping / caravan site	Bunkers Hill Park CL, Bramfield, Halesworth, IP19 9AF	01986 784582	TM390728	5 pitches
O12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Heathside Haven, Blackheath Road, Wenhaston, IP19 9EU	01502 478747	TM 421746	11 Pitches
O12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Heathside Farm Certified Location, Blackheath, Wenhaston, IP19 9ES	01502 478252	TM 42 74 (4 fig grid)	5 Pitches
P12 / 13	School - Primary	Wenhaston Primary School, Hall Road, IP19 9EP	01502 478328	TM 426 752	18 staff 86 students
P12 / 13	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Wenhaston Acorns Pre-school, Wenhaston Primary School, Hall Road, IP19 9EP	07825 002641	TM 426 752	4 staff 24 children
P12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Brook Farm Certified Location, Wenhaston, IP19 9HE	01502 478279	TM 432745	5 Pitches (Easter to Sep)
P12 / 13	Camping/ Caravan Site	Pine Lodge Certified Site, Hazels Lane, Hinton, IP17 3RF	01502 478922	TM 435741	15 Pitches
P12 / 13	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	8 in total (Blythburgh x2) (Wenhaston x3) (Outlying x3)			
	Within 14–15 km				
A14 / 15	School - Primary	Reydon Primary School, Jermyn's Road, Reydon, IP18 6QB	01502 723084	TM 499 775	34 staff 185 students
A14 / 15	School - Private	St Felix School, Halesworth Road, Reydon, IP18 6SD	01502 722175	TM 490 770	Staff – may be 100 321 students of all ages from nursery to middle school (St George's) to 6 th Form, day and boarding (81).

A14 / 15	School - Primary	Southwold Primary School, Cumberland Rd, IP18 6JP	01502 723137	TM 508 763	17 staff 60 students
A14 / 15	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Rosebuds Pre-school, Southwold Primary School, IP18 6JP	01502 723137	TM 508 763	5 staff 26 children
A14 / 15	Pre-school, Nursery or Playgroup	Brambles Nursery, Jermyn's Road, Reydon, IP18 6QB	01502 722541	TM 499 775	11staff-est 38 children
Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (Grid Ref)	Number of People
A14 / 15	Care Home	Oaklands House Care Home, Lowestoft Road, Reydon, IP18 5RY	01502 724955	TM 502 774	29 residents
A14 / 15	Sheltered Housing	Pitches View Sheltered Housing, Wangford Road, Reydon, IP18 6PA	01502 726062	TM 493 780	28 x 1 bedroom flats and 4 2 bedroom flats, Orwell Housing
A14 / 15	Sheltered Housing	Crick Court sheltered housing, Station Road, Southwold, IP18 6DE	07796187764	TM 504 765	21 x 1 and 2 bedroom flats, East Suffolk DC
A14 / 15	Camping/ Caravan Site	Jubilee Certified Site, Green Lane Reydon, IP18 6PG	01502 722395	TM 499779	5 Pitches
A14 / 15	Beach Huts	Southwold x 300			
A14 / 15	Caravan Site	The Listening Station & Watch Room, Easton Road, Reydon, IP18 6SS	01728 666300 (Suffolk Hideaways)	TM512799	2 static
A14 / 15	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	189 in total (35 Reydon) (153 Southwold) (1 outlying)			
I14 / 15	School - Primary	Orford Primary School, School Lane, Orford, IP12 2LU	01394 450281	TM 419 502	18 staff 59 students Includes a pre-school group
I14 / 15	Caravan / Camping	Reydon Hall CL, Orford, IP12 2BT	01394 450231	TM429504	5 pitches
I14 / 15	Sheltered Housing	Esmond House, Barron's Meadow, Orford, IP12 2TY	01394 459964 Orwell housing – 01473 218818	TM418503	Very Sheltered housing – 12 residents
I14 / 15	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	24 in total (24 Orford)			
J14 / 15	Caravan / Camping	Chillesford CL, Chillesford, Woodbridge, IP12 3PS	01394 450994	TM382522	5 pitches - all year

K14 / 15	Children's Centre	Mulberry Kindergarten, The Old School House, School Road, Tunstall, IP12 2JQ	01728 688719	TM359552	Staff 36 children
K14 / 15	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	5 in total (5 Stone Common) (1 Tunstall) (2 outlying)			
M14 / 15	Camping/ Caravan Site	Sibton White Horse Inn Certified Location, Sibton, IP17 2JJ	01728 660337	TM 358702	5 Pitches
M14 / 15	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	12 in total (12 outlying)			
N14 / 15	Camping/ Caravan Site	Hill House Farm CL, Peasenhall Road, Walpole, IP19 9BQ	01986 784344	TM368739	5 pitches – all year
N14 / 15	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	8 in total (4 Peasenhall) (4 outlying)			
O14 / 15	School - Private	Bramfield House School, Walpole Road, Bramfield, IP19 9AB	01986 784235 01204 522667 (Head Office)	TM 385736	25staff-est, 74 students (weekly boarding school for boys with emotional, behavioural and social difficulties)
O14 / 14	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	5 in total (3 Wenhaston) (2 outlying)			
P14 / 15	Holiday homes, guest houses, hotels	17 in total (16 outlying) (1 Wenhaston)			

7. EEPZ – Transient Population

Within the EEPZ there are numerous addresses providing accommodation, the table below lists only those which have 5 or more rooms or can accommodate 10 or more people.

Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (Grid Ref)	No of rooms / more than 10 persons
Within 4km					
H4	SC	Thorpeness Chateau, Thorpeness	Via Booking.com – no further details	TM475601	7 rooms
H4	SC	Shore Cote, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM474599	5 rooms
I4	SC	7 Whinlands, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM471598	5 rooms
I4	SC	9 Whinlands, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM471598	5 rooms
I4	SC	Alexander House, Thorpeness	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM470598	6 rooms
I4	SC	Dormy House, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM472598	Sleeps 10
I4	SC	Meare House, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM470597	Sleeps 10
I4	SC	Turret House, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM471597	5 rooms
I4	SC	The Tower, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM473598	5 rooms
I4	SC	Lake Cottage, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM 469 597	5 rooms
I4	SC	Reedlands, Lakeside Avenue, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM467597	6 rooms
I4	SC	House in the Clouds, Thorpeness	info@houseinthecLOUDS.co.uk 020 7224 3615 07718 455988	TM 469 597	5 rooms
I4	Hotel	Thorpeness Hotel & Golf Club	01728 452176	TM 466 598	36 rooms
I4	SC	2 The Bays, Thorpeness	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553098	TM470597	5 rooms

I4	SC	7 Sanctuary Court	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM472592	5 rooms
O4	B&B	Eels Foot Inn, Eastbridge	01728 830154	TM 452 661	6 Rooms
Within 5km					
I5	SC	Fairhaven, Thorpeness	Via Snaptrip – 0203 637 0812	TM 470591	6 rooms
I5	SC	Sea View, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM472595	6 rooms
I5	SC	2 The Dunes, Thorpeness	Best of Suffolk – 01728 553062	TM 472595	5 rooms
I5	SC	Sanctuary House, 1 The Haven, Thorpeness	Best of Suffolk – 01728 553062	TM471596	5 rooms
I5	SC	Hermitage House, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM469597	7 rooms
I5	SC	6 The Benthills, Thorpeness	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM472596	5 rooms
I5	SC	6 Lakeside, Thorpeness		TM469597	5 rooms
J5	B&B	Tirah Guest House, Aldringham	01728 452972	TM 448597	6 rooms
J5	SC	Swiss Cottage, Aldringham	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages - 01728830250	TM446603	5 Rooms
K5	Hotel / caravan site	Butchers Arms, Knodishall	01728 833873	TM434609	5 rooms plus 2 touring pitches
N5	SC	The Old Manor, Theberton	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM 436659	5 rooms
Within 6-7 ms					
A6 / 7	Hotel	The Ship, Dunwich	01728 648219	TM 477705	16 rooms
A6/7	SC	Church Farm & Cottage, Dunwich	Via Best of Suffolk 01728 553081	TM475705	6 rooms
I6 / 7	B&B	The Toll House, Aldeburgh	01728 453239	TM 458570	7 rooms
I6 - 7	Hotel	Wentworth Hotel, Aldeburgh	01728 452312	TM 465570	35 rooms
I6 / 7	SC	Picket House, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553063	TM459570	Sleeps 10

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I6 / 7	SC	Bluebells, Aldeburgh	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM464572	5 rooms
I6 / 7	SC	Belstead House, Aldeburgh	Via Suffolk Hideaways – 01728 666300	TM460568	6 rooms
I6 / 7	SC	Winton Lodge, Aldeburgh	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM 462 567	5 rooms
I6 / 7	SC	Marsh Harrier, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk 01728 553081	TM451570	8 rooms
I6 / 7	Hotel	The White Lion, Aldeburgh	01728 452720	TM 465569	28 rooms
I6 / 7	SC	The Brick House, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553063	TM461567	Sleeps 10
I6 / 7	SC	Foxglove House, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553098	TM450571	Sleeps 12
K6 / 7	SC	Billeaford Barns	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM433602	6 rooms
M6 / 7	SC	East Green Farm Cottages, Kelsale	01728 602316	TM 404655	5 units
N6/7	SC	Westering, Middleton	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553098	TM437676	5 rooms
O6 / 7	Hotel	The Westleton Crown	01728 648777	TM 440690	34 rooms
Within 8-9km					
I8 / 9	SC	The Gables, Aldeburgh	01725 518755	TM 462562	7 rooms
I8 / 9	Hotel	Brundenell Hotel, Aldeburgh	01728 452071	TM 464560	44 rooms
I8 / 9	SC	Orlando, Aldeburgh	01394 274321	TM 464564	6 rooms
I8 / 9	SC	The Pink House, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553063	TM464566	5 rooms
I8 / 9	SC	Wide Skies, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk - 01728 553095	TM463564	10 pers
I8 / 9	SC	33 The Terrace, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553098	TM463564	5 rooms
I8/9	SC	Jubilee Place & Sea la Vie, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553081	TM464566	5 rooms
I8 / 9	SC	Gunfleet, Aldeburgh	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages – 01728 830250	TM465566	6 rooms
I8 / 9	SC	Stoney Beach, Aldeburgh	Via Aldeburgh Coastal Cottages – 01728 830250	TM464562	5 rooms

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I8 / 9	SC	Holly Lodge, Aldeburgh	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553098	TM462564	5 rooms
I8 / 9	SC	Moorings, Aldeburgh	07802 254361	TM 462565	5 rooms
I8/9	SC	1 Little Dingle Cottage, Dunwich	01473 414806	TM475717	Sleeps 12
L8 / 9	SC	Varley House, Saxmundham	Via Welcome Cottages - 0345 268 0816	TM 385634	5 rooms
L8 / 9	Hotel	The Bell at Sax, Saxmundham	01728 602331	TM386631	10 rooms
L8 / 9	SC	Red House Barns, Sternfield	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM404619	5 rooms
N8 / 9	SC	Old Hall Barn, Darsham	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM410695	7 beds
N8 / 9	SC	Goodas Barn, Mill Farm, Westleton Rd, Darsham	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM421692	4 rooms
Within 10- 11km					
N10 / 11	Hotel	Satis House Hotel, Yoxford	01728 668221	TM 397687	12 rooms
O10 / 11	Hotel	The Griffin Inn, High Street, Yoxford, IP17 3EP	01728 667078	TM 393690	6 rooms
O10/11	SC	High Lodge, Hinton	07128 533663	TM430722	19 lodges
Within 12 – 13 km					
A12 / 13	SC	Bittern House, Walberswick	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553063	TM495745	5 rooms
A12 / 13	SC	Westbury House, Southwold	01502 723292 Durrants Holiday Cottages	TM508759	5 rooms
A12 / 13	SC	The Boat House, Walberswick	Via Cottage Tree – 01728 685800	TM500749	5 rooms
A12 / 13	SC	Teal House, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM488748	5 rooms
A12/13	SC	Fairhaven, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM494748	5 rooms
A12/13	SC	Ferrins, 20 Manor Close, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM494748	5 Rooms
A12 /13	SC	1 Anchor Cottages, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM497746	5 rooms

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A12/13	Hotel	The Anchor, Walberswick	01502 722112	TM497746	10 rooms
A12/13	SC	Leveretts, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM493746	5 rooms
A12/13	SC	Aldebaran, Millfields, Walberswick	Durrants Holiday Cottages – 01502 723292	TM495744	Sleeps 13
A12/13	SC	Admiral House, Walberswick	Via Best of Suffolk 01728 553098	TM496747	5 rooms
A12 / 13	SC	The Lodge, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM496747	5 rooms
A12/13	SC	Vine House, Ferry Road, Walberswick	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM498747	6 Rooms
A 12 / 13	SC	South Green House, Southwold	01508 570028	TM 508760	6 rooms
A 12 / 13	SC	Hill House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM 507759	5 rooms
A12/13	SC	28 South Green, Southwold	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553081	TM508758	6 rooms
A 12 / 13	SC	3 Centre Cliff, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets - 01502 722717	TM 509760	5 rooms
A12 / 13	SC	The Links, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM504762	7 rooms
A12 / 13	Hotel	The Sail Loft, 53 Ferry Road Southwold, IP18 6HQ	01502 725173	TM506754	5 rooms
A12 / 13	SC	SC Holeystone Cottage, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM508761	5 rooms
K12 / 13	Youth Hostel	Blaxhall YHA	01728 688206 0345 3719305	TM 369570	41 bed spaces
K12 / 13	Hotel	The Ship, Blaxhall	01728 688316	TM367569	8 rooms
L12 / 13	SC	Mollett's Farm, Main Road, Benhall, Saxmundham IP17 1JY	01728 604547	TM 366602	6 units
M12 / 13	B&B	Thurston Farm B&B, Rendham	07468 319537	TM3599664	4 rooms plus large barn for sleeping
N12 / N13	SC	Sibton Wilderness Reserve	020 74845700	Sibton Park	7 properties on the estate sleeping more than 10 plus 7

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					smaller properties
O12 / 13	SC	The Manor House, Bramfield	Via Suffolk Cottage Holidays - 01394 389189	TM399740	5 rooms
P12 / 13	SC	Whitehouse Barns, Bulcamp	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM461760	8 rooms
Within 14–15 km					
A14 / 15	Hotel	The Swan Hotel, Southwold	01502 722186	TM 505765	42 rooms
A14 / 15	Hotel	The Crown, Southwold	01502 722275	TM 505765	14 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Amory House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM505763	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Samovar, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM507765	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Sutherland House, Southwold	01502 724544	TM506762	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Room with a view, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM509763	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Marram House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets - 01502 722717	TM 508767	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The Creek House, Reydon	07739 096639	TM 501769	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The Old Farm House, Reydon	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM483771	6 rooms
A14 / 15	Hotel	The Blyth Hotel, Southwold	01502 722632	TM 505765	13 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Seacroft, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM 509761	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The White House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM510765	5 rooms
A14/15	SC	Hare Lodge, Peasenhall	01728 660242	TM356689	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The Shelduck, Southwold	Via Best of Suffolk - 01728 638962	TM 505764	4 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Burchley House, Southwold	No tel no. available, website only.	TM 505765	7 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	St Edmunds House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM 507765	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The Pink House, Southwold	Via Best of Suffolk - 01728 638962	TM 509 763	6 rooms

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A14/15	SC	Kestrel & Osprey, Southwold	Via Best of Suffolk – 01728 553081	TM509763	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Palm House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM 507765	5 rooms
A 14 / 15	SC	Saxon House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM510767	7 rooms
A 14 / 15	SC	Northcliffe, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM510764	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Tall Cottage, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM509764	6 rooms
A14 / 15	Hotel	Sutherland House Hotel, 56 High Street, Southwold, IP18 6DN	01502 724544	TM506762	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Chelsea Villa, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM510763	6 rooms
Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (Grid Ref)	No of rooms / more than 10 persons
A14 / 15	SC	Pier Lodge, Southwold	Via Best of Suffolk - 01728 638962	TM 510767	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	Tynewold, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM506766	5 rooms
A14 / 15	Hotel	The Randolph, Reydon	01502 723603	TM 497773	10 rooms
A14/15	B&B	Newlands Country House, Reydon	01502 722164	TM494771	7 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The Old Gymnasium, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM505762	Sleeps 10
A14 / 15	SC	Southwold House, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM510764	6 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	The Old House & Cottage, Southwold	Via Best of Suffolk 01728 553081	TM506762	5 rooms
A14 / 15	SC	James Cottage, Southwold	Via Suffolk Secrets – 01502 722717	TM509763	5 rooms
Sector	Type	Premises & Use	Tel Number	Location (GRID Ref)	No of rooms / more than 10 persons
I14 / 15	Hotel	The Crown and Castle, Orford	01394 450205	TM 420498	21 rooms
I14 / 15	SC	The Great House, Orford	07808 094415	TM422498	6 rooms

M14 / 15	SC	Bruisyard Hall, Bruisyard	01728 639000	TM 334662	12 rooms
N14 / 15	Inn	Sibton White Horse	01728 660337	TM 357702	5 rooms

8. EEPZ Essential Operational Infrastructure

Agency	Infrastructure	Location/ Sector	Impact of Loss	Agreed Mitigation	Point of Contact for Information
Police	Saxmundham SNT (Fire Stn)	TM 379 630 L10/11	Local SNT Base		Contingency Planning Officer - Suffolk Constabulary
	Southwold Police Stn.	TM 504 766 A14/15	Local SNT Base		
	Peasenhall	TM 362 719 N14/15	Mast Site		
Fire & Rescue	Aldeburgh Fire Station	TM 458569 I6/7	On Call Fire Station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Firefighters are classified as radiation workers under IRR17 for dose limits. ○ Pre-identified informed volunteer firefighters can operate under REPPiR for higher emergency exposure dose limits. ○ Radiation protection procedures in Fire MiP. ○ RPA provided by AWE. 	Resilience Manager - Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service
	Saxmundham Fire Station	TM 379630 L10/11	On Call Fire Station		
	Reydon Fire Station	TM 504766 A14/15	On Call Fire Station		
	Orford Fire Station	TM 419502 I14/15	On Call Fire Station		

Ambulance	Saxmundham	TM 380 629 L10/11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ambulance station 		Resilience Manager - Suffolk East of England Ambulance Service
NHS	Aldeburgh Hospital	TM 460565 I8/9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 29 beds - rehabilitation and palliative care. ○ Outpatient Clinics ○ Day Centre for Elderly 		Emergency Planning & Resilience Manager, Suffolk ICB
	Aldeburgh GP Surgery (Victoria Road)	TM 459571 I6/7	Community healthcare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ (4032 registered patients) 	Patients directed to alternative GP surgery if closed – shelter or evacuation	
	Saxmundham GP Surgery (Lambale Meadow)	TM 385635 L8/9	Community healthcare (8752 registered patients)	Patients directed to alternative GP surgery if closed – shelter or evacuation	
	Southwold GP Surgery (York Road)	TM 505763 A14/15	Community healthcare (5056 registered patients)		
Environment Agency	Orford Flood Gate	TM4246749539 I14/15	Not able to check & shut if necessary		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Snape Sluice	TM3908257634 K10/11	Not able to check for blockages		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Southwold Haven Sluice	TM5020475003 A12/13	Not able to check if possibly open		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Blackshore Sluice	TM4953275665 A12/13	Not able to check if possibly open		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Charity Sluice	TM4945475650 A12/13	Not able to check if possibly open		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Walberswick Floodboards	TM4994474831 A12/13	Not able to inspect and operate.		Incident Management Business Partner

Environment Agency	Palmers Lane Penstock	TM4939775783 A12/13	Not able to check if possibly open		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Damboards South Emergency Access Ramp (Slaughden/Aldeburgh)	TM4633055056 I8/9	Not able to check & shut		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Damboards North – Emergency Access ramp (Slaughden/Aldeburgh)	TM4635855297 I8/9	Not able to check & shut		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Easton Bavents Floodgate	TM5124977015 A14/15	Not able to check & shut		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Walberswick Inner Defence – Flood Gate 2	TM4993674654 A12/13	Not able to check & shut		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Walberswick Inner Defence – Flood Gate 1	TM4983374648 A12/13	Not able to check & shut		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Sibton Park Farm Sluice	TM3790270103 N14/15	Not able to inspect and operate gate.		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Knodishall	TM4251361815 L6/7	Unable to manage flood warnings - 16 properties		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Middleton	TM4309767952 O6/7	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner

Environment Agency	Benhall Bridge	TM3878661802 L8/9	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Saxmundham	TM3863963484 L8/9	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Snape Maltings	TM3909057632 K10/11	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Benhall Raingauge	TM3816660602 L10/11	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Southwold Tide Site	TM5023574980 A12/13	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Beversham	TM3602058259 K12/13	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Farnham	TM3600860105 L12/13	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Bramfield	TM4005773798 O12/13	Unable to manage flood warnings - 25 properties		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Orford Ness	TM4264849376 I14/15	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Butley Tide Site	TM3860651859 J14/15	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner


Environment Agency	Sibton	TM3590469924 N14/15	Unable to manage flood warnings - 23 properties		Incident Management Business Partner
Environment Agency	Holton GS	TM4062276880 O14/15	Unable to manage flood warnings		Incident Management Business Partner
Anglian Water [OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE - provided in commercial confidence]	53 x Inline Sewage Pumping Stations	See full asset list	Environmental Pollution Loss of services/toilet facilities	Sites are telemetered. Remote alarms provide ability to monitor facilities. Tankering can be carried out for pump failures.	
Essex and Suffolk Water [OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE - provided in commercial confidence]	Coldfair Green WTW	TM 438 608 K 5	7789	Increased pumping from Saxmundham WTW	Security and Emergency planning Advisor, Essex & Suffolk Water
	Peartree Valve KCP	TM 425 616 L 6/7	12439	Backfeeding from Coldfair Green and Leiston bypass main	
	Saxmundham WTW	TM 379 631 L 10/11	1972	Bypass	
	Saxmundham Tower	TM 379 630 L 10/11	9983	Bypass and pump from Benhall	
	Blythburgh Tower	TM 453 742 P10/11	1116	Bypass	
	Southwold Tower	TM 501 762 A 12/13	6660	Direct pumping from Southwold WTW	
	Benhall WTW	TM 354 615 L 12/13	18744	Loss of supplies and impact on Sizewell NPS. Some rezoning possible.	

	Southwold WTW	TM 479 771 A 14/15	3330	Bypass and pumping from Shadingfield	
	Little Glemham Borehole	TM 338 589 L 14/15	N/A	Mitigation of sources	
	Lodgewood Tower	TM 362 719 N 14/15	12279	Bypass	
UK Power Networks [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]	Leiston Primary (Samunden Road, Knodishall)	IP17 1TT K6/7	primary substation - 7,000 people	Usually unmanned but access required to restore supplies after fault. Restoration would only take place in uncontaminated areas.	Contingency Planning, UK Power Networks
	Orford Primary (near Lodge Farm, Orford)	IP12 2BS I14/15	primary substation - 1,200 people		
	Benhall Primary (Deadmans Lane, Benhall)	IP17 1JJ L10/11	primary substation - 3,300 people		
	Peasenhall Primary (Top Hill Hev Rd, Peasenhall)	IP17 2LH N14/15	primary substation - 2,100 people		
	Reydon Primary (Quay Lane, Reydon)	IP18 6SJ A14/15	primary substation - 4,600 people		

Information in highlighted rows above is removed from the public version of this plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs and Section 43 - Commercial interests.

OUTLINE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE

1. Map of Sizewell OPZ. Area shown in orange on map below (EEPZ is in green and DEPZ is blue)



3. Assessment of OPZ

An assessment of the OPZ has been conducted to identify:

- Population – permanent and transitory
- Commercial properties
- Potential vulnerable groups – schools, childcare provision, care homes, camping/caravan sites
- Local essential operational infrastructure

This assessment is used before any emergency to identify potential capabilities needed to respond to a worst case accident.

4. OPZ Summary (from 15kms to 30kms):

- Permanent Population 132,000
- Private Properties 58,200
- Commercial businesses 5,300

Vulnerable Groups

- Schools 91 Primary x 58, Secondary x 10, plus 23 other educational establishments,
- Pre School/Children’s Centres 57
- Sheltered Housing 53
- Care Homes 52 Includes 6 children’s homes
- Prisons & YOI 2 Hollesley HMP Warren Hill (258) / Hollesley YOI & Hollesley Bay (458)

Transient Population

- Beach Huts 488
- Holiday Homes 392

Essential Operational Infrastructure

- Ambulance 4
- Fire & Rescue 9
- Police 10
- EA – Flood warning Nil
- NHS 22

Utilities

- Anglian Water 81 Excludes inline SPS
- Essex & Suffolk Water 33
- Gas – National Grid Nil
- UKPN Nil

Note that some sectors are located cross border in Norfolk.

5. OPZ Demographics

Sector	East Suffolk
	Mid Suffolk
	South Norfolk

Sector	Total Permanent population	Total Private Properties	Commercial Properties
Within 16/17 km	10741	4845	698
A16-18	101	46	6
I 16-18	Nil	Nil	1
J16-18	200	87	29
K16-18	2579	1016	213
L16-18	628	260	40
M16-18	379	152	44
N16-18	373	157	23
O16-18	5707	2775	316
P16-18	774	361	26
Within 18/19 km	7263	3239	464
A18-19	587	268	5
J18-19	176	79	7
K18-19	2999	1326	131
L18-19	1505	700	195
M18-19	477	201	25
M18-19	21	9	
N18-19	178	75	23
N18-19	45	19	1
O18-19	731	326	62
P18-19	544	236	15
Within 20/21 km	7215	3105	240
A21-22	740	322	26
J21-22	364	146	5
K21-22	1462	606	43
L21-22	1765	789	70
M21-22	1167	477	43
M21-22	44	18	1
N21-22	270	118	10
N21-22	778	362	10
O21-22	214	96	16
P21-22	411	171	18

Within 22/23 km	6921	2800	290
A22-23	388	168	29
J 22-23	1672	685	21
K22-23	2030	852	78
L22-23	777	297	35
M22-23	353	112	42
M22-23	209	77	7
N22-23	126	56	9
N22-23	170	73	6
O22-23	631	257	29
P22-23	565	223	34
Within 24/25 km	16820	7665	873
A24-25	5122	2341	103
J24-25	645	276	24
K24-25	7265	3489	497
L24-25	962	388	69
L24-25	5	2	
M24-25	21	8	46
M24-25	690	280	12
N24-25	735	319	20
O24-25	666	267	13
P24-25	709	295	121
Within 26/27 km	29426	12695	804
A26-27	6623	2744	317
J26-27	866	387	27
K26-27	4951	2218	110
L26-27	267	101	52
L26-27	305	120	6
M26-27	1560	655	45
N26-27	2084	915	57
O26-27	301	124	7
O26-27	33	13	1
P26-27	12436	5418	198
Within 28/29 km	36713	15984	1033
A28-29	23226	10182	182
A28-29	2	1	1
J28-29	328	140	12
K28-29	3981	1666	328
L28-29	69	27	28
L28-29	388	149	6
M28-29	657	250	13
N28-29	787	317	24

N28-29	33	14	2
O28-29	4158	1751	60
O28-29	176	74	5
P28-29	2250	1136	318
P28-29	658	277	7
Within 30 km	17239	7721	907
A30	7988	3652	684
A30	62	26	1
J30	276	127	
K30	268	111	
L30	17	8	
L30	966	416	56
M30	598	243	24
N30	301	132	2
N30	2292	965	61
O30	1442	766	
O30	1480	623	62
P30	10	4	
P30	1539	648	78

RADIATION PROTECTION

1. **Radiation Protection.** This plan uses the following approach to radiation protection for the public and for intervention personnel:

- **Public.** In this instance the IRR 17 limits are suspended by REPPIR and the emphasis of urgent radiation protection actions by the emergency services and public health authorities is to minimise exposures ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) in keeping with the Emergency Reference Levels published by UK HSA CRCE and to avoid any immediate health effects from radiation exposure or the proposed public protective actions.
- **Emergency Workers.** Emergency Services and other response personnel with defined plan roles and potential to operate in areas with a radiation hazard. Arrangements for the provision of radiation protection advice and the control of exposure to radiation of employees at Sizewell B are the responsibility of the EDF. The management of emergency exposure during any radiation emergency for identified site intervention personnel is detailed in the relevant On Site Emergency Plan and follows ALARP principles.

Emergency services attending any incident involving radiation, but not a radiation emergency, are classed as radiation workers under IRR 17 when operating and are limited to a maximum annual dose of:

Police ⁴ :	5mSv
Fire & Rescue ⁵ :	20mSv. Single incident maximum dose of 5mSv
Ambulance ⁶ :	20mSv
CNC ³	5mSv

During any radiation emergency at Sizewell, occupational radiation protection advice will be provided to the emergency services by the following organisations (i.e. their Radiation Protection Advisors):

Suffolk Constabulary	- Atomic Weapons Establishment
Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service	- UK HSA (RCE Directorate)
East of England Ambulance Service	- UK HSA (RCE Directorate)
CNC	- Nuvia

Radiation protection advice for staff from UK HSA RCE Directorate will be provided by this organisation’s own Radiation Protection Advisors. UK HSA RCE Directorate will also share occupational risk assessments with those organisations providing support under monitoring coordination arrangements to inform their own risk assessments.

4 ACPO Guidelines on the Police Service Response to Operations and Incidents involving Radiation dated Oct 2012

5 Fire & Rescue Service Tactical Operational Guidance- Radioactive Materials January 2019.

6 The Ambulance Service Guidance on Dealing with Radiological Incidents and Emergencies’ July 2017 Version 3.0.

Emergency exposures relates to ionising radiation of intervention personnel which may be necessary to put emergency plans into effect. The management framework to be used by agencies with staff identified as being likely to deploy in the event of a radiation emergency is as follows:

Pre-Planning. The emergency services will:

1. Identify people who can receive emergency exposures
2. Train and equip people to conduct likely intervention tasks
3. Have arrangements for medical surveillance and dosimetry
4. Name those responsible for managing emergency exposures
5. Specify limits of emergency exposures.

Implementation. The emergency services will:

1. Check the fitness of people who will receive emergency exposure
2. Check properly equipped and instructed for intervention task
3. Manage emergency exposures by limiting dose levels except in extreme circumstances to save life
4. Assess the dose received during emergency exposure.

Record Keeping

1. Ensure dose records are kept by approved dosimetry services
2. Provide copy of dose record to employee
3. Report any emergency exposure and resulting action to ONR.

- Emergency Exposure Levels. The following emergency exposure levels have been nationally agreed:

Police Up to 100mSv for plant intervention, simple rescue and future dose saving activities.
 Up to 500mGy for life saving intervention only. This includes intervention to save critical infrastructure which if not attended, may yet threaten public and/or responder life.
 Authorised by appropriately trained police officer.
 Other restrictions are in place for pregnant and breast-feeding police officers.

Fire & Rescue Up to 100 mSv dose limit for an informed volunteer following guidance from a HMA (specially trained officer) and authorisation from a Brigade Manager.
 Emergency exposure to save life or maintain critical infrastructure.
 Other restrictions are in place for pregnant fire-fighters.

Ambulance Up to 100mSv for life saving operations where the casualty cannot be immediately removed from the area of high dose rate.
 Authorised by an appropriately trained and competent Ambulance Tactical Commander.
 Other restrictions are in place for pregnant ambulance officers.

CNC Up to 100mSv for plant intervention, simple rescue and future dose saving

activities.

Up to 500mGy for life saving intervention only. This includes intervention to save critical infrastructure which if not attended, may yet threaten public and/or responder life.

Authorised by appropriately trained CNC officer.

Other restrictions are in place for police officers that are pregnant or breastfeeding children.

KEY EMERGENCY SERVICES LOCATIONS - SIZEWELL

Entire appendix is removed from the public version of this plan. FOI Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters and FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs.

1. **On Site Response**. Detailed operational arrangements for emergency services response to support on site intervention activities are covered by each service operational response plans. The response can be summarised as follows:

- 1.1 **Site Incident:**

Police:	No attendance
Fire & Rescue:	Fire Officer and predetermined Fire attendance to site.
Ambulance:	Predetermined Ambulance response to site

- 1.2 **Off Site Nuclear Emergency - Site Liaison**

Police:	Police Officer to site to act as Liaison Officer in Site ECC and consider Police response to site.
Fire & Rescue:	Fire Officer to site to act as Liaison Officer and some predetermined Fire attendance to site with additional Fire resources deployed to FCP.
Ambulance:	Ambulance Officer to site to act as Liaison Officer and predetermined Ambulance response to site with additional incident support capability deployed to FCP.

- 1.3 **Site Access**. Emergency services will report to Site Security Lodge.

2. **Off-Site Coordination**

- 2.1 **Forward Command Post (operational coordination)**. A multi-agency Forward Command Post (FCP) will be established at the Saxmundham Police and Fire Station to coordinate emergency services support to on-site intervention activity for an OSNE. A Fire SILVER Incident Commander may operate at the ACP or from the Site ECC.

- 2.2 **Tactical Coordination**. A TCG will be established for an OSNE at Landmark House Ipswich. Police, Fire & Rescue and Ambulance Tactical Commanders will operate from this location. If evacuation is required as subsequent public protection action, this will be coordinated by the TCG at Landmark House.

- 2.3 **Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area**. In the event of an OSNE requiring national support to assist the local response, a MASHA may be set up to act as a deployment base for assets coming into the county. The SRF MASHA plan provides details of location options and activation process. The decision to activate a MASHA will be the responsibility of the SCG. The TCG will select and confirm the location.

- 2.4 **Community Information Point**. For an OSNE that has not or is unlikely to affect Leiston, a Community Information Point may be established at Leiston Community

Centre to provide an information point for local residents. This will be established by East Suffolk Council and supported by Suffolk Constabulary (SNT) and Suffolk CC (public health).

APPENDIX L**EVACUATION 4KM – SIZEWELL EMERGENCY**

1. Introduction. Evacuation has been considered as an option for extending public protection measures in the event of a more severe radiation emergency. Detailed planning has been undertaken to inform evacuation up to 4km within 10-12 hours of a radiation emergency declaration. This planning aligns with reasonable worst case planning assumptions contained in the National Security Risk Assessment. The timeframe is important as it aligns with design features at Sizewell B power station to reduce any radiation release to allow such wider public protection action to take place before radiation is released posing a risk at this larger distance.

A detailed technical assessment⁷ of traffic management aspects was undertaken in June 2013 to provide objective information to guide evacuation routes and to provide planning timelines for a range of potential evacuation scenarios.

Arrangements to extend evacuation beyond this 4km option are covered further in the Outline Emergency Planning Appendix N.

2. Approach to Evacuation. UK HSA CRCE advise that evacuation would most likely be implemented within 3 sectorised arcs based upon a centreline informed by prevailing wind. This may be informed using the PACRAM available at the start of any radiation emergency and by any specific UK HSA RCE Directorate advice using information from EDF or other radiation monitoring system. It is unlikely that Joint Agency Modelling will be available at this early stage to inform evacuation planning, but it may help in later stages refine evacuation areas, i.e. post initial evacuation action up to 4kms.

The 4km evacuation option recognises that there are 3 core routes away from the site and that any combination of these routes may be available during any radiation emergency. As a minimum, evacuation planning assumes that only 2 core routes are available to account for any potential traffic incidents effecting one core route area.

Evacuation will be prioritised on those most at risk, i.e. the vulnerable and those in closer proximity to any radiation risk. This is likely to result in response action making sure 0-2kms are cleared first before checking 3-4kms.

3. Evacuation Assumptions

3.1 **National Work.** National work on evacuation planning indicates that many people will elect to self-evacuate when faced with a perceived risk to life. The 4km evacuation option uses the following assumptions based upon national work:

- At least 80% of people heed evacuation advice but up to 20% choose to stay put.
- Of the 80%:
 - At least 64% are self-sufficient for transport but up to 16% require travel assistance.
- Up to 30% of the people that heed evacuation advice will need short term shelter (Rest Centres).

⁷Vectos Transport Technical Report dated August 2013
SRF Radiation Emergency Plan

3.2 **Time of Day.** The technical report used to inform the evacuation arrangements took into account the different traffic conditions, road capacities, population distribution and school times to provide a day and night assessment of evacuation by road. Evacuation will be an option that can be delivered 24/7.

3.3 **Timelines.** Indicative timings to complete an evacuation up to 4kms day or night indicate a worse case of Under 3hours for completion once people are informed.

3.4 **Numbers.** This 4km evacuation option is based upon the worst case 3 sectors for evacuation, i.e. J, K and L - 6000 permeant residents and up to 900 transient. Using the national work on evacuation planning (para 3.1), numbers for worse case 4km evacuation planning are:

At least 80% self-evacuate – 4,800 permanent population and 720 transients.
 Up to 16% require transport – 960 permanent population and 180 transient (all transient heed evacuation as no local ties).
 Up to 30% need short term shelter at Rest centres – 1800 permanent population and 270 transients.
 Up to 20% stay put – 1200 permanent population.

4. Evacuation Routes

4.1 **Northern Route.**

Key roads likely to be used:

B1122 through Theberton to Yoxford/A12
 B1119 to Saxmundham/A12
 B1069 or B1122 to A1094 to A12

4.2 **Eastern Route**

Key roads to be used:

B1125 through Westleton to Blythburgh A12
 Darsham Rd, Wash Lane, the Street to A12
 B1069 or B1122 to A1094 to A12

4.3 **Southern Route**

Key roads likely to be used:

B1122 through Theberton to Yoxford/A12
 Yoxford Road/Westleton Rd to A12
 Darsham Rd, Wash Lane, The Street to A12
 B1119 to Saxmundham/A12

5. Coordination. Evacuation will be a multi-agency coordinated task from the TCG with a Police lead.

5.1 Evacuation FCP. An FCP will be established at Saxmundham Police SNT/Fire Station joint premises to coordinate all emergency service operational activity. Evacuation will be coordinated by the police from this location.

5.2 Muster Point. A number of evacuation pick up points have been identified for people who do not have their own transport but are mobile (in priority order:

- Leiston Leisure Centre, IP16 4LS
- Leiston Children's Centre
- Leiston Football Club
- Thorpeness Country Club

The relevant venue will be selected dependent on the circumstances on the day. Police will lead the management of the evacuation centre supported by Suffolk CC staff who will coordinate transport provision.

5.3 Collection of Vulnerable. Identified vulnerable locations and agency responsible for relocating people:

- In Residential Adult Care Settings – Suffolk CC ACS with EEAST support if clinical need
- In residential Child Care Settings - Suffolk CC CYP
- Residential schools – Suffolk CC CYP
- Home Care – Suffolk CC ACS
- Sheltered Housing – Suffolk CC ACS with EEAST support if clinical need.

Identification of vulnerable people and groups will be confirmed at the TCG using information held by responder agencies and vol orgs, shared using the Cabinet Office Data Sharing Guidance.

5.4 Transport. Suffolk County Council will take the lead in coordinating transport to move people from the Evacuation Muster Point and from homes if needed. East of England Ambulance will transport people with a confirmed clinical need.

5.5 Property Security. Police will provide a passing patrol to prevent criminal activity in evacuated areas within constraints of any radiation protection arrangements.

6. Traffic Management. Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council Highways will provide traffic management for any evacuation under the direction of the Police Evacuation BRONZE. Signs from Suffolk Highways will be used to support physical Police presence on key evacuation routes.

8. Humanitarian Assistance. The following humanitarian assistance facilities will be established to support the 4km evacuation option:

- **Rest Centres** Lowestoft Leisure Centre (East Suffolk Council lead).
Designated to receive people from 4km evacuation that do not go via RMU

Felixstowe Leisure Centre (Babergh and Mid Suffolk DCs lead). Designated to receive people from 4km evacuation that do not go via RMU

Kesgrave Community Centre (Ipswich BC lead). This is the identified Rest Centre for people processed clean from the RMU

Note: If Stratford St Andrew Rest Centre is still required, this will be handed over to West Suffolk Council to run.

- **Radiation Monitoring Unit** – See [Appendix Q](#).
- **Evacuation Register**. Police will lead compilation of a register of people evacuated, supported by Suffolk local authorities with lists of those at Rest Centres.
- **Longer Term Accommodation**. East Suffolk Council will lead on accommodating evacuated staff from Rest Centres from 48hrs plus if people have not been permitted to return to homes by this time. All Suffolk local authority housing teams may be required to assist this task under Suffolk local authority mutual aid arrangements.

9. Public Information. Key messages relating to this evacuation option will be provided to the public via the Media Coord Cell. Likely key messages:

- Self-evacuate where possible, beyond A12 corridor
- Provide info about Rest Centre locations in Lowestoft and Felixstowe
- Provide information on RMU in Woodbridge if worried contaminated
- Provide Suffolk Emergency helpline number as single point of contact for queries, including requests for assistance from vulnerable people.

Public messages will be passed via TV and radio augmented in certain circumstances by use of Police vehicles equipped with loudspeakers. Information will also be passed out through the Suffolk Emergency Helpline on request.

10. Mutual Aid. Mutual aid will be required as follows:

- **Police**. National mutual aid to backfill normal response roles to free up Suffolk Police staff to focus on evacuation operations
- **Local Authority**. Mutual aid from other Suffolk local authorities to operate additional Rest Centres
- **Military Aid**. Police will consider and agree with partners any need for Military Aid to provide support for evacuation at the relevant SCG Meeting.

11. People Remaining

Evacuation is an option that is advised but cannot be enforced under current UK legislation. Where people choose to remain in the 4km evacuation area, it will be made clear that routine public sector services will be discontinued, i.e. rubbish collection, education services, transport services. Emergency calls using 999 will be risk assessed for response as part of the emergency services radiation protection arrangements required under REPIR 19.

SECURITY INCIDENTS


This entire appendix is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.

1. Introduction.

Government has developed guidance designed to provide additional information on command, control and coordination arrangements for responding to security incidents involving ionising radiation, including those leading to radiation emergencies.

2. Notification.

FIXED NUCLEAR SITE – SIZEWELL



3. Responsibilities

In addition to the responsibilities set out earlier in this plan for a nuclear emergency, the following additional responsibilities relate to the management of security incidents at Sizewell:

- **Civil Nuclear Constabulary.** The Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) will provide the initial operational response to any security incident at Sizewell B Power Station from on-site resources. More specifically, in response to a security incident on a nuclear site, the CNC would:
 - Defend and protect the site to which it is deployed, with a view to denying unauthorised access to nuclear material
 - Initiate the first response to the event, including liaison with the Local Police Force
 - Support the coordination of the emergency response, including the provision of advice and support to the Local Police Force Strategic Commander
 - Support the national level strategic emergency response, including the provision of advice and support to the Lead Government Department; and
 - If necessary, recover control of any nuclear material, which may have been lost to any unauthorised person(s). This could involve pursuing a person reasonably believed to have removed or interfered with nuclear material.

In the event of a firearms incident within 5km of Sizewell, initial strategic and tactical command of the incident would rest with the CNC until such time as Suffolk Constabulary was able to take command⁸. A TCG would be established at Landmark House for the tactical coordination of security response. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been developed between the CNC and Suffolk Constabulary to ensure a smooth transition of command. The local Chief Constable will then retain responsibility for the overall command of the incident, criminal investigation of the incident itself, and any necessary post incident investigation or enquiry.

- **Suffolk Constabulary.** Suffolk Constabulary will assume responsibility for the command of any security incident at Sizewell in accordance with the MoU with CNC. Subsequently, Suffolk Constabulary will lead any criminal investigation of the incident itself, and any necessary post investigation or enquiry. More specifically, in a security incident, Suffolk Constabulary would:
 - Nominate a Police Strategic Commander to assume command for the overt response to a security incident at Sizewell
 - Influence the supporting actions of other responders through the SCG
 - Invoke Counter Terrorism Tactical Options if necessary⁹
 - If needed, declare a mobilisation emergency, and request the activation of the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC), to arrange and deliver additional resources in accordance with The Police National Mobilisation Plan
 - Inform NILO / TaCADS in Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service and East of England Ambulance Service.

⁸ Co-ordinated Policing Protocol between the Civil Nuclear Constabulary & Home Office/Scottish Police Forces (ACPO, 2008)
⁹ NPCC National CT Tactical Options document

- **Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service.** Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service would:
 - Support JDRA process and identify priorities and actions for a Multi-Agency Response Plan including the following:
 - Firefighting and management/mitigation of flammable and explosive materials/atmosUK HSAs
 - Carry out search and rescue in order to save lives
 - Support, advise and coordinate the management of risks associated with hazardous materials
 - Coordinate detection, identification and monitoring activity using National FRS resources
 - Carry out deliberate reconnaissance and manage all nine key FRS tasks for CBRNe response
 - Notifying a NILO to
 - Gather intelligence about the nature of hazards and threats posed
 - Provide tactical advice for multi-agency commanders
 - Assist multi-agency Commanders with the JDRA and production of a Multi-Agency Response Plan.
 - Supporting the Ambulance Service in the extraction and immediate life-saving interventions of casualties (if required and as far as it was within the exercise of FRS personnel)
 - Render other humanitarian support
 - Maintain mission critical activities across Suffolk in accordance with Strategic Business Impact Assessment
 - Liaise with the Police on the provision of any relevant information, which may support the management of the scene of the investigation
 - Carry out salvage and damage control activities
 - Participate in the Suffolk SCG, TCG and RCG.

- **East of England Ambulance Service.** East of England Ambulance Service would:
 - Deliver and coordinate clinical care in the pre-hospital phase
 - Set priorities for life-saving interventions to ensure the largest number of survivors
 - Support the joint dynamic risk management process and coordinating medical advice
 - Carry out triage and appropriate interventions at the scene
 - Subject to the risk assessment, extracting casualties from the scene (coordinating support from other services if required) so that further treatment could be affected
 - Prioritise the distribution of casualties to definitive care utilising a range of appropriate hospitals
 - As far as reasonably practicable, maintain reserve emergency cover in case additional incidents arise
 - Liaise with the Police on the provision of any relevant information which could support the management of the scene or the investigation
 - Identify a senior officer for the Press Liaison role in conjunction with the Suffolk MCC
 - Support the generation of public health messages in conjunction with the STAC

- Liaise with the Department of Health and the STAC on longer-term advice to the public
- Liaise with the Department of Health on the provision of post-incident support for first responders and casualties
- Participate in the Suffolk SCG, TCG and RCG.
- **Sizewell B Operator.** EDF would:
 - Declare an OSNE or a site incident, as appropriate
 - Ensure that site personnel are adequately protected (this includes informing staff on-site about the event and providing them with advice on mustering, sheltering and/or evacuation as necessary)
 - Notify local responders in accordance with para 12
 - Activate Site ECC
 - Upon request, provide information to the Police in support of the terrorism investigation
 - Liaise with the CNC and Suffolk Constabulary concerning access to and exit from the site, including appropriate evacuation procedures for staff
 - Site lock-down (site security team putting in place additional security checks and access restrictions).
- **Senior National Coordinator (Counter Terrorism) (SNC(CT)).** In response to a terrorism incident, the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTP HQ) would support the Senior National Coordinator (Counter Terrorism) (SNC(CT)). The strategic coordination of the investigative response to the incident would be led by the SNC(CT) and would complement the local emergency services response by utilising the CT Network. The SNC(CT) would be responsible for:
 - Coordination of the multi-site Police response to manage the risk
 - Overseeing overt and covert counter terrorism investigations
 - Appointing the Counter Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer (CT SIO)
 - Appointing the NPCC CT Commander
 - Chairing the ELG
 - Oversight of the Fusion Cell
 - Oversight of the CTPOR
 - Overall direction and coordination of covert military developments.
- **NPCC Counter Terrorism (CT) Commander.** An NPCC Counter Terrorism (CT) Commander would be appointed by the SNC(CT) to provide tactical coordination and resolution for counter terrorism operations managed from the CTPOR. Their responsibilities include:
 - Establishing effective command and control within the CT Police Operations Room (CTPOR)
 - Providing a tactical command capability to implement the strategy, setting tactical parameters to enable the operational response
 - Maintain the link within the command structure between aims and CT discipline leads in the CTPOR
 - Providing tactical coordination, direction and management of counter terrorism discipline leads in the deployment of resources involved in the response

- Taking responsibility and being accountable for all critical decisions within the CTPOR, and approving all tactical plans provided by the counter terrorism discipline leads
- Set command protocols, where appropriate, ensuring that they are understood and agreed by relevant parties
- Authorising deployment, where necessary, of Police firearms officers (in addition to other (e.g. CNC) firearms officers), high-risk activities and/or directed use of force
- Identifying the level of support needed to resolve the incident or operation and provide resources accordingly
- Maintain an overview of all assets deployed by all agencies involved in the counter terrorism elements of the response
- Agreeing lines of communication with and direct tasking of the Security Service
- Produce, where appropriate, the Military Aid (MACA) document in preparation for any considered employment of specialist military assets as agreed by the SNC(CT)
- Activate the employment of specialist military assets as agreed by the SNC(CT).

4. Command, Control and Coordination

In addition to the command, control and coordination arrangements set out earlier in this plan for a nuclear emergency, the following arrangements may be put into place to manage any security incident at Sizewell:

- **Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR).** COBR would be the physical location from which the central response is activated, monitored and coordinated and which provides a focal point for Government's response and an authoritative source of advice for local responders.
 - COBR Strategy Group. The key decision-making body in COBR for all aspects of the response to a terrorism incident at a nuclear site in the UK would be the COBR Strategy Group. The Prime Minister, Home Secretary, or another senior Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, would direct the central government response from COBR. In cases of doubt as to whether an event was an act of terrorism or not, the Prime Minister, Home Secretary or another Home Office Minister would at least initially, assume the chair in COBR.
 - Impact Management Group (IMG)/ Recovery Group (RG). In response to a nuclear site terrorism emergency, an Impact Management Group (IMG) may be convened to handle separately the central government input to consequence management activity. The IMG would provide detailed, coordinated, advice on all aspects of the Government's contribution to the emergency response. It would ensure that any necessary central government preparations for the recovery phase were addressed. The IMG would have an important role in the early stages of the emergency in advising the COBR Strategy Group on measures to reassure the public, minimise disruption, and restore key services.

- **OSCT Operations Support Room (OSR).** In response to a terrorism incident at a nuclear site in the UK, the Home Office would act as the Lead Government Department (LGD), taking overall responsibility for assessing the situation, and ensuring that its Ministers received effective briefing on the emergency and the response. The Home Office would lead, at least initially, on the wider impact of the emergency in England with the support from other government departments (including BEIS and MOD) as necessary. The Home Office's Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) would manage the response from its Operations Support Room (OSR), which would be activated as soon as the Home Office had been notified about the emergency.
- **Security Service.** In response to a terrorism incident at a nuclear site in the UK, the Security Service would activate its response arrangements.
- **Executive Liaison Group (ELG).** The Executive Liaison Group (ELG) is the secure forum through which the security services can share intelligence with the police service for the purposes of considering potential executive action or other response.
- **MOD Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC).** In response to a terrorism incident at a civil nuclear site, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) would stand up its Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) in the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC). The DCMO would be directed by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)), under the guise of Director of Operations (D Ops), and manned by personnel from the, United Kingdom Counter Terrorism and Resilience (UKCT&R) Operations Directorate. UKCT&R would manage any Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) that might be required in response to a terrorism incident at a nuclear site (Defence or civil).
- **National Police Chiefs Council Counter Terrorism Command Centre (ACTCC).** The NPCC Officers' Counter Terrorism Command (ACTCC) is the unit used to manage resources across the CT Network in response to operational demand. ACTCC supports the Senior National Coordinator (Counter Terrorism) (SNC(CT)). The strategic coordination of the investigative response to the incident would be led by the SNC(CT) and would complement the local emergency services response by utilising the CT Network.
- **Counter Terrorism Unit.** The closest Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) to Sizewell, London - Metropolitan Police, would establish:
 - Counter Terrorism Police Operations Room (CTPOR). The CTPOR would act as a command platform for the deployment of covert resources in response to a terrorism incident at a nuclear site. More specifically, it would support the deployment of physical and technical surveillance assets and Police Specialist Firearms Officers (SFOs) in the counter terrorism operation/investigation.
 - Fusion Cell. The Police Fusion Cell is an integrated, multi-agency, intelligence processing and management capability that would support any counter terrorism or domestic extremism incident. The purpose of the

Fusion Cell is to ensure that intelligence provision to key decision-makers involved in the counter terrorism operation and the response to the incident takes into account the contributing intelligence agencies' different perspectives. This will be located in Forest Lodge at Suffolk Constabulary HQ.


- Counter Terrorism Major Incident Room (CTMIR). The Counter Terrorism Major Incident Room (CTMIR) would handle the administration of the criminal investigation in response to a terrorism incident at a nuclear site. The Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (SNC(CT)) would appoint a Counter Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer (CT SIO) to oversee investigative proceedings. The CT SIO would normally be a Detective Chief Inspector or Superintendent from either the regional CTU or national CTC.
- **Strategic Coordination Centre**. The Suffolk StratCC Coordination Centre Guide provides further detail on the expansion of the StratCC to provide security related functions, specifically:
 - Secure Communications. Provide secure communications (up to SECRET) with the London Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU), to enable liaison between the Police within the StratCC and the Counter Terrorism Police Operations Room (CTPOR), Counter Terrorism Major Incident Room (CTMIR) and Fusion Cell. Secure communications may also be needed with the Executive Liaison Group (ELG), the OSCT Operations Support Room (OSR); and the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR), to enable the SCG chair to participate in COBR Strategy Group meetings when necessary.

These secure communications link will be augmented by the Forward Fusion Cell.
 - Forward Fusion Cell. Located in Special Branch at Suffolk Constabulary HQ to allow it to support the StratCC.

5. Locations. Adjustments to emergency services locations covered earlier in the plan for a CT incident are as follows:


- Firearms SILVER – Suffolk Constabulary HQ, Martlesham.

6. Command, Control and Coordination Diagram.



ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING LOCATIONS - SIZEWELL

- Passive Shade Collector - collects particulate matter - not remotely interrogated
- ◆ RIMNET gamma monitoring Site - remotely interrogated.
- ▶ TLD site - gamma detection - not remotely interrogated.
- ▶ Routine Vehicle Survey Site - gamma detection and air sample.



This entire table is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs.

SIZEWELL OFF-SITE SURVEY POINTS 2015

Survey Point	Location	Grid Reference	Radial Distance from Site	GRID Bearing from Site
1A1	Sizewell Beach Junction with Kenton Walks adjacent to concrete blocks	4758 6452	0.92Km	12°
1C1	Sizewell Beach opposite B Site Rhus Building	4756 6372	0.21Km	62°
1E1	Sizewell Beach Opposite B Site Reactor Dome & CCW pump house	4758 6353	0.23Km	124°
1G1	Sizewell Beach Opposite A Site Turbine Hall (yellow crane)	4757 6317	0.50Km	155°
1H1	Sizewell Beach Top Car Park North	4749 6298	0.66Km	170°
1H2	Sizewell Beach Opposite Vehicle Entrance	4749 6289	0.74Km	171°
1H3	Vulcan Pub Car Park	4741 6273	0.90Km	176°
1J1	Approach Road Bend adjacent to 'B' Site sign	4708 6312	0.32Km	203°
1J2	Sandy Lane bridleway junction adjacent to cottage	4702 6290	0.80Km	212°
1I1	Entrance to SZA overflow car park	4728 6302	0.40Km	195°
1K1	B Site Rd. Opposite Security Lodge-South of Flagpoles	4709 6336	0.21Km	205°
1L1	Sewage Plant access junction adjacent to footsteps	4706 6356	0.17Km	224°
1M1	Roundabout next to alternative access gate	4709 6369	0.13Km	245°
1N1	B Site Visitor/Operations Training Entrance	4710 6385	0.12Km	280°
1O1	'B' Site North Car Park gate to grazing area	4714 6403	0.47Km	328°
2H1	Entrance to South Side of Caravan Park Sizewell	4736 6221	1.41Km	182°
2H2	Car Park adjacent to byway near Dower House	4735 6167	1.96Km	185°
2I1	Home Farm- Footpath entrance adjacent to thatched cottage	4720 6231	1.33Km	188°
2I2	Road Junction West of Sizewell Hall	4726 6208	1.55Km	185°

Survey Point	Location	Grid Reference	Radial Distance from Site	GRID Bearing from Site
2J1	Lane by Halfway Cottages	4622 6233	1.73Km	223°
2L1	Sandy Lane	4617 6328	1.25Km	256°
2L2	West End Sandy Lane (Beirnfels Farm)	4564 6328	1.74Km	270°
2N1	Stonewall Belt/Ashwood Cottages	4611 6493	1.82Km	314°
3K1	ERC entrance	4567 6250	2.04Km	235°
3J1	Crown Land Cottages	4594 6214	2.06Km	227°
3K2	Eastlands Industrial Estate	4529 6261	2.32Km	246°
3K3	Sports Centre/Hawsells Farm	4513 6196	2.79Km	234°
3K4	Leiston Community Centre	4483 6253	2.77Km	247°
3I1	Aldringham Common Shellpits Cottages- conservation area gate	4664 6103	2.69Km	194°
3L1	Abbey Road (Old Pump House)	4450 6345	2.87Km	268°
3M1	Kenton Hills Walk Car Park	4536 6387	2.03Km	276°
3M2	Leiston Old Abbey	4498 6410	2.44Km	280°
3M3	Layby Theberton/Eastbridge Junction	4482 6443	2.67Km	285°
3N1	Upper Abbey Farm	4530 6459	2.24Km	295°
3O1	Lower Abbey Farm. Layby	4585 6576	2.62Km	323°
4O1	Eastbridge Rd./Lower Abbey Junction	4527 6580	3.02Km	314°
4J1	Aldringham Green, Thorpeness Road	4487 6091	3.69Km	222°
4K2	Mill Hill, Aldringham- layby adjacent to green	4445 6096	3.95Km	229°
4I1	Layby adjacent to Thorpeness Golf course	4621 6043	3.40Km	200°
4J2	Layby for Aldringham Walks (Thorpeness Rd.)	4554 6068	3.47Km	212°
4H1	North End Avenue, Thorpeness	4752 6019	3.44Km	188°
4K1	Goldings Lane- end of track adjacent to water tower entrance	4416 6175	3.72Km	240°
4L1	St Margaret's Crescent ,Leiston	4352 6271	3.96Km	260°

Survey Point	Location	Grid Reference	Radial Distance from Site	GRID Bearing from Site
	(Road adjacent to cemetery entrance)			
4P1	Minsmere Visitor Centre Car Park	4714 6722	3.61Km	356°
4P2	Minsmere Scotts Hall Farm (Wet, Wild and woody walk entrance)	4619 6724	3.80Km	343°
5K1	Mill Road, Knodishall (Car Park opposite public house)	4346 6098	4.72Km	237°
5A1	Coastguard Cottages, Dunwich (East Car Park)	4773 6774	4.13Km	4°
5M1	Harrow Lane, Leiston (Old airfield runway layby)	4284 6897	4.54Km	272°
5N1	Doughty Wylie Crescent Car Park, Theberton	4386 6570	4.08Km	299°

OUTLINE EMERGENCY PLANNING - SIZEWELL

This entire appendix is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs.

Outline planning for a Sizewell radiation emergency was developed at Ex EPIMETHEUS in 2016. This multi-agency activity considered how detailed response capabilities might be extended in the event of a more severe, beyond design basis radiation emergency. Outline planning within this section provides information on each identified capability with regards to:

- Ability to extend up to 30kms from what has been implemented as part of detailed planning.
- Sources of additional capability and potential timeframes.
- Known gaps that will need to be managed by the SCG in conjunction with COBR.

Functional Area	Activity	Capability Description
Hazard Assessment		
Hazard information availability	Modelling/ Prediction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial advice available from UK HSA RCE Directorate within 15 – 30 mins of notification. • Food Standards Agency (FSA) modelling within 30mins – 2 hrs. • PACRAM within 30 mins from Met Office. • Operator modelling quickly available. • 4 hrs - 6 hrs Joint Agency Modelling (JAM) from incident –Secretariat provided by UK HSA RCE Directorate. • EA modelling (internal modelling). • Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) running monitoring and modelling info nationally. • STAC will provide a collective assessment to SCG using all modelling/predication sources • Modelling information passed from STA.C to SCG and all agencies on pdf document or verbally.
	Real time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operator - Site fence monitoring, use of meteorological information, 2 off-site survey vehicles available at Sze plus other vehicles will be deployed from other operator assets – information on TIMMS. • Operator can measure dose rates, airborne activity and ground acquisition. • RIMNET has 10 monitors between 2 km – 12 km – 1 hr normal monitoring but interval between readings can be reduced – output via RIMNET and European Radioactivity Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP).

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Real-time data interpreted through the STAC • SFRS/Police/Ambulance dose rate data – gamma monitoring and personnel dosimetry.
Collection of radiological data		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIMMS for operator data – fence line monitors and survey teams. • Crowd source data – be aware of other sources of data for example from members of public with monitoring equipment. • RIMNET pulls together real time data from trusted sources.
Interpretation of data		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raw data collected needs to be modelled to be useful. • UK HSA RCE Directorate model data for public protection use – looking for spikes and constantly revising model predications. • Occupational protection – RPAs use modelled data for advice. • EA have link to RIMNET to advise on environmental impacts. • Interpreted radiological data gets to local responders via STAC. • Utilities get information from EA, also invited to SCG so access to STAC information.
Radiation monitoring	Environmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UK HSA RCE Div has role to coordinate radiation monitoring • Operator continues to carry out long term monitoring around sites • UK HSA RCE Directorate has standing Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) request to defence for radiation monitoring assistance • Mutual aid (including international aid) triggered at start of a response through SAGE / Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) • UK HSA RCE Directorate understand monitoring requirements and available national resources and will lead generation of additional assets as necessary • Resources come from all over country and have different monitoring capabilities, most will deploy on a goodwill basis • Operator has 2 vehicles on site, 1 vehicle will be sent immediately from Dungeness plus other vehicles available from other operator assets – work with UK HSA RCE Directorate to deploy the vehicles. • UK HSA RCE Directorate will agree mustering points for additional assets with TCG on the day. • Requests for monitoring of specific locations, i.e. water extraction sites, through SCG.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extra monitoring processes takes time to get results – technical process to collect data and then it needs to be interpreted – additional information available within hours of resources being on site. • National assets follow a broad plan for monitoring – can't be pinned down until the day.
	RMU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current guidance (HPA-CRCE-017) identifies NHS England to lead set up of RMU, to identify potential sites for the off-site plan, to provide Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE). • NHS do not want to use trained nurses for admin roles – use LA resources? • UK HSA RCE Directorate will provide specialist monitoring resources with 24 hrs, monitoring location to be set up in 6 hrs prior to the start of monitoring. <p>UK HSA RCE Div indicate process capacity of 200 people per hour in single location.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wet decontamination done by ambulance and SFRS. • EA to provide advice on storage and disposal of radioactive and conventional waste that may be generated. EA to provide advice on the standards and criteria that premises/locations will need to satisfy. • No RPA provision for non-emergency services.
	Food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only start monitoring when safe to go in the area – need stable environment to be able to the define extent of the problem. • In response phase, UK HSA RCE Directorate coordinate monitoring. • Not clear who lead in recovery phase. • Adopted precautionary advice areas from onset for food production. • Monitor through sampling in areas such as milk, soil – operator can sample these things. • Limited capacity to analyse samples in UK – Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) has laboratory to do this type of analysis. • First 8 hrs, coordination done through UK HSA RCE Directorate to place assets where required. • Results within 3 – 4 hrs from samples but then this information needs to be added to the modelling • Need process to know where the activity is being carried out for coordinate purposes – define overall area which is being monitored then liaison directly with local responders on where monitoring is happening to they are aware.
	Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Normal online continuous monitoring equipment does not pick up radiation. Could use specific sampling.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water companies to participate in STAC to understand where the hazard is to understand if it is in the water supply. Sampling requests to be routed through the STAC. Assets subject to contamination would be automatically shut down so it would be a recovery activity.
Plant prognosis		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extension of operator process already being done daily, enhanced by specific experts at EDF Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) Can predict outcomes from understanding what has changed, changes noticed instantly.
Emergency Management		
Notification by operator of more severe accident		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formal notification of more severe accident from CESC to company SCG technical advice team. Liaison Officers (LO) at site may pick up information but need formal notification to act. SCG would be considering contingencies constantly for a developing/worst case scenario. Steer from Counter Terrorism Advisor (CTA) to SCG on possible scenarios and time scales for these eventualities. ONR will check the operator's assumptions.
Interface with national structures and other SCGs		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police would inform the neighbouring Police forces of wider impact risk. Fire & Rescue would inform Fire and Rescue Service National Coordination Centre (FRSNCC) of the incident automatically using the National Incident Reporting tool and neighbouring FRS would be informed. MHCLG and DESNZ LO raise awareness of wider scale risk to COBR. SCG would raise awareness/link in with neighbouring counties who will then manage their own area response. ResCG would be required.
	SCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SCG operation same as for OSNE. If go to 24/7 staffing the following organisations indicated they would be stretched - Essex and Suffolk Water, Anglian Water, EA, Ambulance, FSA capability to do assessments. Teleconference facilities would help some agencies to be able to participate in SCG meetings remotely. Police would go to mutual aid from start of an OSNE.
	STAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operator and RCE Div to sit in STAC to provide advice. Formal meetings may be workable by teleconference but need to be together to resolve issues.

Strategic coordination		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Be prepared to assume 24 /7 endurance initially but may not need all organisations for 24/7 later, some agencies would be stretched to sustain this. • Physical presence initially but may change arrangements later. STAC dial in always provided.
	Media Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24 / 7 operation would present issues. • If no COBR sitting, then no National Coordination Cell (NCC). • News Coordination Centre (NCC) needed to ensure consistent national messages. • FSA media would be done from London – should link to national and local media coordination activity.
Tactical coordination		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military and UK HSA RCE Div need to be represented at the TCG. • Space issues with identified location. • Access to hazard information. • Operator interface with TCG coordination activity. • Traffic Management will be a specific TCG coordination task. • Evacuation management will be a specific TCG coordination task.
Operational coordination (includes support to on site intervention)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative location(s) for FCP to be identified. • Lot of ES resources on site, there will be a potential challenge to sustain normal ES operations due to potential large number of resources becoming contaminated. • Impact on resources due to responders being affected by radiation or shelter zones.
Traffic Management		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police led function with Suffolk Highways in support. • Road closure will use Suffolk Highways signage, signs will come from the depot and other resources in Suffolk, it will be signed not to drive into area not road closed. • Police have signage provided by EDF for the initial response. • Focus traffic management in the 4 km area whilst evacuating. • Traffic management coordination required as will affect roads well outside of the area and county. • How do we get the road closure information out to the public – social media, Google maps etc? • Should we be preventing people entering the 15 km area as a car does not afford adequate protection?
Recovery coordination		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recovery activity start early in response phase. • Food safety aspects need to be considered from the start. • The longer response goes on the harder for agencies to staff both recovery and response functions. Use mutual aid or change the battle rhythm of meetings.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • STAC needs to feed both the response and recovery structures.
Interface with operator emergency management structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On-site Emergency Control Centre (ECC) will remain during an incident or fall back to the SZB Emergency Response Centre (ERC) • Emergency Response Centre in 4 km zone, operator has got a complete mobile tented/ISO container control facility as well.
Telecommunication links	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional AIRWAVE capacity might be needed. • Use of military/BT to augment comms links. • Operator has its own resilient telecommunications between site and the Emergency Response Centre staff.
Mutual aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency Services will request mutual aid early using current processes. • UK HSA–use mutual aid for monitoring coordination. Non specialist staff would back fill administrative roles. • NHS –regional mutual aid agreement in place but as most NHS staff will be continuing to work in their own normal locations and roles it was not felt to be a great issue. • EA – mutual aid agreements across the agency, problem would be finding enough specialists. • Local Authority (LA) – mutual aid for Rest Centres and delivery of local authority services from the other Suffolk LAs. • Local Authority Nuclear Working Group to investigate the potential to draw on LA resources from authorities with nuclear facilities. • ONR – operation not affected by the scale of an incident, would call on Health and Safety Executive (HSE) if necessary. • Water – technical tasks would be OK but have mutual aid agreements in place between all water companies. • DESNZ – use core Emergency Planning team and then ask for support from other departments. • GO-Science can call on other government departments for support.
Concurrent security incident (not at start)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would involve Home Office • If it is a CBRN incident it would impact on national resources • Resource issues for ES as people would be taken off the nuclear response role and used for the security incident. • Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) deliver site security and would continue to do so.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site management same, role of EDF site security would be more prevalent and closely linked to CNC Centre. • Local Coordination structures would be same as normal but with CT enhancements. • Another concurrent event may affect other agencies' ability to respond so harder to manage and to get mutual aid. • Focus would have to be on saving most life, whilst managing the incidents in a concurrent fashion. • NHS may be affected if another mass casualty event occurred simultaneously. 		
<p>Science Advice</p>			
<p>STAC – SAGE interface</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairs must talk and dial in to each other's meetings • SAGE advise the government, STAC the local response. 		
<p>SCG – COBR interaction</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minister will have a huge interest in this, but the response is carried out at a local level. • May need to consider use of CCA Emergency powers to deliver extended public protection effect. 		
<p>Health Protection</p>			
<p>Implementation of Protective Actions</p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;"> <p>General public</p> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Up to 75% will self-evacuate in an incident – learning from other emergencies. - Pet issues - are evacuees told to bring pets or leave them behind? - Ministers will want to know detailed information about the area including about the location of the people - Up to 15 km – stay in means stay in for the specified time. - Implementing shelter issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ No powers to stop people moving around in shelter area or carrying on with life ○ Care workers would need to stay in area – can't enforce this. Radiation protection? ○ Business Continuity problems for many organisations as staff will not get to work if they reside in the area or work in the area ○ Essential repairs to infrastructure – workforce to carry these out are classed as members of the public so advice will be to shelter and not move around or go into the area. - Implementing evacuation issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Need to understand how people remaining in the evacuation area are contaminated and the risk to other people they meet. ○ Possibility that NHS 111 could identify and create a health register and to give specific advice to people in the area to go to RMU or to shower and change clothes etc. ○ ES still have duty to respond to life threatening requests from non-evacuees. </td> </tr> </table>	<p>General public</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Up to 75% will self-evacuate in an incident – learning from other emergencies. - Pet issues - are evacuees told to bring pets or leave them behind? - Ministers will want to know detailed information about the area including about the location of the people - Up to 15 km – stay in means stay in for the specified time. - Implementing shelter issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ No powers to stop people moving around in shelter area or carrying on with life ○ Care workers would need to stay in area – can't enforce this. Radiation protection? ○ Business Continuity problems for many organisations as staff will not get to work if they reside in the area or work in the area ○ Essential repairs to infrastructure – workforce to carry these out are classed as members of the public so advice will be to shelter and not move around or go into the area. - Implementing evacuation issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Need to understand how people remaining in the evacuation area are contaminated and the risk to other people they meet. ○ Possibility that NHS 111 could identify and create a health register and to give specific advice to people in the area to go to RMU or to shower and change clothes etc. ○ ES still have duty to respond to life threatening requests from non-evacuees.
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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Diversion of main trunk roads – via SCG using STAC/UK HSA RCE Directorate advice required on whether vehicles can transit through the area. ○ Evacuation collection point in Leiston – driver issues with working in a contaminated area if people not moved prior to contamination occurring. ○ Health Protection (Local Authority Powers) Regulations 2010 Reg 8 – Tier 2 LA Environmental Health Officer (EHO) potentially has powers to act to prevent group of people returning to a contaminated area. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Railway – as above, via SCG using STAC/UK HSA RCE Directorate advice – slightly different to vehicles transiting area as trains can be kept moving through the area – need to involve Network Rail etc in discussion. - Police have a traffic plan to keep traffic flowing not to prevent people coming in or out of the area. - Police have powers to direct SCC Highways to close roads.
	<p>Vulnerable people - Adult</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have the legal ability to direct certain groups of people to evacuate who do not have mental capacity to make that decision (Best interest policy). - Use existing vulnerable lists held by multiple agencies to identify the vulnerable (SCC, NHS). - Need to understand the success of process at the coordination structure level. - Pre identify vulnerable and who is needed to help them at start of incident before it escalates. - Social Care – decide on day where to put them, range of existing options to choose from. - Movement of people from care setting easier than moving those in their own homes. - LA consider request to transport this group with suitable sourced vehicles, but drivers may not operate in contaminated areas. - Medical needs - Ambulance service transport vulnerable with medical needs. - Employing agency is responsible for Health & Safety of its staff, including any voluntary sector staff working for them. - Need care workers to accompany vulnerable people being transported. - ES have trained people to go into the area, other organisations do not have trained staff. – REPPIR criteria identifies lifesaving activities and moving people from an exposed area which would allow the ES to be asked to do the task.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local ES staff may have already reached exposure levels by the time an evacuation is needed. - SCG to consider availability of ES or through ES mutual aid to assist evacuation. - Potential option to use Defence and CNC - Evacuees advised to take means to access money, medications and ID with them. - Cannot 'police' no go area and could contaminate bigger area if materiel brought out as a result of looting or homeowners removing possessions. - Assistance dogs need to be kept with their owners even if pets are not brought out. - Sustaining vulnerable people - Home care provision will stop in the 15 km zone including provision of meals on wheels. - People requiring treatment would need to be risk assessed as to whether the person is more at risk from not getting treatment or being exposed to radiation Risk assessment done by the responsible organisation. - Social Care need to understand most vulnerable and move them out early. - NHS 111 service to give advice to people. - Ambulance service will only focus on life saving. <p>Specific care settings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adult Care setting should have Business Continuity plans in place in case of closure. - Give advice to prepare to evacuate early, include childcare settings. <p>Disabled (mental health) groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need specialist treatment and support. Do Mental Health Foundation Trust have the resources?
	<p>Vulnerable people - Child</p>	<p>Schools</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If advice is to carry on as normal and this is given during the school day then the school should remain open but not reopen the following day. This is to prevent conflicting messages being given out. - Within shelter zone but outside evacuation zone – children need to be sent home prior to the shelter advice being given, don't want to keep children in shelter for 48 hrs. - Children may live in the 4 km zone so need to consider what to do with these school children when they are sent home. - Head teachers are authorised to close school so they can do what they consider best without adhering to advice issued.
<p>Evacuation (RMU)</p>	<p>RMU</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack agreed RMU guidance. - Need to be able to monitor and measure contamination of evacuees.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UK HSA RCE Directorate coordinates monitoring. Will need 24 hrs to be able to get monitoring assets in place. - Need monitoring processes in place before putting messages out to public about getting monitored. - Look at putting people in emergency holding area (initial Rest Centres), Fire Service could do dry contamination there. - Medical support required as part of Rest Centre. - LA responsibility to look after people with nowhere to go. - On pre-planned RMU has been exercised previously.
Shelter / Stable iodine		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC) reviewing national stockpiles, 5 hr delivery time. Instigate movement on declaration of an off-site emergency. - Pharmacy can only issue tablets on a personal basis, not in bulk. - En masse issuing of KI on a Patient Guidance Directive, (PGD) – must be signed off by a qualified medic and issued by them – mechanism there but infrastructure and staff not identified in sufficient numbers. - Military can issue KI to members of the public (investigate more). - Consider adapting the evacuation plan principle to deliver the tablets. Local pharmacy to deliver to individuals would take a long time. Deliver to distribution centres then each household to break shelter and collect for their household from a pharmacy or distribution centre. Utilise the Polling Station format. - Problem of people not in effected area asking for tablets – approach would be not to give them tablets. How do you confirm people do need KI as there is a large transient population in the area? - Evacuate before the release occurs, if you do, then distributing stable iodine is not a problem.
Animal / livestock protection		<p>Pets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - better to take it out with owner. - no powers to take them away from their owners. - Need to understand radiation effect on animals left in area - Within shelter area UK HSA RCE Directorate already have internal standing advice that pets should be allowed into the house but do not go outside to collect them. <p>Livestock:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recovery guidance issued by UK HSA RCE Directorate covers management of livestock - FSA have powers to prevent food going into food chain and movement of livestock – can permit

	<p>movement but have identification process so know where it goes to.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guidance to farmers to limit exposure by keeping livestock indoors. - Greater problem if leave them in the area rather than removing them, as have the problem of disposal later if animals must be culled. - APHA responsible for welfare, FSA for controlling the food chain, Trading Standards for licensing movement of livestock. - Initial message to farmers would be do not move livestock but put in place avenues for their movement if necessary. - Wild animals and birds – cannot control their movement – lot of deer and game birds killed for consumption depending on the time of year. - FSA would put in place a 50 km – 100 km restriction zone for the sale of food. Undertake longer term monitor of food to determine when it is safe to enter food chain. - Welfare animals – expectation farmers would continue to care for their animals but cannot force people to work in a contaminated area. - Livestock kept outdoors could be left to fend for themselves for about a week before they would need attention. - Housed livestock could only be left for a matter of days without attention. - Responsibility for welfare is on the owner, if owner incapacitated then down to LA (which Tier?). - Legislation to cover undue suffering for animals, if putting people at risk this may not apply. LA can seize animals under Animal Welfare Act. - REPPIR is to protect humans not animals - Shelter animals if possible, without endangering people getting the animals to shelter. - Dairy animals – dairy farms tend to have more covered accommodation - milking to continue, but product could not be sold. - UK HSA Recovery handbook covers options for disposal of milk which include land spreading or disposal at sea. EA to advise on how to dispose of milk. Milk will need to be stored then disposed of for up to 100 km. - FSA alert other neighbouring authorities on food restrictions - Disposal of crops covered in UK HSA Recovery handbook. - Would be a lot of self-regulation from retailers and consumers on where they source their food from
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sealed foods still safe, problem is foods exposed to contamination and from food producing area that are contaminated. - Can't enforce not eating food from allotments. - EDF has a limited liability to pay for loss of livestock. Compensation would be political discussion.
<p>Exclusion zones – land, sea and air</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil Aviation Authority control air space – could be enforcement issues especially with drones. - SCG can request a no-fly zone if needed.
<p>Decontamination</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will be contaminated vehicles at the Rest Centre – RMU to monitor both people and vehicles but people monitoring will be the priority. - What would be an acceptable contamination level to be able to release vehicles – useful levels in transport regulations, not specifically for these situations – via SCG using STAC advice would discuss and set level. - UK HSA Directorate coordinate monitoring resources - ES would have sacrificial vehicles for use in the area, these would be held in a 'dirty' area where there would be some decontamination ability. - Main concern is contamination inside the vehicle not outside of it. - Coaches used for evacuation would also be contaminated inside - Holding area concept to be further investigated - Wet contaminated products –RMU will collect waste in bladder tanks. Can be held in bladder tanks for certain time, take EA advice for disposal of the waste - Guidance on decontamination of buildings and open environment available.
<p>Environmental Protection</p>	
<p>Countryside access / Rights of way</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wild food chain difficult to enforce or police. - FSA provides advice on food safety but cannot enforce restrictions on private food consumption. - Might be able to find legislation to prevent hunting of wildlife – needs further investigation. - FSA responsibility to advise neighbouring counties also effected. - LA has power to restrict access to public footpaths. - Cannot enforce footpath closure within shelter area, can put up signs to warn people of the issues.

TRAINING AND EXERCISE - SIZEWELL1. Training.

1.1 **Training Requirement.** REPPIR Regulation 11 requires all agencies identified in this plan to ensure that people are suitably briefed, trained and equipped in order to carry out the identified roles or to deliver capabilities. The number of trained people must be sufficient for 24/7 operations. This plan sets out the multi-agency response arrangements and requires that each agency ensures that individual operational plans or procedures cover agency specific responsibilities. All staff who are liable to respond to a Sizewell radiation emergency, and thus support the implementation of this plan must be aware of its content and of the agency specific operational plans and procedures to enable them to undertake their role safely and effectively. To assist with the distribution of this plan, an unclassified version is available on the SRF website.

1.2 **Assurance.** Suffolk County Council will seek assurance in writing from all agencies identified in this plan that so far as reasonably practicable:

- The necessary information, instruction and training has been provided and the necessary equipment for restricting exposure has been made available
- Any other underpinning capabilities required to implement the SRF Radiation Emergency Plan are in place and readily available, for example individual agency supporting plans and procedures.

1.3 **Training Delivery.** This plan acknowledges the use of a tiered approach to training staff with a response role:

- **Individual Training** - Specific to individual role, conducted by individual agency. Training standards in accordance with individual agency policies
- **Team Training** - Specific to team role, conducted by individual agency. Training standards in accordance with individual agency policies
- **Multi-Agency Training** - Collective training between more than one agency in relation to a response role or capability. Overseen by the SRF as part of the wider CCA training and exercise programme. Standards as set out in national policy or guidance or as mutually agreed by the SRF.

2. Exercise. REPPIR Regulation 12 requires that this plan be tested through exercise at least every 3 years. The purpose of the 3 yearly tests is to adequately test the ability to implement the off-site emergency arrangements. This requirement is discharged as follows:

2.1 **Exercise Planning.** Suffolk County Council in conjunction with the site operator and local emergency services agree a date for the 3 yearly exercises. An SRF exercise planning group is established to develop an Exercise Order that follows national guidance.

2.2. **Exercise Scope.** The scope of exercise run every 3 years is agreed as part of the exercise planning, this could be as follows:

- Full test of off-site detailed emergency planning arrangements. This will be undertaken at least every 6 years.
- Modular test of emergency planning arrangements.
- Additional testing of outline planning arrangements, either as part of a full test or modular test above.

Where the SRF has evidence of adequate response activity from live response in another CCA risk area, this may be considered against the 3 yearly test requirements with the agreement of ONR.

Testing of detailed emergency planning arrangements will cover the following capabilities:

- Notification of emergency responders
- Generation of emergency facilities and equipment
- Strategic coordination
- Tactical coordination
- Operational coordination
- Warning and information of the public
- Media strategy, coordination and communications
- Scientific and Technical advice (UK HSA)
 - Protective action advice and consideration of vulnerable groups
- Telecommunications between responders
- Mutual aid/national assistance
- Information sharing systems and situational awareness
- Radiation monitoring and decontamination
- Transition to recovery.

Outline testing will follow the same capability areas.

2.3 Exercise Type. Detailed testing will normally utilise a mix of live play and command post activity in order to deliver exercise outcomes. Outline planning will normally use a tabletop/workshop delivery.

2.4. Exercise Evaluation. ONR may assess the test and make a judgement as to whether the test was adequate. This will be through a test report that covers the capability areas above. Wider consideration of learning will be captured via the formal debrief process run by the SRF and the publication of an SRF Exercise Report; Suffolk County Council will lead this debrief and report production process.

3. Lessons Identified. After each radiation emergency exercise, a formal debrief process takes place overseen by the SRF. Lessons from the exercise to improve performance or to record better practice are captured on a standard form set out in national guidance on testing off-site preparedness. A summary of radiation emergency exercises is as follows:

Date	Exercise	Exercise Focus	Exercise Report Issued	Lessons Incorporated
7 Mar 2007	Ex ARAGON	SZA off site L2		
27 Aug 2008	Ex LEADON	SZB off site L2	March 2009	
18 Feb 2010	Ex ARDENNE	SZA off site L2	6 May 2010	
6 Jul 2011	Ex TAMAR	SZB off site L2	27 Sep 2011	
14 Feb 2013	Ex ARATHORN	SZA off site L2	30 April 2013	
21 May 2014	Ex EAGLE 14	SZB off site/national L3 & extended response	14 Aug 2014	Off Site Plan Issue 3.2
30 June 2015	Ex DIAMOND DRAGON	MoD NEO L3	26 Oct 2015	SRF Radiation Response plan Issue 1
23 Sep & 27 Oct 2016	Ex EPIMETHEUS	Fixed civil outline planning	3 March 2017	SRF Radiation Response plan Issue 1
17 May 2017	Ex EAGLE 17	SZB off site L2	26 Jul 2017	SRF Radiation Response plan Issue 1
22 Jul 2022	Ex EAGLE 22	SZB off site L2		SRF Radiation Response plan Issue 1

RADIATION MONITORING UNIT

Reference:

A. UK HSA CRCE Draft Template Radiation Monitoring Unit Plan v4.

1. Introduction

The purpose of a Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU) is to provide information on levels of radioactive contamination on or in people, by facilitating individual monitoring (also known as personal monitoring or people monitoring). An important function of an RMU is to ensure that NHS Emergency Departments and other healthcare settings do not become overwhelmed by members of the public seeking monitoring by directing them to the RMU.

This appendix addresses the requirement for an RMU to be established primarily in the event of an off-site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) at Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station although the capability is generic and may be used to support any radiation incident that presents a risk to the public.

The Suffolk arrangement is based upon Reference A which sets out national best practice for local RMUs, noting that some key policy issues relating to provision of certain capabilities remain outstanding and are being addressed via the Nuclear Resilience Coordination Committee.

The local concept of operations is based upon the establishment of an RMU. The preferred location is at Brackenbury Leisure Centre. The RMU will utilise enabling capabilities provided by responder agencies on a *'best endeavours'* basis. The approach seeks to create an initial operating capability, with the most important features of an RMU, from 6 hours of the decision to establish radiation monitoring. Full operating capability is established within 24 hours and is sufficient to process up to 1000 people per day, with the flexibility of further extendibility in the case of a larger-scale incident.

The RMU is not established to monitor workers associated with the response to the emergency, who should have separate arrangements, nor does this plan address monitoring of pets or livestock

2. Aim and Objectives

Provide an operational framework for the establishment of an RMU at Brackenbury Leisure Centre, Felixstowe in response to a radiological incident requiring monitoring of members of the public within Suffolk.

The objectives of the RMU in order of priority are:

- To identify those who are externally contaminated at a level which could result in significant health effects and who therefore require urgent decontamination
- To reassure those who are not so contaminated
- To identify those who are externally contaminated at lower levels but for whom decontamination is still justified
- To identify those who are internally contaminated at a level which could result in significant health effects and who require medical assessment

- To identify those who should be considered for treatment to reduce internal contamination levels (e.g. by the administration of Prussian Blue in the case of radio caesium contamination).
- To prioritise people for later measurements or assessments of internal contamination that cannot be carried out at the RMU
- To provide information to individuals on their internal radiation dose, with the aim of providing reassurance where appropriate
- To supply information on radiation dose received by members of the public for incident assessment purposes.

3. **Activation**

An RMU will be automatically generated following the declaration of an OSNE at Sizewell unless specifically paused by the SCG at its 1st meeting (Appendix B refers). At this 1st SCG meeting agencies will confirm the availability of RMU location and resources using this appendix.

4. **Military Aid**

The SCG will confirm what additional military aid capabilities may be sought in conjunction with the JRLO at the 1st SCG meeting. These will be focused on providing initial enabling capability while civil arrangements are generated and deployed. This will be on a best endeavours basis as no MoD resources are held at readiness for this task. These requirements will form part of any MACA request.

5. **Location**

The RMU is planned be located at Brackenbury Leisure Centre - See map and diagrams below.

6. **Facilities**

Brackenbury Leisure Centre, Felixstowe is a well-found location with electricity, heating, lighting, water and ablutions. Responders providing the RMU facility should expect to be self-sufficient for food up to 24hrs.

7. **Key Capabilities**

Enabling capabilities provided by agencies at '*best endeavours*'.

Location

Suffolk Constabulary:

- Prevent any public order incidents at the RMU.

Suffolk County Council:

- Provide signage from the A14/A145 roundabout, via Beatrice Avenue and High Road East.

RMU Management

- UK HSA RCCE Directorate:
 - Provide a manager to oversee radiation monitoring operations at the RMU.
- East Suffolk Council:
 - Provide initial reception and liaison to allow agencies to deploy into the area identified.
 - Provide logistics support on a best endeavours basis.

- Suffolk LAs:
 - Support reception and logistics capability using existing LA emergency volunteer staff and augment with contract staff as needed.

Radiation Protection

- UK HSA will provide a manager to provide oversight of radiation protection arrangements.

Radiation Monitoring

- UK HSA /EDF Energy/NHSE (inc. HART/SORT):
 - Deploy radiation monitoring capabilities to site (trained people, mobile structures, clinical support and radiation monitoring equipment).

Decontamination

- Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service:
 - Arrange for the deployment of national Fire resilience assets to provide decontamination capability at the RMU.
 - In conjunction with EEAST HART, ensure appropriate measures are in place to control and contain contamination, particularly any run-off from wet decontamination.

Contamination Control

- UK HSA:
 - Provide advice on Action Levels to be used by RMU Manager.
 - Provide advice on contamination control arrangements to be used at the RMU to preserve a 'clean area' where deployed staff are not classed as emergency workers and a 'dirty area' where deployed staff are classed as emergency workers.

Disposal of radioactive waste

- EA:
 - Provide advice on storage and disposal of radioactive and conventional waste that may be generated.
- Suffolk County Council:
 - Provide radioactive and conventional waste collection and disposal service as advised by the EA and UK HSA.

Logistics Support

- Suffolk LAs:
 - Support in providing longer term RMU logistics support using existing LA emergency volunteer staff and augment with contract staff as needed.


Public Communications

- SCG Media Communications Cell:
 - Provide public messaging to support use of the RMU on advice from UK HSA and Suffolk DPH.


RMU LOCATION



RMU LOCATION



RMU layout



DISTRIBUTION

Organisation
National
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero - Nuclear Emergency Planning
Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government RED Advisor
Ministry of Defence (MoD) - Joint Regional Liaison Officer
Maritime & Coastguard Agency
Food Standards Agency
Environment Agency – Nuclear Regulation Group (South) and Incident Management Business Partner
Office for Nuclear Regulation – EP&R
Met Office
Civil Nuclear Constabulary – Contingency Planning Department
UK Health Security Agency (UK HSA) - Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Directorate
Magnox Ltd: - Sizewell A - EHSS&Q Manager
EDF Energy Nuclear Generation: - Head of Emergency Preparedness Emergency Planning Group, - Sizewell B - T&SS Manager
Essex & Suffolk Water
Anglian Water
National Grid – for Sizewell off-site Substation
UKPN
Network Rail
Renewable Energy Systems (RES) Ltd – for Galloper Substation (Redacted Version)
SSE Ltd & EDS Ltd - for Greater Gabbard Substation (Redacted Version)
Regional
NHS England and NHS Improvements – East of England (Head of Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response)
UK HSA – East of England
East of England Ambulance Service – Resilience Manager (Suffolk)
Local
Suffolk Constabulary - Contingency Planning Manager
Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service - Resilience Manager
Ipswich & East Suffolk Integrated Care Board - Emergency Planning Manager
East Suffolk and North Essex Foundation Trust - Associate Director of EPRR
Suffolk County Council - Director of Public Health - AD Integrated Services, CYP - AD Schools Organisation & Infrastructure - AD Highways & Transport - Head of Communications
Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils
Norfolk County Council – Emergency Planning
East Suffolk Council
Ipswich Borough Council
West Suffolk Council
Suffolk Resilience Website (Redacted Version)

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATION/TERM	DESCRIPTION
ACP	Access Control Point – on-site
ALARP	As low as reasonably possible
BTP	British Transport Police
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CCR	Contact and Control Room - Police
CESC	Central Emergency Support Centre - operator national response
CNC	Civil Nuclear Constabulary
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms - national response
CR	Consequences Report
RCE Dir.	Radiation, Chemicals and Environmental Hazards Directorate (UKHSA)
CTA	Company Technical Advisor
DCO	Development Consent Order
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DEPZ	Detailed Emergency Planning Zone – area set by Suffolk County Council where immediate emergency arrangements are in place to protect the public beyond the nuclear site boundary.
DESNZ	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero
‘deterministic effect’	are those which the severity of the effect varies with radiation dose and there is a threshold below which the effect does not occur.
DfT	Department for Transport
‘dose’	the amount of radiation energy imparted to the human body
DPH	Director of Public Health
MHCLG	Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government
EA	Environment Agency
ECC	Emergency Control Centre
EDF	EDF Energy Nuclear Generation
‘effective dose’	the sum of dose to whole body from external radiation and from internal radiation
EHA	Emergency Holding Area
EHO	Environmental Health Officer
‘emergency exposures’	a justified and formally authorised dis-application of dose limits under IRR99 for the purpose of allowing emergency response by pre-identified people to a radiation emergency under REPPiR for the purpose of lifesaving or plant intervention tasks
‘emergency worker’	Someone who might be exposed to radiation while acting in response to an emergency and has a defined role in an emergency plan.

EPDO	Emergency Planning Duty Officer – Suffolk local authorities
ERL	Emergency Reference Levels - used to plan which countermeasure actions would be most suitable in particular circumstances by means of an upper and lower level of avertable dose
ERC	Emergency Response Centre – Off site Sizewell B
FCP	Forward Command Post - Agreed location where emergency service Operational Commanders (BRONZE) will work from to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face to face. Other responders may work from this location to manage operational support provided to the emergency services.
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRSNCC	Fire & Rescue Service National Coordination Centre
FSA	Food Standards Agency
CDG 19	Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Amendment) Regulations (CDG) 2019
GLO	Government Liaison Officer
GLT	Government Liaison Team
Gray (Gy)	unit of dose - most applicable when exposure is likely to lead to deterministic effects (i.e. emergency exposures)
HO	Home Office
HSE	Health & Safety Executive
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Authority
iaw	in accordance with
ICB	Integrated Care Board (previously Clinical Commissioning Group)
IMG	Impact Management Group - part of COBR
IRR 17	Ionising Radiations Regulations
JAM	Joint Agency Modelling
JDRA	Joint Dynamic Risk Assessment
JEPU	Joint Emergency Planning Unit - Local Authorities
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer
LAESI	MoD Local Authority & Emergency Services Information
LGD	Lead Government Department
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authority
MCGA	Martine & Coastguard Agency (includes HM Coastguard)
'Major Incident'	Any emergency that requires implementation of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency services, the NHS or local authorities to: rescue or treat large numbers of casualties, that directly or indirectly involves large numbers of

	people, that is likely to generate a large number of enquiries by the public or media or which requires the mobilisation of additional emergency services or supporting services.
MCC	Media Communications Cell - part of StratCC (can also be referred to as Strategic Media Advice Cell - SMAC)
'member of the public'	any person not present on the site where the radiation emergency can occur or has occurred or not engaged in a response activity.
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
NACC	National Ambulance Coordination Centre
NCAF	National Coordination and Advisory Framework (Fire)
NCC	News Coordination Cell (part of COBR)
NHSE	NHS England
NNEP&R	National Nuclear Emergency Planning & Response
NPCC	National Police Chiefs Council
NPoCC	National Police Coordination Centre
NSRA	National Security Risk Assessment
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
OPZ	Outline Planning Zone – area set by REPPiR 19 Sch 5 where less urgent emergency arrangements are in place
OSNE	Off Site Nuclear Emergency
PIZ	Public Information Zone
PWR	Pressurised Water Reactor
'radiation accident'	an accident where immediate action would be needed to prevent or reduce exposure to ionising radiation
'radiation emergency'	a non-routine situation or event arising from work with ionising radiation that necessitates prompt action to mitigate the serious consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) of a hazard resulting from that situation or event; (b) of a perceived risk arising from such a hazard; or (c) to any one or more of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) human life; (ii) health and safety; (iii) quality of life; (iv) property; (v) the environment;
RCG	Recovery Coordinating Group - part of StratCC, takes over from SCG once response phase ends
RD	Resilience Direct
'reasonable worst case'	Designed to exclude theoretically possible scenarios which have so little probability of occurring that planning for them would be likely to lead to disproportionate use of resources (as defined in National Risk Assessment). This results in a challenging

	scenario after highly implausible scenarios are excluded (National Risk Register)
RED	Resilience & Recovery Directorate (part of MHCLG)
REPPIR	The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019
'REPPIR guidance'	HSE Approved Code of Practice and Guidance
ResCG	Response Coordinating Group
RIMNET	Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
RMU	Radiation Monitoring Unit
RVP	Rendezvous Point
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies - part of COBR
SCG	Strategic Coordinating Group - part of StratCC. This where individual agency Strategic Commanders work together.
SRF	Suffolk Resilience Forum – statutory civil contingencies partnership comprising emergency services, local authorities, local health agencies, EA and MCA.
SFRS	Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service
stable iodine	Non-radioactive (stable) iodine can be used as a countermeasure to greatly reduce the uptake of radioactive iodine to the thyroid. It is usually provided in the form of potassium iodate (KIO ₃) or potassium iodide (KI) tablets
UK HSA	UK Health Security Agency
StratCC	Strategic Coordination Centre - local response
TCG	Tactical Coordinating Group - local response
TIIMS	The Incident Information Management System (EDF system)
UKPN	UK Power Networks

Explanation of terms from REPPIR Guidance

[Hyperlink to National Resilience Lexicon](#)

GENERAL REFERENCES

[The Radiation \(Emergency Preparedness and Public Information\) Regulations 2019 - Approved Code of Practice and Guidance](#) – Health and Safety Executive and Office for Nuclear Regulation dated 2019.

[Public Health Protection in Radiation Emergencies](#) – UK HSA dated May 2019

[Emergency Preparedness](#) –Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act - Cabinet Office.

[Emergency Response & Recovery](#) - Non-Statutory Guidance Accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 - Cabinet Office dated October 2013.

[Enhanced SAGE Guidance](#) - A strategic framework for the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) - Cabinet Office dated October 2012.

[Provision of Scientific and Technical Advice in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre: Guidance to Local Responders](#) – Cabinet Office dated April 2007.

[International Atomic Energy Authority Safety Guide No. GS-G-2.1](#) - Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency dated 2007.

[National Nuclear Emergency Planning & Response Guidance](#) - Department for Energy and Climate Change dated October 2015.

[Responding to Emergencies - The UK Central Government Response - Concept of Operations](#) - Cabinet Office dated April 2013.

[The Lead Government Department and its role – Guidance and Best Practice](#) - Cabinet Office dated March 2004.

[Strategic National Guidance: The decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and open environment exposed to CBRN materials](#) – UK Government Decontamination Service dated March 2017.

Nuclear Accidents and the Farmer: Livestock and Crop Management – DEFRA dated November 2017.

[UK recovery handbooks for radiation incidents](#) PHE-CRCE-018 dated June 2015

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY ARRANGEMENTS - ANNEXES


Annex 1

EDF Sizewell B Relocated Facilities Project

EDF SIZEWELL B – RELOCATED FACILITIES PROJECT - TEMPORARY EMERGENCY PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS

1. Background. EDF is relocating a number of existing facilities, ancillary to the operation of the Sizewell B Power Station ('Sizewell B facilities'). The Sizewell B facilities are currently located on the proposed Sizewell C site and will be relocated to new sites within and adjacent to the Sizewell B power station. This will involve the construction of consolidated replacement facilities at Sizewell B followed by demolition of the existing facilities (referred to as the 'Proposed Development') to release land for Sizewell C. The project will take place until March 2025.

The proposed development area is outlined on the plan below in red. Purple buildings are those designated to be demolished and yellow areas are where the new facilities will be built.



2. Operators. The workforce completing the relocation works will be managed by EDF.
3. Emergency Contact. Any emergency contact regarding these works should be made using existing Sizewell B contact points:

The sub paragraphs are removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs and FOI Section 41—information provided in confidence

4. On Site Construction -. The construction workforce for the relocated facilities will be captured by the existing on-site EDF emergency arrangements for the Sizewell B site. All works take place on EDF owned land and the majority of the works will take place within the existing Sizewell B Nuclear Site Licence boundary. Only the development of the new outage carpark in the Pillbox Field to the south of the site will take place outside of the nuclear site licence boundary.

4.1 **People**. During peak construction activity (2022 – 12 months) there will be up to 80 people on site.

4.2 **Vehicles**. HGV numbers peak (2022 – 12 months) at 2,000/month. This equates to 460/week or 92/day.

4.3 **Site Warning Sirens**. Personnel will be warned of any radiation emergency by the existing on-site warning sirens and Public Address System which are the same for all site staff. All construction staff will receive induction training which includes procedures to follow in the event of an emergency. This training will be identical to that received by any other station staff.

5. Construction Site Radiation Emergency Protection Measures. The construction sites are located within the Sizewell DEPZ, adjacent to the Sizewell B Power Station. As such the construction site staff are considered identifiable people under REPPiR and need to be accommodated within existing nuclear emergency arrangements. It has been agreed that the construction staff will be accounted for within the Sizewell B on-site emergency arrangements whether they are working within or outside of the nuclear site licence boundary.

The arrangements are as follows:

5.1. **Prior Information**. EDF will provide REPPiR prior information provided by Suffolk County Council to all construction site staff. This will be in line with the arrangements for existing staff. All construction staff will receive direction as to actions to take during a site emergency as part of their induction process. This will be same information given to any site personnel.

5.2. **Alerting.** Construction staff will be alerted to an emergency situation using the existing site emergency notification sirens and will react according to the situation.

5.3 **Shelter and Muster.** On hearing the site alarm, all construction staff will take shelter in provided buildings and a muster taken to account for personnel. Further instructions appropriate to the situation will then be provided to the Senior Person at each muster point.

5.4. **Pre-Issued Stable Iodine.** EDF has issued stable iodine to construction sites for use as an immediate countermeasure in the event of a declared OSNE. Sufficient stocks will be held at each muster point and these will be reviewed as the construction moves through its various phases.

5.5. **Protective Actions.** Construction staff will take the following action on notification of an OSNE:

- All construction site staff to muster and take shelter in pre-identified site buildings and take one dose (2 tablets) of stable iodine as an immediate protection action.
- Senior person at each muster location to establish contact with muster controller.
- Halt all construction works and associated delivery activities until the nature of the incident is confirmed.
- Be prepared to take further action on receipt of direction from the muster controller. This may include relocating to another area or building.

5.6. **Information and advice.** Information will be passed to the Senior Person at each muster point from the Emergency Control Centre or Main Control Room via a Muster Controller.

- The site Emergency Control Centre will advise on appropriate protection measures based on the on-site situation.

5.7 **Evacuation.** Construction workforce personnel will be evacuated from site in line with on-site emergency arrangements as soon as practicable and safe. Where this is done prior to the presence of any radiation hazard, the workforce will be dispersed from site. Where there is the risk of potential contamination, the workforce will be released under site control to a location designated by the emergency services or SCG, if functioning, to allow monitoring and decontamination to take place.

6. Review of Temporary Arrangements. Suffolk County Council, as the agency responsible for providing protection measures outside of the site boundary in the event of a nuclear emergency, and EDF, as the organisation responsible for emergency preparedness arrangements at the construction sites, will review this Appendix if:

- There is a change to the wider Sizewell off-site emergency arrangements that affects the site.
- There is a change in use of the site, number of people and vehicles, that might affect the ability to implement the Sizewell off-site emergency arrangements or implement any site emergency plan.